Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 37 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actuality | Stalnaker | I 28 Actuality/Stalnaker: actuality is a relation that a world has to itself and only to itself. Problem: any other world can also have it to itself. That means actuality is contingent. >Contingency, >Self-identity. LewisVsErsatz World: (moderate modal realism): an ersatz world represents the real world as a special one because it represents it as a "way". >ersatz world. StalnakerVsLewis: but it represents it specifically only from its own point of view, not from any. Stalnaker: there is no neutral position outside of each possible world but there is an objective one: the one from the real world. >Actual world, >Perspective. I 31 The thesis that only the real world is actual only makes sense when "actual" means something different than the totality of all that, that is there. >Totality, >Wholes. StalnakerVs: and it does not mean that. I 31 Way a world can be: is an abstract object, abstracted from the activity of the rationally acting. Cf. >Centered worlds. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Attribution | Chisholm | I 15/16 Chisholm: Direct Attribution/Direct Ascription: self-ascription, only security, basis of any reference - indirect attribution: to someone or something else. >Self-ascription. I 50 Chisholm: direct attribution: instead of self-attribution (exception E.g. Mach) - P1 self-identity from direct attribution - P2 what is being attributed is a property - D1 Meaning: direct attribution - indirect attribution: to someone else, derived from direct attribution. - basic concept: the property of being-F so that x attributes it directly to y - ((s) from this should follow: x = y). >Self-identification. I 51 Any kind of reference can be understood with the help of self-ascription - 1) The meaning person must be able to turn themselves into an object, 2) He must understand propositions and facts - direct attribution (self-attribution) original form of all attributions. >Reference. I 133 But not yet self-awareness: this also requires the knowledge that it is the subject itself to which the properties are attributed. >Awareness, >Self-consciousness. I 53 Indirect Attribution/Chisholm: about identifying relations: there is a certain Rel R which is so that you are the thing to which I stand in R - (irreversible) - in that, I directly attribute a specific two-sided property to myself: that the thing to which I stand in R, is a thing that is F (E.g. wears a hat) - but this second part does not need to be right. Confusion/Forgery/Chisholm: attributes properties to one of which it is thought that they belong to the other. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Existence | Field | I 80 Necessary existence/KantVs/Field: nothing can be negated with all its predicates, and nevertheless leave a contradiction. - (VsOntological proof of God). >Proofs of God's existence. Existence/Field: should not be part of the logic. - Therefore, mathematics cannot be reduced to logic. - Otherwise, too many properties would have to be assumed. >Infinity, >Properties. I 155 Semantic/syntactic/singular Term/Denotation/Ontology/FieldVsWright: it is not built into the syntax that, e.g. The singular term "4" denotes. - (i.e. that the number is an object). Just as little as "God". - So syntax cannot be the criterion for existence. >Syntax, >Semantics, >Proofs, >Criteria, >Singular terms. I 167 Existence/Ontology/FieldVsWright: existence does not follow from "explanation of the term", otherwise God's existence would follow from the explanation of the term "God". >Explanations. Term explanation is only conditionally: "if there is a God, he is omnipotent". Cf. >Omnipotence. Solution: the term-introducing theory must not be true - existence generalization. >Introduction, >Existential generalization. False: from self-identity no existence can be concluded, only in the reverse direction. >Identity, >Self-identity. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Existence | Woods | II 248f Existence/Tradition/Woods: existence is no predicate. GeachVsTradition: that is only correct, as long as not conceived temporally - Tradition: as predicate would make any statement necessary. >Necessity, >Predication, >Existence predicate. DummettVsTradition: this is not true. Solution: higher-order predicate, but not like "rare". Dummett: this is no problem for truth conditions, if constructed as "PeS":"true of everything". >Truth conditions. II 250 But this does not have to be a primitive predicate. Problem: Self identity cannot change with time. >Identity, >Self-identity. II 254 Predicate/Existence/Woods: E. g. "there were dodos": Dodo: one-digit predicate that is only true of an object if it belongs to the extension of the predicate at that time - i. e. relative to the time of the utterance - with some predicates one associates the non-applicability with the passing away of the object, with others not. Always true during existence: e.g. "Human". Cf. >Presupposition. Sometimes true, but only if object exists: e.g."sleeps". Sometimes true, but even if object does not exist: e.g. famous. See also >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic. II 258 Existence/Time/Woods: other approach: Predicates should carry temporal relativization, not the quantifiers. >Quantifiers. Then indices and demonstratives are necessary. >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Indexicality. Indexical singular terms with the attribution function* should be treated in such a way that objects are linked with expressions by triplets from a sequence, a person and a time. "There were dodos": Dodo here two-digit predicate, true of object at a time when it is a dodo. - Here too the implication of past existence is carried by the meaning of "dodo". >Predicates, >Singular terms. II 259 Problem: future existence cannot be expressed if "F" is the only predicate - past and future are indistinguishable - solution: combining both approaches: a) Indexical sentence operators. b) To introduce time into predicates: so that one can say that it is now true that something is F in the future and that it will be true that something is F then. >Time, >Past, >Present, >Future. II 262 Existence/Woods: should not be treated as a "Type 1 predicate", i. e. only to be meaningfully applied if the object already exists, e. g. "human being" - solution: Existence predicate should be treated as the 2nd level quantification. >Quantification, >Second Order Logic. |
WoodsM II Michael Woods "Existence and Tense" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Existential Generalization | Field | I 166 Existential generalizationField: false: no existence of self-identity can be concluded only in reverse. >Existence, >Identity, >Self-identity. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Explanation | Anscombe | Frank I 95 I/Explanation/Anscombe: since "I" cannot be aligned to any pronoun, we might ask: "Why align it at all?" (Bishop Butler): "Every thing is what it is and not another thing!" AnscombeVs: then nothing is said with "Every word is what it is." >Self-identity, >Identity, >Predication, >Statements. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| He/ He himself | Perry | Frank I 432f "He*"/Perry: He* is not working without an antecedent: nonsense: E.g. "God knows that he* (Jones) is in the hospital." >Identification, >Indexicality, >Index words, >Levels/order, >Description levels. I 439f Extra-sense/Perry: possible solution: "s": variable that ranks above sense - E.g. Sheila thinks that an s exists so that s = Ego(Ivan) and Ivan believes that s is wanted on the telephone. Here Ivans extra sense i is not part of the proposition that Sheila believes but it is part of the proposition of which she believes that Ivan believes it. Extra-sense/PerryVsCastaneda: we do not need one. >H.-N. Castaneda, >Extra-sense/Castaneda. Frank I 441 "He*"/PerryVsCastaneda: He* does not seem to be so different from "he". "F-use", "he" as a placeholder of an aforementioned object (*). In attachment to an F-using it is limited* to the meaning area on special extra sense. Problem: that does not yet exclude believing in the evening star that it is the morning star (as long as X believes that evening star = evening star, a priori argument). >Identity, >Trivial identity, >Self-identity. Solution: E.g. "Albert wanted from Mary ... so he went over to her" must be "the woman on the corner" and not the one "he had seen last week". >Anaphora. Solution: it is not the "it/she" but the "that's why", which compels us to - "he*" not composed. - "*" Does not mean "itself". Frank I 446ff "He*"/Perry: not composed of "he" and "self": E.g. the dog Elwood bites himself/...bites Elwood. Difference: a) covered with wounds, b) broken teeth. Analog: a) believes of himself, to be rich b) thinks of Privatus that he is rich. Problem: e.g. the Dean was surprised to find out that he considered himself to be overpaid (according to other description). >Description, >Context, >Intension, >Extension. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Identity | Adorno | Grenz I 119 Identity/Adorno/Grenz: identical with itself is, what rests closed in itself, which is not changed by the formal categories of the for-us. >Other authors on self-identity, >Other authors on identity. Grenz I 125 Identity/Adorno/Grenz: the identity of the identical is dismayed. Critical is such a consternation, because of the fact of the becoming independent (of the thought), a difference in the identical itself is revealed. >Thinking, >Thinking/Adorno. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Identity | Armstrong | III 83 Identity/Self-identity/Armstrong: self-identity: is pseudo-property: it has no causal or nomic force. >Properties/Armstrong. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Identity | Bigelow | I 140 Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: we understand this here as a 2-digit predicate, we do not need to expand the language. I 141 Axioms: A19. (x)(x = x) A20. (a u ~a (σ/λ) > σ unequal λ) Everyday language translation: if something is true of something and not true of something, then these two things cannot be identical. I 141 Contingent Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: these two axioms have a surprising consequence: namely that all identity is necessary. Cf. >Identity/Kripke. There is then no contingent identity. Non-identity is then also necessary. So the following can be proved as theorems: NI. (x = y) > N(x = y) NNI. (x unequal y) > N(x unequal y) Semantic rule: then causes an identity statement to be true in all possible worlds or true in none. >Possible worlds, >Necessity, >Truth. Valuation rule/identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: V (=) (c, c) = W W: is the set of all possible worlds. Identity statements/Bigelow/Pargetter: are then either necessary or impossible. This is surprising and shows another illustration of the interplay between semantics and ontology. >Semantics, >Ontology. Ontology/Bigelow/Pargetter: is what is suggested to us by a streamlined and plausible semantics. Identity/Science/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the history of science there have often been discoveries that have shown us that things we thought were different are identical. Cf. >Natural kinds/Putnam, >Progress, >Science, >Knowledge. I 143 Now one should think that these are contingent identities. >Contingency. Contingent Identity/Semantics/Bigelow/Pargetter: if they like contingent identity, they would have to change the semantics. And that is not hard: Def Diversity/new: instead of saying that two things are different, if something is true of one but not true of the other, we could say that something non-modal is true of one, but not true of the other. That brings out some new systems. >Cf. >Leibniz principle, >Indistinguishability, >Distinctions. It is interesting to note that some of these systems verify NNI while they continue to falsify NI. For example, it is more difficult to allow New York and Miami to be one and the same city than to allow Miami to be two cities. Identity/BigelowVsContingent Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: we should let the semantics decide and say that there is simply no contingent identity. Contingent Identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: instead of changing the semantics and then to allow it nevertheless, we should rather explain why they seem to exist: e.g. Theory of descriptions/Russell/Bigelow/Pargetter: provides a means to reconcile contingently with necessary identities: assertions of the form the F = the G can be analyzed as contingent by saying that the properties F and G are co-instantiated by a single thing. This is still compatible with the necessary self-identity. >Theory of descriptions/Russell, >Descriptions. Bigelow/Pargetter: through descriptions most contingent identities are explained away. I 144 Introverted Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above Chapter 1) introverted realism, as can be seen here, can reinforce the extroverted realism from which it originated. >Realism/Bigelow, >Realism. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Identity | Boer | I 13 Identity/Boer: well-known individuals, characteristics and relations seem to have "identities" in the sense that there is something that makes them what they are. ((s) identity as a "set of (typical) properties"). Solution/Boer: then we could link actuality/existence with identity: principle (E!) A being is existing/actual iff an essential property is exemplified by him. Non-actual/non-existent: here there are two possibilities then: A) an essential property of N is not exemplified (e.g. fictional figures, "merely possible individuals" e.g. Superman). >Possibilism. Also Plantinga as an actualist pro) >Actualism. (B) N has no essential properties. For example, it is assumed that fictional characters are essentially fictional, that is, they could not be real. Then there might be at best an imitation of Superman. The fictional Superman is then a thing without individual essence. If one accepts this, one can still maintain the thesis that all things are necessarily self-identical. >Self-identity. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
| Identity | Field | II 114 Self-identity/Identity/Field: true identity is only self-identity. - It is not enough when the extensions of the other predicates (other than "is identical to") are up for grabs. Less than true identity: E.g. congruence: is an equivalence relation for which substitutivity applies. >Schmidentity, >Identity/Kripke. Identity/Quine: it is not easy to say which facts about us make it, that "is identical to" and "rabbit" stands for rabbits - and not "belong together" or "are of the same". >Identity/Quine. And by analogy for temporary stages. Inflationism: can in turn accept facts. - (FieldVsinflationism). >Inflationism, >Facts, >Nonfactualism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Identity | Geach | I 218 Identity/GeachVsFrege: identity is not a relation - "Is an A" does not mean "has identity with A" - (whereby "A" is a name). VsFrege: (in Frege, basic principles of artihmetics) instead of "There are just as many Fs as Gs": "Either any given object F iff it is a G, or there is a relation that is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and Gs". But this must not be an identity. I 226 Identity/Geach: only objects can be strictly identical. - In terms, there is only analogous identity: if they are coextensive. >Coextensive. I 238 Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: Identity is relative. - If someone says "x is identical to y", this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same as y". - (Weird, that Frege did not represent this). >Identity/Quine. Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single schema. (1) l- Fa (x)(Fx u x = a) - everyday-language: whatever is true of something which is identical with an object y is true of a and vice versa. From this we derive the law of self-identity: "l-a = a". Because we take "Fx" for "x unequal a", then schema (1) gives us: (2) l- (a unequal a) Vx(y unequal a u x = a) - this,of course, gives "l-a = a" I 240 Identity/Geach: if we demand strict identity, regardless of the theory in which we move, we get into the semantic paradoxes such as Grelling's or Richard's >Grelling's paradox. Solution: relative identity on theory or language, indissibility/"indiscernibility"/Quine -> Partial identity. 1. Frege, G. (1893). Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Jena: Hermann Pohle. --- Tugendhat I 37 Identity/Dummett/Geach: "=" can only be used with reference to objects. >Equal sign. Habermas IV 158 Identity/Geach/Habermas: Peter Geach argues that identity predicates can only be used meaningfully in connection with the general characterization of a class of objects.(1) (See also Criteria/Henrich, HenrichVsGeach). E.g. Person/Identification/Habermas: Persons cannot be identified under the same conditions as observable objects. In the case of persons, spatiotemporal identification is not sufficient. Also see >Identity/Henrich. 1.P.Geach, Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity, in: K. Munitz, Logic and Ontology, NY. 1973 |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Identity | Lessig | I 90 Identity/Cyberspace/Internet//Lessig: You cannot simply define a different character; you must make it, and more important (and difficult), you must sustain its separation from your original identity. >Definition, >Definability, >Cyberspace. |
Lessig I Lawrence Lessig Code: Version 2.0 New York 2006ff |
| Identity | Millikan | I 187 Identity/stabilization function/Millikan: necessarily identifying descriptions may have three different identification functions. 1. To introduce well-known referents into the discussion. 2. To introduce new referents 3. Sometimes, necessary identifying descriptions are also purely descriptive: e.g. "John is the tallest boy in the family" does not express identity! >Identification. I 197 Identity Statement/Identity Sentence/Identity Assertion/Image/Millikan: Suppose "A" and "B" are single words. Does the sentence "A is B" have to map something to exercise its stabilizing function? Stabilization function: according to the stabilization functions of the lowest types, "A" and "B" are referential terms. Truth: the identity statement is true if these referential types have the same referent. >Reference. R be this (common) referent. Problem: do "A" and "B" map a fact here that has "R" as a variant? Intentional Icon/Millikan: if "A is B" is an intentional icon, it has two variants, "A" and "B" and an invariant "___is___". Intentional icon: if the identity statement is an intentional icon of a fact, it must contain two variants and one invariant. Fact/logical form/problem: which triadic fact (world affair) that contains R as a variant should correspond to "A is B"? >Fact. Identity/Relation/Tradition/Millikan: sometimes identity is thought of as a two-digit relation, which has a thing to itself and nothing else. Two-digit/relation/Millikan: To think of identity like this means to think of it as a variant (variable) within a triadic world state, Monadic relation/Millikan: a monadic relation is simply a property. Identity: if it is to be a variant (variable) of a world state, it must be a simple property: self-identity. Problem: "A is B" has two variants and one invariant. There can, however, be no intentional icon of the dyadic state of the world, which simply exists in R's self-identity. I 197 Identity/relation/property/Millikan: if identity is not a relation, it should be a property. It can only be a property if there is also an opposite property. Problem: what should be the opposite of self-identity? "Self-difference"? Identity/Millikan: identity is not a property at all. Just as little as "being or" or "being and" is a property. Self-identity/Millikan: how would it be for a thing to not be self-identical? Self-identity/representation/Millikan: the identity of a thing with itself is reflected in representations of the thing not by the articulation of the representation, but only insofar as it is represented by the same. I 240 Identity/Millikan: we must add an epistemology of identity to the ontology of identity. I 257 Identity/Substance/Millikan: Thesis: the identity or the sameness of a substance implies the naturally necessary rejection of contrary properties. Thus, identity is a structured natural phenomenon. I 258 Identity/Millikan: identity is not a relation between a thing and itself. It does not map a world state with a referent, but they form a relation between the reproductively determined family of "A" and "B", whereby these families are protoreferents and not represented referents. I 264 Definition Self-identity/Self-Identity/Identity/Naturalism/Millikan: Thesis: the sameness of an individual is constituted in part by the natural necessity that it has all the same properties as it has. This is not a "conceptual truth," but a theory about the nature of identity. ("Naturalistic view" rather than a "logical view"). Millikan: but that is not a reduction of the identity of an individual to something else. For example, the identity of an individual qua sameness, which has a variability of different properties, is not reduced or explained by this view. Identity/Logic Form/Millikan: the identity itself is represented as the statement of the form: "Px and Sx and Rx". Reduction: (of an individual) would only be possible if one had an ontology that recognizes only properties, but not a category of individuals. Identity/Naturalism/Millikan: If the naturalistic view of identity is correct, then the discovery that a certain given individual exists is like the discovery that a particular natural law applies! When a natural law exists, there is a corresponding regularity in nature. ((s): MillikanVsNon-instantiated natural laws) Problem: an observed regularity does not yet guarantee that a natural law is involved. Problem: also the discovery of an agreement of all properties does not guarantee yet that it is the same individual. The concurrence of properties could come about by chance. This is, however, extremely abstract and has no interesting consequences. 1. We must link it to a theory about the identity of properties, and to a theory of how it is for an individual to have a property. 2. The theory must be generalized for all substances. That is, as natural species and materials may also have properties similar to individuals. >Properties, >Predication. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Identity | Quine | I 208ff Identity/Davidson/Quine: we are unable to pick out the relationship that is constitutive for the knowledge of the identity of an object. The reason is that every property can be considered as relevant. If the mind can only think if it establishes a clear relationship to the object, then thought is impossible. (QuineVsRussell). Identity: does not work without conceptual scheme. Identity: QuineVsHume, QuineVsLeibniz: Confusion of word and object: there is no relation between different objects but a relationship between singular terms - a = b different names. I 211 Copula form indefinite singular terms: no longer Fa but a = b = E.g. Agnes = a lamb - but: Agnes bleats: Fa. I 211 Synonymy and analyticity is graded, identity is absolute. I 365 Identity conditions strong/weak/(s):> E.g. Paul and Elmer. II 23 Identity/absolutely distinguishable: an open sentence is only fulfilled by an object. Relatively distinguishable: only fulfilled in the given order. Identity: are objects that are not relatively distinguishable, not all objects that are not absolutely distinguishable. >Objects/Quine. I 397 Theseus' ship: it is not about the term "the same" but the term "ship" - each general term has its own individuation principle. II 156ff Individuation: in our world moment-to-moment individuation by predicates - for objects at random (everything can be the object), for predicates crucial truth value. Identification between possible worlds: is dependent on predicates - for body also from space displacement, composition, etc., therefore not cross-worlds - "The same object" is meaningless. -> singular term, instead predicate. Geach I 238 Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: identity is relative - if someone says x is identical to y, this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same A as y". (Weird that Frege has not supported this). Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single scheme: (1) l- Fa (x) (Fx ux = a) in everyday language: whatever is always true of something that is identical to an object y, is true of a and vice versa. From which we derive the law of self-identity from: l- a = a if we take Fx for x unequal to a then scheme (1) provides us with: (2) l- (a unequal a) Vx (x unequal a u x = a) - this results in l- a = a. Geach I 240 But Geach is for relative identity. Quine V 86 Identity/Quine: initially only means extending the time pointing - then it is a relative mass term: E.g. "the same dog as" - used for individuation of absolute general term E.g. "dog". Geach: this is a reduction to a relative term - Quine: that does not work when objects overlap. V 89 Identity/Geach: is only with respect to general terms the same thing. V 161 Identity: is restricted: in terms of general terms: "the same apple" - is unrestricted: Learning: 1. Anyone who agrees with the sentences [a = b] and [a is a g] also agrees to [b a g] ((s) > transitivity). 2. Disposition, to agree on [a = b], if it is recognized that one can agree [b is a g] due to [a is a g] for any g. - Relative identity: also this kind of identity is relative, because the identity scale depends on words. - [a = b] can get wrong when adding new terms. I 162 Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: x = y as the statement y is an element of every class, from which x is an element - characterization of the identity by using all relative clauses. V 162 Definition Identity/Set Theory/Quine: with quantification over classes is x = y defined as the statement y is a member of each class, from which x is element. Language learning: here initially still substitutional quantification - then no class, but exhaustion of relative clauses. VII (d) 65ff Identity/Quine: important: is the demand for processes or temporally extended objects - by assuming identity rather than flow kinship, one speaks of the flow instead of stages. IX 24 Definition identity/Quine: we can now simplify: for y = z - y = z stands for x (x ε y x ε z) - because we have identified the individuals with their classes. X 90 Definiton identity/Quine: then we define "x = y" as an abbreviation for: Ax ↔ Ay (z) (bzx ↔ bzy. Bxz ↔ Byz .Czx ↔ Czy .Cxz ↔ Cyz (z') (Dzz'x ↔.... .. Dzz'y .Dzxz'↔ Dzyz' Dxzz '↔ Dyzz')) - i.e. that the objects u x. y are not distinguishable by the four predicates, not even in terms of the relation to other objects z and z'. X 99 Identity/Quine: is only defined (in our appearance theory of set theory) between variables but it is not defined between abstraction expressions or their schematic letters. XII 71 Relative identity/Quine: results from ontological relativity, because no entity without identity - this is only explicable in the frame theory. - E.g. distinguishability of income classes. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Identity | Russell | Prior I 163 Identity/Russell: "a=a" "the a is the a" is false if there is no a or if there are multiple a - Def self-identity/Russell: nevertheless Russell’s Law "x = x" is part of his system - "For any φ if x φs, then φs x" - if we define individual existence as Lesniewkian self-identity, then it comes out at a class which must be regarded as a class of one and which can be predicted from some, but not from all classes. >Element relation/Lesniewski, >Unit set. Russell I 58 Identity/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell: no judgment! E.g. we do not judge that Socrates = Socrates. In a way, we judge an ambiguous case of propositional function (propositional function) "A is A". >Propositional function. ad I 111f Containment/Identity/Element relations/Equal sign/Epsilon/Principia Mathematica/(s): therefore containment must not be the same as identity, otherwise from the right i'x = i'x follows the wrong i'x ε i'x i.e., a class may not be identical with its (perhaps only) element. >Element relation, >Equal sign. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Identity | Stalnaker | I 14 Vague identity/Stalnaker: vague identity can at most occur with vague terms in identity-statements. >Vagueness. Solution/counterpart theory/Stalnaker: if cross-wordly-relation between classes of deputies ((s) counterparts) exists and not between individuals themselves, then the relation must not be the one of identity, and this other relation may be vague.) >Counterparts, >Counterpart theory, >Cross world identity, >Possible worlds. I 126 Contingent Identity/Stalnaker: it is of course not the case that the actualism requires contingent identity, the above examples can be explained away. >Actualism. One cannot simply reject the possibility on the basis of semantics and logic of identity. Necessary identity: that means, that the thesis that all identity is necessary is a metaphysical thesis. >Identity/Kripke. I 131 Identity/necessary/contingent/Stalnaker: according to the modal quantifier theory all identity is necessary. We do not want this, e.g. a thing can have more counterparts in another possible world. I 132 Solution: there are different ways of picking. I 133 Vague identity/Stalnaker/Nathan SalmonVsVague Identity: (Salmon 1981(1), 243) according to Salmon identity cannot be vague: e.g. suppose there is a pair of entities x and y so that it is vague if they are one and the same thing - then this pair is certainly not the same pair like the pair, in which this is definitely true that x is the same thing as itself - but it is not vague, if the two pairs are identical or differentiated. I 134 Vague identity/identity statement/vague objects/Stalnaker: e.g. M is a specific piece of land within the indeterminate Mt Rainier. a) Mt. Rainier is an indefinite object: then it is wrong to say that M = Mt. Rainier. b ) If it is about a statement instead of an object: then it is indeterminate. I 135f Vague identity/Stalnaker: e.g. there are two fish restaurants called Bookbinder's. Only one can be the same as the original. Endurantism: Problem: "B0": (the original) is then an ambiguous term. Perdurantism: here it is clear. >Perdurantism, cf. >Endurantism. I 138 Vague identity/SalmonVsVague identity/uncertainty/Stalnaker: Salmon's argument shows that if we manage to pick out two entities a and b that there then has to be a fact, whether the two are one thing or two different things (Stalnaker pro Salmon, Nathan). Conversely: if it is undetermined whether a = b, then it is uncertain what "a" refers to or what "b" refers to. But this does not give us a reason to suppose that facts together with terms have to decide this. Salmon just shows that when facts and terms do not decide that it is then indeterminate. I 140 StalnakerVsSalmon: Salmon's vagueness is a vagueness of reference. I 139 Identity/indefinite/Kripke: (1971(2), 50-1) e.g. would the table T be the same in the actual world if in the past the constituting molecules were spread a little differently? Here, the answer can be vague. I 148 Identity/one-digit predicates/Stalnaker: one cannot generally treat sentences as predications. >Predication, >Sentences. E.g. x^(Hx u Gx) is an instance of the form Fs, but "(Hs and Gs)" is not. Therefore, our identity-scheme is more limited than Leibniz' law is normally formulated. >Leibniz Principle. I 154f Definition essential identity/Stalnaker: all things x and y, which are identical, are essentially identical, i.e. identical in all possible worlds, in which this thing exists ((s) that means, the existence is made a prerequisite, not the identity for the existence.) ((s) necessary identity/Stalnaker/(s): here the situation is reversed: if x and y are necessarily identical, they must exist in all possible worlds - or if a thing does not exist in a possible world, it may, in the possible worlds in which it exists, not be necessarily identical). Necessary identity/logical form: x^(x = y)> N(x = y) fails in the standard semantics and in counterpart theory, because a thing can exist contingently and include self-identity existence. Counterpart theory. Two different things may be identical, without being essentially identical, e.g. two possible worlds a and b, each possible for the respective other, and two distinct things have the same counterpart in b, namely 3. Then the pair satisfies the identity-relation in b, but because 1 exists in the world a and is from 2 different, the pair does not satisfy N(Ex> x = y) in b. >Cross world identity. 1. Salmon, Wesley C. 1981. Rational prediction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (2):115-125 2. Kripke, Saul S. Identity and NEcessity. In Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York: New York University Press. pp. 135-164 (1971). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Identity | Woods | II 250 Self-identity/time/identity/Woods: self-identity can not change in time. >Self-identity, >Existence/Woods. |
WoodsM II Michael Woods "Existence and Tense" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Incommensurability | Putnam | III 161f Incommensurability/Putnam: even before Kuhn the following could be found in Saussure: basic units of language cannot be determined from the sounds. Whorf: if individual languages have many quite different color predicates, then the meaning is reserved for individual languages. > Idiolect. DerridaVsWhorf: the meanings are not only individual languages but reserved for the individual texts. > Deconstruction. DerridaVsSaussure: the concept of the sign can be completely forgotten. PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida misunderstands Saussure's project of a theory of meaning. >Sign/Derrida, >Sign/Saussure. III 165 Solution/Putnam: the solution is to maintain the concept of meaning equality, but realizing that it may not be understood as in the sense of self-identity of objects and signified. PutnamVsDerrida (HowVsFodor): "meaning equality" is interest relative, and presupposes a normative judgment on rationality in a situation. --- V 157 Incommensurabilityy/PutnamVsFeyerabend: it is contradictory to state, Galileo's concepts are incommensurable and then to describe them in detail afterwards. One must also understand the old language to be able to say that the predictions are identical. >Meaning change. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Individuals | Millikan | I 272 Def property/self-identity/sameness/Millikan: the identity of the properties of an individual is determined by natural opposition to these properties, based on that individual. >Identity. Def Individuals/self-identity/sameness/Millikan: the identity of an individual is defined by the fact that it naturally has the qualities it has. The identity of an individual is determined by the rejection of contradictory properties. A self-identical individual has exactly one property from each property domain, whereby the property domains are mutually exclusive. >Properties. