Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Basic Concepts | Schiffer | I 10 Basic concept/Schiffer: a theory cannot have an infinite number of basic concepts. - E.g. therefore "Kripke refers to Kripke" cannot be a primitive, naked fact. >Naked facts, >Bare facts, >Definitions, >Meaning theory, >Theories. I 216 Basic concept/Schiffer: for a basic concept there must be an axiom and a set of conditions. >Axioms, >Rules. Problem: therefore, "believes" cannot be a basic concept, because there are infinitely many conditional clauses or axioms needed. >Propositional attitudes/Schiffer. "Thinks" is not a basic concept, yet semantically simple, but does not fulfill certain conditions and denotes nothing. >Denotation, >Thinking. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Dispositions | Esfeld | I 289 Bare dispositions/Esfeld: bare dispositions have no non-dispositional basis. >Bare particulars, >Bare facts, >Foundation, >Actions. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Ethics | Nozick | II 17 Ethics/Nozick: there is no argument, which Hitler had to bow to. - This means that we cannot regard ethics as absolute, but: E.g. Heimson: does not bring our belief system about personal identity in the same way at risk. >Heimson case/Perry. We have more of a "How's that possible?" Question about ethics than about personal identity. >Identity, >Personal identity, >Temporal identity, >Identification, >Individuation, >Individual, >Person. II 118 Categorical imperative/Kant/Nozick: when the content could be extracted from the form, it would not be a "hard fact" (brute fact) anymore. - It would arise necessarily from the form. >Bare fact, >Categorical imperative, >Ethics/Kant, >Morality/Kant. II 570 Ethics/Nozick: how important is it, anyway? - As long as the meaning of our lives is not shown, ethics and values appear to be meaningless. >Life. II 631 Ethics/moral/reduction/Reductionism/Nozick: VsReductionism: infringes the principle that everything has a value in itself. NozickVsVs: this is not only theoretically wrong but also morally wrong. >Reductionism, >Reduction, >Values. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Existence | Prior | I 116f Existence/Thomas Reid: Existence is not possible without attributes (e.g. a general triangle does not exist) but term and definition without attributes. >Concepts, >Definition, >Definability, >Predication, cf. >Bare Fact. Ihinking is not only thinking of the concept, but always of the attributes. >Concepts, >Attributes, >Thinking, >Thoughts, >Statements, >Propositions, >Sentences. Thomas Reid: (similar to Frege), "a triangle" (or "a horse ") is not an object but a concept. >Th. Reid, >Concepts/Frege. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Explanation | Nozick | II 10 Explanation/Nozick: not based on arguments - and not on evidence - because an evidence provides no understanding. >Understanding, >Argumentation, >Proofs, >Provability, >Evidence. Hypotheses that are needed in an explanation must not be known to be true. >Hypotheses, >Knowledge. II 12 Explanation/Nozick: locates something in the topicality. >Actuality. Understanding: localizes something in the space of possibilities. >Possibility, >Truth conditions, cf. >Understanding/Dummett. II 115 Existence/explanation/Leibniz/Nozick: each factor that should explain why there is anything at all, will be part itself of what needs to be explained. cf. >Existence/Leibniz. Explanation: always happens in terms of something else - one cannot explain everything, but nothing is inexplicable in principle. >Concepts, >Description levels, >Levels/order. II 116 Explanation/Nozick: is irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive: - irreflexive: nothing explains itself. Asymmetrical: if X explains Y then Y does not explain X (not reversible). II 117 Transitive: if X explains Y and Y explains Z, then X explains Z. - With that a strict partial order is established. >Partial order. II 118f Explanation/existence/Nozick: another possibility: explanation from laws or theories. >Laws, >Theories. Question: why is there then such theories and laws. Ultimate justification/self-explanation: could one last law subsume itself? >Ultimate justification. Last law: must have any characteristic C - all other laws. Problem: truth is not proven from form. >Truth, >Proofs, >Provability. II 120 Explanation/level/stage/Nozick: some authors: the statement must be deeper than the explained. KripkeVs: new theory: statements themselves seek the appropriate level - the highest level/stage/Kripke: those to which the sentence to its reference