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Leibniz Principle | Millikan | I 259 Leibniz Principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Leibniz/Millikan: Thesis: I treat his principle so that it is an implicit assertion about grammatical categories. (x)(y)[(F)(Fx equi Fy) > x = y] Problem: what is the domain of the quantifier "(F)"? ((s) >second order logic). Here, there cannot simply elements of the domain be paired with grammatical predicates. The set of grammatical predicates may not be of ontological interest. E.g. neither "... exists" nor "... = A" nor "... means red" is paired with something which has the same meaning as "... is green" paired with a variant of a world state. Quantification/properties/2nd order logic/Millikan: perhaps we can say that the quantifier (F) is about all properties, but we must characterize this set differently than by pairing with grammatical predicates. Second order logic, >Quantification, >Properties. False: For example, the attempt of Baruch Brody's thesis: "to be identical with x" should be understood as a property of x "in the domain of the quantifier (F)" is quite wrong! ((s) "be identical with oneself" as a property). If so, then every thing that has all the properties of x would be identical with x. ((s) Even if it had additional properties). Problem: under this interpretation, property is not a coherent ontological category. How can we treat the Leibniz principle, and keep the notion of "property" so that it is ontologically coherent? I 260 Leibniz principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan: the Leibniz principle is usually regarded as a claim about the identity of individual substances. Substances in which it is useful to attribute to them place and time. That is, "x" and "y" go over individuals. Quantifier: (F) is generally understood in the way that it only goes via "general properties". Or via "purely qualitative properties". Purely qualitative properties: i.e. that they are not defined with regard to certain individuals: e.g. the property "to be higher than Mt. Washington" N.B.: but: "the property of being higher than something that has these and these properties and which are the properties of Mt. Washington". Individual related properties/Millikan: are normally excluded because they would allow properties like "to be identical to x". That would lead to an empty reading of the Leibniz principle. MillikanVs: but it is not at all the case that "is identical to x" would not correspond to any reasonable property. Leibniz principle/Millikan: however, the principle is mostly examined in the context of the domain of general properties in relation to... I 261 ...the domain of things that have these properties. Thus there ist the question: do we have to postulate a domain of such things beyond the domain of these general properties, or can we define the self-identity of an individual in purely qualitative expressions? Leibniz principle/Millikan: in this context, the relation to a particular individual ((s) and thus of the thing to itself) appears to be an impure or mixed ontological category. VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe could be perfectly symmetrical, whereby then a perfectly identical (indistinguishable) individual would be in another place. >Identity, >Indistinguishability. ((s) That is, there is something of x that is indistinguishable, which nevertheless is not identical with x, against the Leibniz principle). (See also Adams, below). Variants: For example, a temporal repetitive universe, etc. e.g. two identical water drops, two identical billiard balls at different locations. ((s) Why then identical? Because the location (the coordinates) does not have influence on the identity!) Property/Leibniz: Thesis: a relation to space and time leads to a property which is not purely qualitative. Millikan: if one ignores such "impure" properties ((s) thus does not refer to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties! VsLeibniz Principle/Law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: Thesis: the principle that is used when such symmetrical worlds are constructed, is the principle that an individual cannot be distinguished (separated) from itself, so the two world halfs of the world cannot be one and the same half. Leibniz principle/VsVs/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of hacking): the objections do not consider that this could be a curved space instead of a doubling. Curved Space/Hacking/Millikan: here the same thing emerges again, it is not a doubling as in the Euclidean geometry. MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question. I 262 But there are still two interesting possibilities: >indistinguishability. Leibniz Principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan: 1. Symmetrical world: one could argue that there is simply no fact here that decides whether the space is curved or doubled. ((s) > nonfactualism). N.B.: this would imply that the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention. 2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very well be a fact whether the space is curved or not. A certain given space cannot be both! N.B.: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary. N.B.: but in this case this is not a question of convention, but a real fact! MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong take that into account. Curved space/Millikan: here, what is identical is necessarily identical ((s) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if the one half were different, then also the other. Here the space seems to be only double. Doubling/Millikan: if the space (in Euclidean geometry) is mirrored, the identity is a random, not a necessary one. Here one half could change without changing the other half. ((s) No counterfactual conditional). Identity: is then given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law applies in situ, but a natural law, a natural necessity. I 263 Then, in the second option, identity from causality applies. (x) (y) {[NN (F) Fx equi Fy] equi x = y} Natural necessary/Notation: natural necessary under natural possible circumstances. Millikan: this is quite an extreme view, for it asserts that if there were two sets of equivalent laws that explain all events, one of these sets, but not the other, would be true, even if there was no possibility to find out which of the two sets it is that would be true. This would correspond to the fact that a seemingly symmetrical world was inhabited. Either the one or the other would be true, but one would never find out which one. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Particulars | Stalnaker | I 72 Bare particular/anti-essentialism/BIT/Stalnaker: thesis: for every individual and every property there are possible worlds in which the individual has this property, and other possible worlds in which it does not. >Bare particulars, >Possible Worlds, >Essentialism. Exception: self-identity. Problem: we need special semantics for that. I 72/73 Essential properties/bare individual things/theoretical terms/particulars/Stalnaker: from the perspective of the theory of the bare particulars there are undeniable essential properties. 1) Something that is necessarily an essential property of everything, e.g. the ability to be self-identical, e.g. to be either a kangaroo or not a kangaroo, e.g. to be colored when red. 2) Def referential properties/Ruth Marcus: (1967)(1) the following attributes are essential for Babe Ruth: e.g. being identical with Babe Ruth, e.g. either being identical with Babe Ruth or fat, e.g. being fat when Babe Ruth is fat, e.g. having the same weight as Babe Ruth. This also applies in possible worlds where Babe Ruth is a tricycle. 3) Possible worlds-indexed properties/Plantinga: (1970)(2) possible worlds-indexed properties are undeniable essential properties, e.g. call the real world Kronos - then being-snub-nosed-in-Kronos is defined as the property that something/someone has in any possible world iff. this person/thing has the normal accidental property to be snub-nosed in Kronos (actual world). Important argument: this imposes no restrictions on an individual as to which properties it could have had. >Properties, >Necessity, >Necessity de re, >Accidens, >Essence, >Essential property, >Essentialism. 1. Ruth Barcan Marcus (1967): Essentialism in modal logic, Nous 1, (1):91-96. 2. Alvin Plantinga (1970): "World and Essence", Philosophical Review 79, pp. 461-92. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Parts | Millikan | I 283 Temporal part/Millikan: the temporal part is a momentary or almost momentary three-dimensional object. >Mereology. I 284 Analogously, you can split an object into time slices. >Fourdimensionalism. Just as with spatial parts, two temporal parts of a whole can never be identical. Otherwise they could not be distinguished. Identity/Self-Identity/Unity/Uniformity/Millikan: to be identical with oneself, a thing must never exemplify a principle of uniformity. E.g. also a very loosely held sheep herd is always this herd itself. Temporal identity: also plays no role in the question of self-identity: no one believes that an object state to t1 would be the same as to t2. >Temporal identity. Unity/Object/Thing/Millikan: nevertheless, we need principles of uniformity to approach objects as such. Thus, it is about the question as to which relation must have the states S1 and S2 in order to be valid as states of the same thing. I 285 Identity/unity/Millikan: thus questions of the identity of a thing do not seem to be separated from questions of the principles of uniformity. >Identity/Millikan, >Unity/Millikan. Problem: there are often different ways to summarize parts into a whole. Here we must ask which category the whole is to belong to. Self-Identity/Sameness/Millikan: slef-identity then appears relative to the category to which a thing should belong. Problem: is the water surface S1 part of the same water mass as water surface S2? Such questions are not fully defined. We need principles to summarize parts. The relations between the parts can also be more or less loose. I 286 And that has nothing to do with the identity of the whole! Whole: can also be specified by a mere list. This would identify the whole without mentioning the relations of the parts at all. And the self-identity of the whole would not be dependent on the strength of the cohesion of the parts at all. Temporal/spatial: so far the analogy between temporal and spatial parts seems to apply. Cf. >Part-of-relation. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Person | Williams | Nozick II 29f Self/Person/Self-identity/Identity/B. Williams: e.g. two stories together that put us to a mystery: 1st case: one person enters a new body, actually two people exchange their bodies. A-body-person: (now connected with the A-body): has all the memories, knowledge, values, behaviors, etc. of the (earlier, complete) person B - if A could choose which pain should be inflicted after the change, he would choose the A-body for it - because he assumes that he lives in B. 2nd case: someone tells them to endure pain. after that, you will learn that you will undergo a change in your psychological condition - so that you will possess the character of someone else - which frightens you, you don't want to lose your identity and then endure pain. Question: Why did the A-person not have the same fears in the first case? Why is case 1: Transfer of a person to another body and case 2: something that happens to a permanent person? Why does memory play a role in case 1? II 31 Difference 1/2: in 2, B does not acquire the memories of A. Nozick II 29f Identity/Person/Self/B. Williams: e.g. Symmetric case: Outside view: two people swap bodies, A is now in the B-body and decides that B (now in his old A-body) pain should be inflicted instead of him in the new body - inside view (symmetric): You are supposed to get pain inflicted which frightens you, before you should get another character which frightens you even more - you choose the pain for yourself to ward off the loss of the person - other decision, symmetric case. Problem: nothing outside influences A's task and acquisition of a new psyche. Question: how can then two tasks and acquisitions lead to an exchange of bodies? Williams: Thesis: physical identity is a necessary condition for personal identity. II 31 Problem: what happens elsewhere can have no effect on whether A continues to live in the A-body. Williams: Thesis: Physical identity is a necessary condition of personal identity. Nozick II 32 Identity/Person/Self/B. Williams: Principle 1: Identity of something cannot depend on whether there is another thing of any kind. Principle 2: if it is possible that there is another thing that prevents identity, then there is no identity, even if this other thing did not exist. NozickVsWilliams: both principles are wrong. E. g. The Vienna Circle dissolves - several successor groups emerge - then the identity depends on something that happens elsewhere ((s) whether there are several groups). >"closest continuer, . Nozick II 33 Identity/time/next successor/NozikVsWilliams: but dependence on the existence of other things: whether a group can call itself a Vienna circle depends on whether there are other groups in exile - if two things are equally close to the original, there is no next successor (closest continuer). Identity in time: necessary condition: to be next successor. II 35 If God provided causally for identity in time, he would also have to decide how the factors should be weighted. >Ship of Theseus. II 40 It may be that the next successor is not close enough. II 41 Randomly created copy is not a next successor (because of missing causality) - we could have the second one without the first one. II 45 Identity in time/problem: overlapping. >Overlapping, >Identity, >Personal identity, >Continuity, >Change, >Temporal identity. |
WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Predicates | Quine | I 174f Predication: is a combination of a general term with a singular term. General term: also verb, adjective, (also attributive), noun. Singular term before "is" - then general term ("is" = prefix). I 311 Singular term: can always be traced back to the form "=a" (except if variable) - i.e. it is actually a general term. (predicate)! Example "=Mama","=Socrates","=Pegasus". >General Terms/Quine, >Singular Terms/Quine. I 323 Elimination of singular terms: is the fusion of "=" with a piece of text but "=" remains together with variables in a predicative position. "=" is a predicative general term. II 61 ff Naming: Name or singular term - Designate: predicate - both are reference, not meaning. >Reference/Quine. II 158/159 Predicate/Object/Quine: in our world, moment to moment identification is governed by the principle of individuation of predicates. They are neutral to the actual quantification of physical objects, because quantification respects all moment to moment groups, no matter how randomly they are composed. For the predicates, however, they are of importance: since all propositions contain predicates, the identification at the corresponding place is a decisive thing for the truth value. >Truth Value/Quine. Likewise one needs a cross-world identification, which is relative to the predicates used in each case. Also here it will be mostly such for bodies. However, our identification for bodies was based on space displacement, shape change, and chemical change. II 199 Predicate: is a sentence with a gap - general term: is a special type predicate with a gap at a particular end. II 205 Predicate/Tradition: is not always a separated, it is continuous character string (unlike a general term) - the predicate letter F always had to remain connected with an argument. New: term abstracts allow predicates to be combined to general terms. This is the logical operation of predication. >Predication/Quine. VII (f) 115 Predicate/Quine: has no names of classes - classes are their extensions: the things from which the predicate is true. Theory of validity appeals to classes, but not to individual sentences. X 7ff Predicate/Quine: by this I mean only those barbaric expressions that produce statements when completed with variables or individual terms. No attributes. IX 128 Existence/Subject/Predicate/Quine: if the existence is questionable, it is better to use a predicate - ((s) E.g. pedantically is applicable, even if the figure of Beckmesser does not exist.) - Quine: instead of class term sequence for transfinite sequences, being able to have the NO (class of ordinal numbers) as an argument, better predicate Term SEQ - ((s)> lambda calculus). X 50 Predicates/Quine: are not names of properties - so you can call them syncategorematic. Other authors: Vs.See also more autors on predicates. X 102 Predicates/Quine: are not names of properties, but of objects. >Object/Quine. XII 68 Universal Predicates/Quine: they do exist. E.g. self-identity - E.g. "Is different from Hans or sings" - universal words/Carnap: quasi-syntactical predicates: are applicable to everything, without empiricism, only because of the meaning - Quine: is no solution to ontological relativity. - ((s) i.e. the question of what we refer to ultimately). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Properties | Armstrong | III 12 Properties/Armstrong: properties are always non-local! - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property. - Relational properties may not be local either! ((s) Cf. >Properties/Chisholm). III 14 Individuation/Individual/particulars/properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties. - E.g. no property: "being one light-second away from proton A". - But: E.g. this is a property: "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Generality). III 83 Properties/Armstrong: properties are strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore they are not all arbitrary predicates. Pseudo-property: self-identity (not a universal). - Identity lends no causal or nomic force. >Identity. III 114f Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st order relation. - If E.g. "to be a mass" is a property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight. >Laws/Armstrong, >Natural laws/Armstrong. VsRealism of Properties/VsProperty realism: there is a risk of duplication and intermediate elements. - Armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass". III 141 Properties/Armstrong: a "property of being a property" is not desirable. - At least it is not a second order Humean regularity, - But it is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws. >Tooley. III 145 Solution/Armstrong: We should rather introduce new properties than new laws. III 163ff Properties/Armstrong: if they are essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes. II 5 Properties/Armstrong: categorical property = non-dispositional property. - But many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible". - But dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties. >Dispositions/Armstrong. II (c) 96 Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: there is a asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions. - It is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side. - According to Martin that would be a "lazy" world, because there would be no causality. II (c) 102 MartinVsArmstrong: A world does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested. (> 77 II) II (c) 97 Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: properties are individuals! - Therefore there is no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same". ArmstrongVs: 1st that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! >Regularity. ArmstrongVs: 2md Per universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical". Martin III 168 Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: We should assume properties instead of parts. - The complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts. Martin III 169 Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Properties | Martin | Armstrong III 12 Properties/Armstrong: properties are always non-local! - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property. - Relational properties may not be local either! ((s) Cf. >Properties/Chisholm). Armstrong III 14 Individuation/Individual/particulars/properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties. - E.g. no property: "being one light-second away from proton A". - But: E.g. this is a property: "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Generality). Armstrong III 83 Properties/Armstrong: properties are strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore they are not all arbitrary predicates. Pseudo-property: self-identity (not a universal). - Identity lends no causal or nomic force. >Identity. Armstrong III 114f Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st order relation. - If E.g. "to be a mass" is a property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight. >Laws/Armstrong, >Natural laws/Armstrong. VsRealism of Properties/VsProperty realism: there is a risk of duplication and intermediate elements. - Armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass". Armstrong III 141 Properties/Armstrong: a "property of being a property" is not desirable. - At least it is not a second order Humean regularity, - But it is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws. >Tooley. Armstrong III 145 Solution/Armstrong: We should rather introduce new properties than new laws. Armstrong III 163ff Properties/Armstrong: if they are essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes. Armstrong II 5 Properties/Armstrong: categorical property = non-dispositional property. - But many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible". - But dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties. >Dispositions/Armstrong. Armstrong II (c) 96 Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: there is a asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions. - It is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side. - According to Martin that would be a "lazy" world, because there would be no causality. Armstrong II (c) 102 MartinVsArmstrong: A world does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested. (> 77 II) Armstrong II (c) 97 Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: properties are individuals! - Therefore there is no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same". ArmstrongVs: 1st that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! >Regularity. ArmstrongVs: 2md Per universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical". Martin III 168 Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: We should assume properties instead of parts. - The complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts. Martin III 169 Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters). |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Properties | Millikan | I 11 Properties/Kind/Millikan: properties and kind exist only in the actual world (our real world). MillikanVsNominalism. >Nominalism. I 197 Property/Millikan: Thesis: A property is only a property by virtue of opposing properties - properties that they exclude or are incompatible with them. ((s)> disjunctive property). I 264 Identity/Sameness/Property/Millikan: how can we describe the identity of a property? 1. we consider only those properties that individuals can have. I 265 Leibniz Principle/Millikan: we turn around the Leibniz Principle by adding an operator for natural necessity. (F)(G){[NN(x)Fx equi Gx] equi F = G}. >Leibniz principle, >Indistinguishability. I 266 Properties/identity/Millikan: The traditional objection that properties are the same when all their instances are the same is divided into two arguments. 1. Objections from those who believe that properties correspond one-to-one to possible concepts: "Argument from the meaning"/argument from meaning/Armstrong: (Armstrong not pro): (Has often confused the problem of universals): If universals are to be meanings, and if a semantic criterion for the identity of predicates is accepted, then it follows that every predicate type corresponds to its own universal. ((s) This can be re-invented newly infinitely many times). Problem/Millikan/(s): already diversity of linguistic expressions entails difference in the corresponding properties. Inflationism/Deflationism/Millikan: Realists have interpreted this argument inflationistically, and nominalists have interpreted it deflationistically. >Deflationism. Millikan: for this, however, one has to equate meaning with intension - that is to say, to combine meaning with the concepts that one has of the things that are mapped with the expressions. Solution/Millikan: we differentiate meaning and intension, therefore, it can have different concepts for one and the same variant in re. Therefore, we can ignore this objection. For example, the concepts that Hubots and Rubots have (> Terminology/Millikan) of the "square" are different variants in nature, because they are governed by different intensions. This could be misunderstood in that way that for the ancient Hesperus and Phosphorus concepts there would have been concepts of different celestial bodies,... I 267 ...because they were ruled by different intensions. ((s) general problem: there are too many properties in such approaches). 