is applied to. >Truth/Kripke, >S.A. Kripke, >Fixped points/Kripke. Nozick: then P has to be, when used in a deduction, one level lower than its instance - then a deduced statement is lower when it subsumes something than when it is subsumed. >Deduction. II 120 Self-explanation/Nozick: self subsumption explains itself in the quantifier logic - Otherwise:. explanation is irreflexive - that means, it cannot explain itself. Bare facts/Nozick: a) something that cannot be explained by something else b) weaker: something that cannot be explained by something else. Then the explanatory self subsumption is a bare fact that explains itself. >Bare facts. II 305 Explanation/Nozick: one says, an explanation should not have less (for example, semantic) depth than the explained. >Semantics, >Semantic facts. II 308 Causation/Descartes: cannot be less deep than the effect (principle). >Cause, >Effect, >Description levels, >Levels/order, >Principles. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Facts | Simons | I 317 Mere fact/Simons: e.g. that something happens to be a part of something else is a mere fact. >Bare facts, >Mere facts, >Coincidence. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Facts | Vendler | Z. Vendler, Die Linguistik und das a priori in: Grewendorf/Meggle Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt 1974/1995 I 252 Naked fact/bare fact/Vendler: e.g. in chess: move a piece of ivory across the board. There are no bare facts of language here. - You can not step out of the language. >Exterior/interior, >Language, >Levels/order, >Description levels, >Metalanguage. |
Vendler II Z. Vendler Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967 Vendler I Zeno Vendler "Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Mind Body Problem | Putnam | IV 146ff Mind Body Problem/Leib-Seele-Problem/Putnam: you can no longer see the mind body problem as a real theoretical problem. A "solution" would not throw the least light on the world. The identity of logical and structural states of machines is also not important at all - even if everything is accurate, it would only be a discovery about the language. IV 147 Mind Body Problem: it is the question whether or not mental events can be identified with physical events in connection with it. >Identity theory, >Type/Token identity, >Type/Token, >Token-physicalism. Question: can a logical analogue be constructed? Carnap: partially interpreted calculation: machine: state A, when flip-flop circuit 36 is on. Theoretical Language: for the machine: "flip-flop circuit 36 is on." Observation Language: for the machine: "I am in state A". Here, the theoretical language is partially interpreted by the observation language. >Observation language, >Interpretation, cf. >Theoretical term. IV 148 Putnam: thesis: all considerations for or against the identification of body and mind can be parallelized with considerations for or against the finding that state A is actually identical to the flip-flop circuit 36 being on. State A : is directly observable. Flip-flop circuit: the flip-flop circuit can only be determined indirectly via highly complicated conclusions. (1) "synthetic" statement: "I am in state A exactly when the flip-flop circuit is 36 on". (2) also synthetic: "I have pain exactly when my C fibers are irritated." IV 148/149 A synthetic statement cannot have an identity, otherwise it would be analytical. >Analyticity/syntheticity. This traditional argumentation for dualism does not use "bare facts of direct experience" at all, but is a complicated train of thought that includes: a) an objectification of universals (properties, states, events) and b) a sharp analytical/synthetic distinction. >Dualism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Platonism | Field | I 8 Platonism/Field: his only argument is the applicability of mathematics. >Mathematics/Field, >Mathematical entities. I 14 FieldVsPlatonism: Platonism has to answer the fictionalist in his language - it cannot rely on it's "initial plausibility". I 152 Def Priority Thesis/PT/Crispin Wright: Thesis: the priority of the syntactic over the ontological categories. Platonism/Wright: that allows Frege to be a Platonist. >Numbers/Frege, >Gottlob Frege. Def Gödelian Platonism/Crispin Wright: in addition: the thesis that mathematical knowledge must be explained by a quasi-perceptual relation. FregeVsGödel. WrightVsGödel: we do not need that. I 153 Def weak Priority Thesis/PT: that each syntactic singular term also works automatically in a semantical way as a singular term. l 159 Equivalence/Platonism/Nominalism/Field: Question: In which sense is a Platonist statement (e.g. "direction 1 = direction 2") and a nominalistic statement equivalent (c1 is parallel to c2)? Problem: if there are no directions, the second cannot be a sequence of the first. >Nominalism. I 186 Def Moderate Platonism/mP/Field: the thesis that there are abstract objects like numbers. - Then there are probably also relations between numbers and objects. - Moderate Platonism: these relations are conventions, derived from physical relations. Def Heavy Duty Platonism/HDP/Field: takes relations between objects and numbers as a bare fact. l 189 Strong moderation condition/(Field (pro): it is possible to formulate physical laws without relation between objects and numbers. I 192 Heavy Duty Platonism/Field: assumes size relationships between objects and numbers. FieldVs: instead only between objects. --- II 332 Platonism/Mathematics/VsStructuralism/Field: isomorphic mathematical fields do not need to be indistinguishable. >Field theory. II 334 Quinish Platonism/Field: as a basic concept a certain concept of quantity, from which all other mathematical objects are constructed. So natural numbers and real numbers would actually be sets. III 31 Number/Points/Field: no Platonist will identify real numbers with points on a physical line. - That would be too arbitrary ( "What line?") - What should be zero point - What should be 1? III 90 Platonistic/Field: are terms such as e.g. gradient, Laplace Equation, etc. III 96 1st order Platonism/Field: accepts abstract entities, but no 2nd order logic - Problem: but he needs these (because of the power quantifiers). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Qualities | Field | IV 409 Primary qualities/Locke: E.g. length, size, shape - secondary: e.g. color. Secondary quality/Locke: do not resemble our ideas directly. Putnam thesis: Kant has that what Locke said about secondary qualities extended to primary qualities. Field: many say that today because the imaging theory is dead. FieldVsPicture theory. >Picture theory. Locke: color is a force to affect us. Putnam: this also applies to size, charge, mass,...etc. Putnam: Putnam even extends this to properties of sensations. - But this force is not a noumenon, but the world itself (= Vs correspondence theory - ((s): Forces instead of objects). >Noumenon, >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory. Problem/Field: if electrons do not exist as noumena, they do not exist at all. IV 410 Qualities/Locke: secondary qualities are founded in primary: the objects have the power to affect us by the length, size, mass, etc. of the corpuscles - otherwise there are bare facts. "Things for us"/Putnam/Field: according to the limits of scientific research. IV 412 I.e. shape, etc. are only dispositions; we will never represent the last properties, to appear so and so. - We will never represent the last properties. FieldVsPutnam: that can never be proven. >Representation, >Properties. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Terminology | Field | I 18 Explanation/Field: a) Def intrinsic explanation/Field: does not contain causally irrelevant entities (namely: mathematical entities) b) Def extrinsic explanation/Field: also contains causally irrelevant entities. For example, the attribution of finite sentences for the behavior of animals. II 159 Linguistic view/Field: assumes no meanings as mind-independent entities, but assigns words of a speaker to words of an interpreter. - The relations are based on different characteristics. - I.e. to inferences that contain this word - that's what I call "meaning-characteristic". - E.g. II 226 Definiteness/determined/definition/definite/vagueness/precision/(s)"definite"/Field: we cannot define "definitively true" ("determined", "determinately") by truth - we must conceive it as a reinforcement. Solution : Operator: "Definiteness-Operator"/dft-operator: this one is independent of truth-theoretical terms - but there is no physical information which decides. II 201 Signification/Terminology/Field: here: Relations are signed - objects are denoted. - predicates signify their extension. II 211 Def Basis/Field: here: E.g. the basis for predicates whose extension depends on other predicates: - E.g. "rabbit", "dinosaur": depend on the basis: predicate "identical". - The functional dependency of the other predicates from the basic predicate "identical" allows the partial extensions of the predicate to be correlated with the partial extension of the others. Def dependent: is a predicate, if it has a basis. - Now we can define relevance. Def Relevance/Structure/Language/Gavagai/Field: a structure partially agrees with the semantics of O, iff a) each independent term t of L denoted or signified partially m(t) b) each dependent term t of L denoted or signified m(t) with b(t) relative to the correlation of m(b(t)). ((s) in b) not partial). Still unsolved: how do we know which terms have a basis and which that is? - Problem: the words should also have a physical sense. II 287 Def "weak true"/truew/Field: "It is true that p" as equivalent to "p". Def "strongly true"/trues/Field: "It is true that p" as equivalent to "There is a certain fact that p". Det-Operator/D/Field: "It is a certain fact that". - This cannot be explained with "true". III 12 Def Principle C/Conservativity/Field: Let A be a nominalistic formulated claim. N: a corpus of such nominalistic assertions. - S a mathematical theory. A* is then not a consequence of N* + S if A is not itself a consequence of N* alone. ((s) "A* only if A", that is, if A * is not determined yet, that any nominalistic formulation is sufficient). III 60 Nominalization/Field: ... this suggests that laws about T (i.e., T obeying a particular differential equation) can be reformulated as laws over the relation between f and y. That is, ultimately the predicates Scal-Cong, St-Bet, Simul, S-Cong and perhaps Scal-Less. II 230 Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. Then it is a borderline case without definition-operator (dft-operator): "Jones is bald in some, but not in all extensions". I 152 Def Priority Thesis/PT/Crispin Wright: Thesis: the priority of the syntactic over the ontological categories. Platonism/Wright: that allows Frege to be a Platonist. I 153 Def weak Priority Thesis/PT: that each syntactic singular term also works automatically in a semantical way as a singular term. I 186 Def Moderate Platonism/mP/Field: the thesis that there are abstract objects like numbers. - Then there are probably also relations between numbers and objects. - Moderate Platonism: these relations are conventions, derived from physical relations. Def Heavy Duty Platonism/HDP/Field: takes relations between objects and numbers as a bare fact. l 189 Strong moderation condition/(Field (pro): it is possible to formulate physical laws without relation between objects and numbers. I 192 Heavy Duty Platonism/Field: assumes size relationships between objects and numbers. - FieldVs: instead only between objects. III 96 1st order Platonism/Field: accepts abstract entities, but no 2nd order logic. Problem: anyway he needs these (because of the power quantifiers). II 228 Def Weakly true/vagueness/truth/truth-predicate/Field: to be able to say general things about borderline cases. Not only that somebody represents a certain limiting case. Not weakly true/deflationism: e.g. "Either bald or not-bald is true". Then the Truth-predicate itself inherits the vagueness. It is not definitely true whether or not. Def Strongly true/Field: assuming, Jones is a limiting case: then neither "bald" nor its negation (strongly) plus classical logic: then the disjunction "bald or not bald" should be true even in strong interpretation. Law of the excluded middle: if we give it up: a) weakly true: then the disjunction is not true b) strongly true: then the disjunction is without truth value. Strongly true: is less vague, does not inherit the vagueness. II 230 Def strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension. - Then the limiting case without definite-operator: "Jones is bald in some extensions but not in all". |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Theories | Nozick | II 121 Inegalitarian Theory/Nozick: an inegalitarian theory assumes that a state is privileged as a "natural". This needs no explanation and also does not allow one. - Other situations are then differences that need to be explained. E.g. For Newton rest or uniformity of movement was the natural state. For Aristotle: rest. - inegalitarian theory does not answer, 1. Why this state is the natural. 2. Why exactly these forces are making a difference. To accept something as a natural state is also to ascribe a specific content to him. II 122 R. Harris: the thesis that something remains the same, does not need to be explained. >Regularity, >Explanations, >Constancy. NozickVs: but we have to explain why a thing for the purposes of this principle counts as the same and not in other contexts. Existence: the question concerning it, is typical inegalitary. Punchline: here we presuppose the nothing as their natural state. Cf. >Existence/Leibniz. II 126 1. We do not know what the natural state is. 2. We do not know whether there is a fundamental natural state at all. That means whether the correct fundamental theory is inegalitary. Each inegalitarian theory leaves a bare fact as inexplicable back, a "natural state". II 127 Egalitarian Theory/Nozick: needs to see much more possible states as in need of explanation. - But it asks no longer the question "Why X instead of Y?" - But always "Why X?". II 127 Egalitarian Theory/existence/nothing/Nozick: "principle of indifference" (from probability theory). - For them, there are many ways, how things could be, but only one possibility how nothing exists. - Punchline: then is the chance that something exists much greater than that nothing exists. Vs: one has to make an appropriate division into states that are to be treated as equally likely. - Many ways how things exists can be summarized as one. Extreme case: only two ways: something exists or does not exist. II 128 Under the worst assumption if we assume a division, there is a 50%-chance that something exists. - Because all other divisions have to be at least three partitions then, the chance that something exists rises for the next alternative already to two-thirds. - At the end almost 1. - Problem: the probability theory is still assuming the non-existence as the natural state - because it assumes that if something exists, then randomly - The natural state of a way is the non-realization. Solution:> richness. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Ultimate Justification | Nozick | II 131 ff Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Leibniz/existence/Nozick: 1. Inegalitarian Theory: Distinction of something before the nothing 2. Egalitarian Theory: (Probability Theory): Nothing is equal: when multiple options are accepted, then nothing is very unlikely because only one of many possibilities can consist. Richness: all possibilities are realized. Cf. >Possible Worlds/Leibniz, >Possible Worlds. Requirement: possible worlds are separated, otherwise contradictions - realm of possibilities includes possible worlds. >Possibility, cf. >Real world. In addition: principle of invariance: otherwise there are possible worlds that exclude possibilities: Restricted richness/self-subsumption: validity due to application, reference and supply by itself. Then existence is not a hard fact and not arbitrary (due to invariance). >Invariance, >Bare Facts, >Existence/Nozick. II 137 Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: Problem: the various limited types of richness all apply because of their limitation and because of their validity and because of their special invariance principle. - This is just the characteristic of reflexivity. >Reflexivity, >Description levels, >Levels/order. II 138 Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: it is no shame that circularity occurs at the end if it is only avoided in the middle. - It should not be an addition ("and that are all"). >Circular reasoning, >Lists. Principle of sufficient reason: every truth has an explanation. >Sufficient reason. II 278 Self-subsumption/self-affirmation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: self-subsumption is a sign of a fundamentality, not for truth. - Something can be fundamental in one dimension, without being fundamental in another. >Wholes, >Totality. A fundamental principle needs not to be "non-circular". - In different realms different relations, orders and connections apply. - E.g. justification, explanation, evidence. >Justification, >Explanation, >Evidence. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Counterfactual Conditional | Field Vs Counterfactual Conditional | I 220 Problem of Quantities/PoQ/Modality/Field: but this does not exclude a possible modal solution to the PoQ: perhaps other operators can help? Anyway, I do not know how that could be excluded, even if I do not know what these operators should look like. I 221 Counterfactual Conditional/Co.Co./PoQ/Field: one suggestion is to use Counterfactual Conditional to solve the PoQ: FieldVsCounterfactual Conditional: 1) they are known to be extremely vague. Therefore, you should not rely on them when formulating a physical theory. Neither should we use Counterfactual Conditional for the development of geometrical concepts. 2) DummettVsCounterfactual conditionals: They cannot be "barely true": if a Counterfactual Conditional is supposed to be true, then there must be some facts (known or unknown facts) that can be determined without Counterfactual Conditional, and by virtue of which the Counterfactual Conditional are true. (Dummett, 1976, p.89). Then the relationism cannot use the Counterfactual Conditional for the PoQ, because in that case the principle requires: if distance relations are counterfactually defined, then situations that differ in their distance relations (like situations A and B) must also differ in non-counterfactual respects!. Substantivalism: can guarantee that. Relationism: cannot, and if it could, it would need no Counterfactual Conditional. 3) VsCounterfactual conditionals: does not work for very similar reasons for which the version with impredicative properties (P3) did not work: no theory about counterfactually defined relations works if these relations cannot also be counterfactually defined, (This is the formal reason for the metaphysical argument of Dummett, for why Counterfactual Conditional cannot be "barely true"). E.g. In order to prove the incompatibility of "double distance" and "triple distance" (given that z and w do not occupy the same point, i.e. given that zw is not congruent with zz - (logical form: local equality) - then you would need the incompatibility of the following: a) if there were a point u in the middle between x and y, then uy would be congruent with zw. b) if there were a point s between x and y, and a point t between s and y, so that xs, st and ty were all congruent, then ty would be congruent with zw. If these Counterfactual Conditional were somehow derivable from non-counterfactual statements, E.g. statements about spacetime points (ST points), then you could probably, and by way of derivation. I 222 Together with the demonstrable relations between the non-counterfactual statements win an argument for the incompatibility of (a) and (b). But if we have no non-counterfactual support, we would have to consider them as bare facts. That would not be so bad if you only needed a small amount of them, but we would need a very large number of them. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Platonism | Field, Hartry | I 44 To succeed in VsPlatonism, we must also show, thesis: that mathematics is dispensable in science and metalogic. Then we have reason not to literally have to believe in mathematics. (>Indispensability argument). I 45 If that succeeds, we can get behind the agnosticism. I 186 Def moderate platonism/mP/Field: the thesis that there are abstract objects like numbers. Then one probably also believes that there are relations of physical size between objects and numbers. (But only derived): Example "mass in kilogram" is then relation between a given physical object and the real number 15,2. Example "distance in meters" is a relation between two objects ((s) on one side) and the real number 7,4. The difference to high-performance platonism (HPP) lies in the attitude to these relations: Moderate Platonism: Thesis: These are conventional relations derived from more fundamental relations existing between physical objects alone. Def High Performance Platonism/Field: denies that and takes the relations between objects and numbers as a bare fact that cannot be explained in other terms. Inflated one could explain this as "platonistic participation". II 332 Standard Platonism: Thesis: Mathematical theories such as set theory or the theory of real numbers are about different mathematical domains, or at least about certain structures, because there is no need to assume that isomorphic domains (i.e. domains with the same structure) would be mathematically indistinguishable. Thus, "regions" should not be assumed as sets. II 333 Def "Platonism of perfection": (plenitude): postulates a set of mathematical objects. Thesis: Whenever we have a consistent purely mathematical theory, there are mathematical objects that fulfill the theory under a standard-fulfillment relation. Platonism of perfection: but also suggests that we can consider all quantifiers about mathematical entities in this way, I 334 that they are implicitly limited by a predicate to which all other predicates of mathematical entities are subordinated: The "overarching" predicate: is then different between the different mathematical theories. These theories then no longer conflict. II 335 Universe/Standard Platonism/Field: (Thesis: "Only one universe exists"). Problem/PutnamVsPlatonism: how do we even manage to pick out the "full" (comprehensive) universe and confront it with a sub-universe, and accordingly the standard element relationship as opposed to a non-standard element relationship? (Putnam 1980). (Here placed from the perspective of "Universe"). Putnam: Thesis: We simply cannot do that. |
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