2. Type of objections against the view that properties are the same when their instances coincide: that there are so many counterexamples. For example, even if it can be that every living creature with a heart is a living being with kidneys, it does not show that having the one property would be equal to having the other property. Solution: the instances must already coincide with natural necessity. For example, suppose there is only one single object in the world with a particular green color, and this object would also have a unique form. It would still not follow from this that the property of having this hue would be equal to the property of having this form. Certainly, there are also no principles of natural necessity that link these properties. Millikan: but not all the counter-arguments against the inverse Leibniz principle are so easy to invalidate. E.g. Properties for materials in general: e.g. properties that can have gold: a certain spectrum, electrical conductivity, melting point, atomic weight. Suppose each of these properties is only once applicable to gold and therefore identifies the material. N.B.: then each of these properties necessarily coexists with the others. Nevertheless, the properties are not identical! But how do we actually know that it is not one and the same property? How do we know that they are not like a form that is once touched and once seen? This is a question of epistemology, not of ontology. But it cannot be answered without making ontological assumptions. I 268 General Properties/Material/Millikan: in order e.g. that the particular conductivity of gold and the particular spectrum of gold could be one and the same property, the entire range of possible electrical conductivities would have to be mapped one-to-one to the entire range of possible spectra. That is, the particular conductivity could not be the same as this particular spectrum, if not other spectra coincided with other conductivities. Properties/Millikan: Thesis: Properties (one or more digits) that fall into the same domain are characteristics that are opposite to each other. Of course, one area can also contain a different area. For example, "red" includes "scarlet" instead of excluding it, and "being two centimeters tall plus minus one millimeter" means "2.05 centimeters tall plus minus 1 millimeter" than excluding it. The assumption that two properties can only be the same when the complete opposite domains from which they come coincide, suggests that the identity of a property or a property domain is tied to the identity of a broader domain from which it comes and is thus tied to the identity of its opposites. Now we are comparing Leibniz's view with that of Aristotle: Identity/Leibniz/Millikan: all simple properties are intrinsically comparable. However, perhaps not comparable in nature, because God created only the best of possible worlds - but they would be metaphysically comparable. Complex properties/Leibniz/Millikan: that would be propertes that are not comparable. They also include absences or negations of properties. They have the general form "A and not B". I 271 Properties/Millikan: properties are not loners like substances. Self-identity/property: a property is itself, by virtue of the natural necessary comparison to other properties. Representation/exemplification/Millikan: if an opposite is missing, no property is represented. E.g "Size is exemplified by John" has no opposite. The negation is not made true by the fact that size would have a property that would be contrary to being exemplified by John. "Being exemplified by John" says of substance John that it has that property. >Terminology/Millikan. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Properties | Place | Armstrong III 12 Properties/Armstrong: properties are always non-local! - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property. - Relational properties may not be local either! ((s) Cf. >Properties/Chisholm). Armstrong III 14 Individuation/Individual/particulars/properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties. - E.g. no property: "being one light-second away from proton A". - But: E.g. this is a property: "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Generality). Armstrong III 83 Properties/Armstrong: properties are strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore they are not all arbitrary predicates. Pseudo-property: self-identity (not a universal). - Identity lends no causal or nomic force. >Identity. Armstrong III 114f Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st order relation. - If E.g. "to be a mass" is a property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight. >Laws/Armstrong, >Natural laws/Armstrong. VsRealism of Properties/VsProperty realism: there is a risk of duplication and intermediate elements. - Armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass". Armstrong III 141 Properties/Armstrong: a "property of being a property" is not desirable. - At least it is not a second order Humean regularity, - But it is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws. >Tooley. Armstrong III 145 Solution/Armstrong: We should rather introduce new properties than new laws. Armstrong III 163ff Properties/Armstrong: if they are essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes. Armstrong II 5 Properties/Armstrong: categorical property = non-dispositional property. - But many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible". - But dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties. >Dispositions/Armstrong. Armstrong II (c) 96 Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: there is a asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions. - It is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side. - According to Martin that would be a "lazy" world, because there would be no causality. Armstrong II (c) 102 MartinVsArmstrong: A world does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested. (> 77 II) Armstrong II (c) 97 Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: properties are individuals! - Therefore there is no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same". ArmstrongVs: 1st that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! >Regularity. ArmstrongVs: 2md Per universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical". Martin III 168 Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: We should assume properties instead of parts. - The complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts. Martin III 169 Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters). |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Qua-Objects | Fine | Simons I 298 Qua-objects/Kit Fine/Simons: x qua F - or x under the description of F. Definition Basis: the underlying object Def Explanation/Fine: x qua F is always differentiated from the base. SimonsVsFine: this is too strong, because then one would also have to distinguish "x qua self-identity" from x - also essential properties should not make up the qua. - Only contingent properties are ment to occur in the explanation. >Mereology, >P. Simons, >Explanations. Simons: most qua-objects have incorporated their explanation, not as a property. - (This already exists in Principia Mathematica(1)). Qua-objects provide an ontological dependency for a conceptual dependency - e.g. fist qua clenched hand. - e.g. statue qua shaped clay. >Statue/clay, >Conceptual dependence, >Ontological dependence. SimonsVs: they do not achieve anything, one cannot form with them new singular terms from old. >Singular terms, >Concepts, >Identification, >Distinctions. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Fin I K. Fine The Limits of Abstraction Oxford 2008 FinA I A. Fine The Shaky Game (Science and Its Conceptual Foundations series) Chicago 1996 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Self- Identification | Anscombe | Frank I 103 Memory loss/self-identification/I/Anscombe: someone who has lost his memory has not forgotten the use of "I". >Memory loss, >Self-consciousness, >I, >Pronouns, >Language use. Frank I 108 Self-consciousness/Self-Identity/Henry James/Anscombe: E.g. the story of the "poor Baldy" who fell out of the coach and lost his self-consciousness: he asks himself, "Who fell from the carriage? Poor Baldy." G. Elizabeth M.Anscombe (1975a): The First Person, in: Samuel Guttenplan (ed.) (I975): Mind and Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974, Oxford 1975,45-65 |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Identification | Woods | II 250 Self-identity/time/identity/Woods: self-identity can not change in time. >Identity, >Self-identity, >Existence/Woods. |
WoodsM II Michael Woods "Existence and Tense" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Substance | Millikan | I 109 Substance/properties/Millikan: Thesis: "substance" and "properties" are categories that are cut off relative to each other and relative to the operation of the negation. They do not mutually exclude one another. Properties/Millikan: are varied elements of facts, receptive to negation. Substances/Millikan: are also variable, but relative to other transformations. >Terminology/Millikan, >Properties/Millikan. I 254 Substances/property/Millikan: substance and property are determined in relation to one another. Definition Substance/Millikan: substance is what it is and the same as it is relative to a set of property domains from which it necessarily has a property, while other properties are excluded in the property domain. E.g. substance category/Millikan: corresponds to a set of substances. The identities are relations to the same opposite-predicate domains. E.g. gold, like other elements of the category of chemical elements, has an atomic number, a valence, a melting point, a color. But it does not have size, shape, mother, birthday, gesture. Def property/Millikan: (corresponding to substance) is what it is and the same as it is relative to a domain of opposites and to a set of elements of substance categories whose elements necessarily have a property from this domain and all other properties are excluded. Grasping/property/Millikan: to grasp a property is to distinguish it from others, or to grasp the opposite parts relative to which the property is the same as that which it is. I 255 Senseless/Millikan: thus we can recognize expressions as meaningless as e.g. "Gold is great". >Sense/Millikan. I 274 Property/object/predicate/substance/individual/ontology/Millikan: Strawson's distinction between "monogamous" and "non-monogamous" entities is not absolute, but relative: Object/thing: For example, if my ring is made of gold, it cannot be made of silver at the same time. Polygamous: Gold is relative to my ring ((s) it could also have been silver - the gold could have belonged to another object.). Then gold is a property (unlike another) and my ring is a substance. But relative to other substances, the identity of gold seems like the identity of an individual. Ontology/MillikanVsFrege/MillikanVsRussell: we must drop the rigid distinction between concept and object or particular and property. >Particulars/Strawson, >Ontology/Millikan. I 275 Variant: not only predicates are variants in world states, but also substances or individuals (they can be replaced). Substance: when we consider gold as a property, it does not prevent us from understanding it as a substance. As Aristotle said: Individuals/Aristotle/Millikan: are merely primary substances, not the only substances which exist; that is, substances that are not properties of something else. Substance/Millikan: a substance is actually an epistemic category. Substance/Millikan: e.g. gold, e.g. domestic cat, e.g. 69s Plymouth Valiant 100. Substance/Category/Millikan: substances fall into categories, defined by the exclusivity classes with regard to which they are intended. E.g. Gold and silver fall into this category because they belong to the same exclusivity classes: having a melting point, atomic weight, etc. I 276 Imperfect Substances/Millikan: imperfect substances have only approximate properties. e.g. a domestic cat has a weight between 7 and 14 pounds. Perfect substance/Millikan: a perfect substance can also have time-bound properties: E.g. Johnny sits at t1, but not at t2 E.g. water has a melting point at 0 degrees, in an atmospheric pressure, but not at 10 atmospheres! E.g. Johnny has then however once and for all the property, to sit to t1. I 277 Complete concept/Millikan: to have a complete concept, one needs time concepts. Accessibility: complete concepts for durable objects are not as accessible as concepts for substances such as e.g. domestic cat or e.g. gold. I 281 Summary/substance/property/identity/self-identity/Millikan: Perfect Secondary Substance: e.g. gold: has an identity that is formally the same as that of an individual in relation to its properties. Imperfect secondary substance: e.g. 69s Plymouth (contradiction to above) e.g. domestic cat: have a kind of identity that is formally analogous to the identity of perfect substances. For example, in accordance with laws in situ, instead of under all natural conditions. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Substance | Spinoza | Holz I 31 Substance/Spinoza: is with him unique according to its nature, infinite, and indivisible. Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: whoever starts from the thought prerequisite of the substantial unity of the world and the experience prerequisite of the qualitative difference of beings (of manifoldness) can conceive this manifoldness only as manifestations or aspects of the one substance, in which "all that one had taken for true, has perished." >Unity/Spinoza, >Appearance, >World, >Order, >World/Thinking. This, however, reveals the actual presupposition of thinking, the difference in the content of thought. Leibniz saw the danger. Holz I 32 Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in the unity". >Unity and multiplicity. If deduction is only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought. >Reduction, >Reductionism. Holz I 62 Identity Principle/objective cognition/Leibniz: The objective unity of the world can also be shown independently of my perception, it is evident in the way of givenness of every consciousness content in itself. (Everything appears as what it appears). >Identity, >Self-identity, >Whole, >Totality. Adequacy does not matter here. >Adequacy. "Tantum est quantum est, tale est quale est". Pre-predictive being a priori. Problem: then the phenomena are still mere moments of the one and only substance, as in Spinoza. Substance/Spinoza: no being is to be justified against the universe in its own being. Rather, the reduction of identical sentences would lead to an "ens absolute infinitum" in Spinoza, from which "it follows that there is only one substance and that it is infinite." However, this reduction can only come to a beginning with a waiver of the substantial existence of the many individuals. Holz I 63 VsSpinoza: if one accepts the existence of the individual, the problem is insoluble for Spinoza. He solves the problem, or it does not come into his field of view, because he conceives the essence of the human only as formed from certain modifications of the attributes of God. With this, the Cartesian doubt is covered up. The ego cogitans becomes the mere appearance, the annexation of the self-assured unity of God. Thus Spinoza returns to medieval realism. Thus the rationality of the factual cannot be justified. >Rationality, >Rationalism, >Ultimate justification, >Foundation, >Realism. Höffe I 232 Substance/Spinoza/Höffe: The only substance that exists, God, is cause of itself (causa sui); the different basic forms of reality are nothing else but attributes of God. This indwelling (immanence) of all things in God and God in all things amounts to a pantheism (All-God doctrine: God is everything and in everything). It excludes a transcendent concept of God that transcends the world and, although its system starts from a concept of God, it brings Spinoza the then almost fatal accusation of atheism(1). >Pantheism, >God. 1. Spinoza. Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata, 1677 |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Terminology | Millikan | I 2 Def Eigenfunction/Millikan: in contrast to 1. the current function 2. a "type of purpose", applicable on different occasions. (Generalization, "average" (see below.) E.g. An organ has a certain function = eigenfunction. Natural language/Millikan: natural language is not invented by someone for a purpose. Eigenfunction/Millikan: analogy: e.g. to organs of the body: we can use our organs for purposes other than their own function, e.g. to row with one's arms. I 3 Speech patterns/language device/terminology/Millikan: I mean words with this as well as, syntactic forms, stress, accents, punctuation, etc. Thesis: such patterns were only handed down because stable open and covert reactions of a cooperation partner are just as much handed down (have asserted themselves). Standardization/Millikan: the (speech-) pattern only performs its eigenfunction with a co-operation partner, but with an arbitrary one. Therefore, it must be standardized. Stabilization/Millikan/(s): (temporal) for recurring tokens a similarity must be given to previous tokens. Stabilization/standardization/Millikan: stabilization and standardization are two sides of a medal. I 5 Eigenfunction/Language/Meaning/MillikanVsGrice: we do not take the speaker meaning as the basic concept. Meaningfulness/Millikan: We do not explain meaningfulness with typical use. Belief/wishes/Intention/Millikan: belief, wishes and attention can be explained without reference to language. I 5 NORMAL/Terminology/Millikan: (spelling: capitalized): is understood here as a biological term, which is biologically normal. Not what average behavior is. I 12 "Real value"/real value/terminology/Millikan: I call the basic partner of sense real value. The difference between real value and a speaker is at least as great as between sense and intension. Terminology/Millikan/(s): "sense" is to be reproduced from now on with "meaning", which is not Fregean sense. Real value/Millikan: the real value is practically the truthmaker of sentences. Part II: this is about Fregean sense. Sense: is quasi intentionality. Thought/sentence/Millikan: are patterns that show intentionality, perhaps they have the form of inner sentences ((s) > Mentalese). Inner Sentences/Mentalese/Millikan: inner sentences and Mentalese are not determined by final rules. Therefore, intentionality is not equal to rationality. Intentionality/Millikan: I describe naturalist, but not reductionist. (MillikanVsReductionism). Intentionality/Millikan: their understanding is something quite different from the understanding of consciousness. I 17f Def direct eigenfunction/Millikan: a thing (device, pattern, instrument) has a direct eigenfunction, if it has it as an element of a particular family of things that I call Definition reproductively established family/reF/Terminology/Millikan: things that are similar are similar here because there was a kind of copying process (> reproduction). I 19 Reproductively established family/reF/Millikan: here there are two different ones: Reproductively established family 1st level: only elements of reproductively established families of 1st level are copies of each other. Reproductively established family of higher level: their elements can only be defined by the concept of the eigenfunction of lower-level families and the concept of "normal explanation" (according to biological normality). I 23 Def reproductively established family 1st stage/reF/Millikan: Any set of entities having the same or reproductively established characters derived from repetitive reproductions of the same character of the same model form a reproductively established family of 1st level. N.B.: i.e. that the elements can be reproduced in the same way, but they do not have to! e.g. Tokens of the written word "dog" can be copied in writing, photocopied, printed, etc. For example, the repetition of a word by a parrot. Reproductively established family of higher level: I 24 (1) Any set of similar units produced by elements of the same reproductively established families if it is a direct eigenfunction of this family to produce these units and if all are produced in accordance with normal explanations, form a higher level reproductively established family. (2) Any set of similar units produced by elements of the same pattern, if one of the eigenfunctions of this pattern is to make later units coincide with earlier ones, and this similarity is in accordance with a normal explanation of this function, form a reproductively established family of higher level. I 27 Def method of difference/Mill/Millikan: trial and error, but with only one trial and one observation. I 109 Substance/Properties/Millikan: Thesis: "Substance" and "properties" are categories that are cut off relative to each other and relative to the operation of the negation. They do not mutually exclude one another. Properties/Millikan: properties are varied elements of facts, receptive to negation. Substances/Millikan: substances are also variable, but relative to other transformations. I 127 Def Hubot/Terminology/Millikan: Hubots are beings that are like us, except that they all think in the same inner language. (This is unlikely for humans). (Other classification, other opposites, other concept pairs > order). In addition, Hubots never develop new concepts. N.B.: the example is to show that Fregean senses and intensions are not the same. I 130 Def Rubots/Rubot/Terminology/Millikan: Rubots are like Hubots, (sensitive to light, odors, temperature, touch) but in a different frequency spectrum than Hubots. Vocabulary: may still be perfectly coordinated with the environment with regard to the meaning (as with the Hubots). I 130 Def Rumans/Ruman/Terminology/Millikan: Rumans apply color concepts like Hubots. And they also live in a similar environment (but initially somewhere else). Color/Color concepts/Perception/Spectrum: unlike the Hubots, the Rumans live under a sun that emits much redder light. Language/Stimulus Meaning/Hubots/Rumans/Millikan: Suppose the mechanisms that produce their sentences are identical. That is, the stimulus meanings of their expressions correspond perfectly! I 151 Def "fully-developed" Intension/Terminology/Millikan: the fully-developed intension is the intensions, which an inner term can have beyond the language-bound intentions. I 277 Complete concept/Millikan: to have a complete concept, one needs time concepts. Accessibility: complete concepts for durable objects are not as accessible as concepts for substances such as e.g. domestic cat or e.g. gold. I 281 Summary/substance/property/identity/self-identity/Millikan: Perfect Secondary Substance: e.g. gold: has an identity that is formally the same as that of an individual in relation to its properties. Imperfect secondary substance: e.g. 69s Plymouth (contradiction to above) e.g. domestic cat: have a kind of identity that is formally analogous to the identity of perfect substances. For example, in accordance with laws in situ, instead of under all natural conditions. I 289 Def Subessence/Terminology/Millikan: e.g. Gold exists over space and time, without being instantiated in the same objects. It is an identity that the material has relative to its own properties. I 332 Veil/Millikan: authors such as Wittgenstein and Quine have once again introduced a veil, like Descartes and Hume earlier. I 325 Def "Meaning-rationalism"/Millikan: Thesis: the knowledge that a proposition has meaning is not empirical, but a priori. Unlike knowledge about judgments, this is empirical. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Verification | Anscombe | Frank I 107 I/Identity/Verification/Anscombe: E.g. "I am standing" is verified by my standing body. E.g. Nothing verifies however in a comparable way "I see a variety of colors"! Anscombe: one could say: "the thought"! But the question is, what it means for the thought to be verified like this? >Thoughts. The Cartesian thoughts all have the same character, that in their descriptions they are little different from the descriptions of the events and the persons on whom they could be verified. >R. Descartes. Even if there are such processes, then the thoughts are not thoughts of such processes, such as the thought of standing. >I, >Self-consciousness, >Self-identity, >Self-identification. G. Elizabeth M.Anscombe (1975a): The First Person, in: Samuel Guttenplan (ed.) (I975): Mind and Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974, Oxford 1975,45-65 |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Ayers, M. | Rorty Vs Ayers, M. | VI 408 Philosophy/Rorty: we have distinguish clear clearly between questions of the tasks of philosophy and content-related topics such as e.g. knowledge, and express ourselves as clearly as possible about their mutual relationship. Philosophy/Rorty: the following theses tend to be represented by the same people 1) Realism/Anti-Realism important distinction 2) Dummett is right: these Antirealism/Realism struggles have been decisive in the history of philosophy. >Antirealism, >Realism. VI 409 3) Wilson was right to express doubts about the contingency of problems. 4) Ayers is right to say that we must allow our own metaphysical and epistemological views to be influenced by our politics and morals. 5) Color: the problem of the "essence of color" is not solvable. The same is true, consequently, for the body-mind problem. 6) Descartes' >skepticism is ahistorical. 7) Sellars and Davidson are wrong when they say that the senses merely play a causal role. Pro McDowell: revival of empiricism. 8) self-identity is not dependent on description, but on intrinsic, non-relational features. Some terms are rigid. 9) Recognition of the unspeakable is laudable intellectual modesty. 10) Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding`" is not a guide, but a work that is yet to be studied and still holds not yet articulated truths. RortyVsAyers: in all 10 theses above, Ayers and I represent diametrically opposed views. VI 410 Rorty: we will never be able to establish a "purely logical" argument for or against one of the 10 theses. VI 411 "Linguistic Idealism"/Rorty: battle cry of AyersVsSellars. RortyVsAyers: a lot it must be established in language before a plausible reference to the taste of onions is at all possible. VI 412 This includes the notion of an inner "Cartesian stage". >Cartesianism. This includes the notion of "consciousness" - (As 17th century notion). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Derrida, J. | Putnam Vs Derrida, J. | III 96 ff However, the typical representatives of relativism paradoxically believe they had made something like a metaphysical discovery. Deconstructivism/Derrida/Putnam: he completes step from relativism to nihillism. This concept of truth is incoherent and belongs to a "metaphysics of presence" (Derrida). Derrida, allegedly: "the concept of truth is inconsistent, but absolutely essential!" PutnamVsDerrida: What do you mean, every use of the word "true" contains a contradiction? III 97 The failure of a number of mutually exclusive philosophical explanations of the concept of truth is something completely different from the failure of the concept of truth itself! LL Wittgenstein: the failure of a number of philosophical analyses of certainty is something other than the failure of the normal concept of certainty. PutnamVsDerrida: but the collapse of a particular worldview is far from being a collapse of the concepts of representation and truth. Because if we equate this metaphysical tradition with our lives and our language, we would be giving metaphysics an entirely exaggerated importance. DerridaVsSaussure: approves this, he criticized Saussure only in that he did not go further and abandoned the concept of the character altogether. III 163 PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida overlooks here that Saussure's way of thinking was based on a utopian project. It had been hoped that a a stringent scientific explanation of the concept of meaning could be given. This hope has failed, but we are not forced to the absurd view that nobody could understand a language other than their own idiolect. Even Derrida himself does not go that far. He recognizes the indispensability of translations indeed. III 164 Solution/Putnam: the alternative to Saussure's view is that retaining the concept of "meaning equality", while realizing that it must not be interpreted in the sense of self-identity of objects called "meaning" or "significate". III 165 Can it be that Derrida makes the same mistake as Jerry Fodor? He does not even consider the possibility that the kind of "meaning equality" aimed at in translation could be an interest-relative (but still very real) relationship, which presupposes a normative judgment, i.e. a judgment about what is reasonable in the individual case. III 168 Derrida/Putnam: his attitude is much harder to pin down. (DerridaVsLogocentrism.) Derrida himself emphasizes that the logocentric quandary was no "pathology" for which he had a cure to offer. We must fall into this quandary by fate. >Logocentrism. By his leftist supporters Derrida has often been interpreted as if this justified even a consistent rejection of the idea of the rational justification. Forgery/Bernstein: "You cannot falsify just anything." Richard BernsteinVsDerrida: what do the texts by Derrida have about them that permits, or even demands this double interpretation? It is ultimately true that "not just anything can be falsified". III 171 PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida's quandary is one in which those fall who, albeit not wanting to be "irresponsible", also want to "problematize" the concepts of reason and truth by teaching that these concepts have failed. His steps amount to the fact that the concepts "rationale", "strong reason", "justification", etc. correspond to repressive practices more than anything. And this view is dangerous indeed, because it offers help and comfort to all sorts of left and right extremists. I (a) 22 PutnamVsDerrida: its criticism of "logocentrism" is not only wrong, but dangerous. I (k) 266 Deconstruction/PutnamVsDerrida: is right in that a certain philosophical tradition (for example, binary logic) is simply bankrupt. But identifying this tradition with our lives and our language is to give metaphysics a completely exaggerated importance. Meaning Equality/PutnamVsDerrida: is actually an interest-relative one! It contains a judgment about what is reasonable in each case. I (k) 273 PutnamVsDerrida: deconstruction without reconstruction is irresponsibility. >Deconstructionism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Frege, G. | Newen Vs Frege, G. | I 209 Physicalism/Identity Theory/New: because of the possibility that mental phenomena could be realized in different ways (functionalism) token physicalism was abandoned in favor of type physicalism. (VsToken Physicalism) Functionalism/Newen: Problem: we do not know what the possibly physical states have in common ((s) on a mental level). Mental Universals/Newen: are needed then. Bieri: Problem: either a theory about mental universals seems empirically implausible. Or it is empirically plausible, then it does not tell us what we want to know. (Bieri: Anal. Ph. d. Geistes, p. 41). Functional State/Newen: similar to dispositions in that it can be characterized by hypothetical relations between initial situations and consequent states. I 211 VsFunctionalism/Newen: qualia problem FunctionalismVsVs: zombie argument: I 212 There need be no qualia to explain behavior. Mental Causation/Newen: is still an open question. NS I 90 Descriptions/Theory/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: the objective is to overcome two problems: 1) identity statements: need to be informative 2) negative existential statements or statements with empty descriptions must be sensible. Names/Personal Names/Russell: Thesis: names are nothing but abbreviations for decriptions. Theory of Descriptions/Russell: E.g. 1) There is at least one author of "Waverley" (existence assertion). 2) There is not more than one author of "Waverley" (uniqueness assertion) 3) Whoever wrote "Waverley", was a Scot (statement content). This is about three possible situations where the sentence may be wrong: a) nobody wrote Waverley, b) several persons did it, c) the author is not a Scot. NS I 91 Identity/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: if the identity of Cicero with Tullius is necessary (as self-identity), how can the corresponding sentence be informative then? Solution/Russell: 1) There is at least one Roman consul who denounced Catiline 2) There is not more than one Roman consul who denounced Catiline 1*) There is at least one author of "De Oratore" 2*) There is not more than one author of "De Oratore" 3) whoever denounced Catiline is identical with the author of "De Oratore". Empty Names/Empty Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Solution: 1) There is at least one present king of France 2) There is not more than one present king of France 3) Whoever is the present King of France is bald. Thus the sentence makes sense, even though the first part of the statement is incorrect. Negative Existential Statements/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: assigning a sensible content. It is not the case that 1) there is at least one flying horse 2) not more than one flying horse. Thus, the negative existence statement "The flying horse does not exist" makes sense and is true. RussellVsFrege/RussellvsFregean Sense/Newen/Schrenk: this is to avoid that "sense" (the content) must be assumed as an abstract entity. Truth-Value Gaps/RussellVsFrege: they, too, are thus avoided. Point: sentences that seemed to be about a subject, however, now become general propositions about the world. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Jackson, F. | Williamson Vs Jackson, F. | Stalnaker I 106 Global Supervenience/WilliamsonVsJackson/Stalnaker: as Jackson defines global supervenience, it is not sufficient for strong supervenience. Def Global Supervenience/Ethics/Jackson: (s) for all possible worlds (poss.w.) w and w' if w and w' are descriptively exactly the same, then they are also exactly the same from an ethical point of view. I.e. the ethical supervenes on the descriptive. I 107 WilliamsonVsJackson: shows that global supervenience in this sense can also apply if the strong supervenience does not apply: Def uniform property/Williamson/Stalnaker: be a property that is either true of all or nothing. ((s) then possible worlds may differ in that in one all things are u, in the other possible worlds is no thing u). ((s) uniform property(s): e.g. self-identity e.g. difference from other individuals). U: be the set of uniform properties N.B.: then U = U' (the closure on the set of U, properties that are definable in terms of uniform properties are themselves uniform). For example, suppose w and w' are equal in terms of all uniform properties, then w = w'. ((s) I.e. they are equal at all). So that all possible words which are the same in terms of uniform properties are also the same in terms of all properties! ((s) Because F properties are not yet introduced, see below). Then the set of all properties supervenes globally on the uniform properties. But this is not true for strong or even weak superveniences! Because two individuals existing in the same possible world will have the same uniform properties, but may differ in terms of non-uniform properties. StalnakerVsWilliamson: that is true, but it exploits the gap we have closed in the text. Therefore, it does not affect our outcome. Gap: Q: be a trait that applies to some but not all things in world w. ((s) I.e. F is not a uniform property, i.e. there are other properties besides u properties). f: be some picture of world w on itself that maps everything what is in w F, on something that is not F in w. w. will be U-indistinguishable from itself relative to figure f, but not {F}- indistinguishable from itself. ((s) Simple, because not all things are F, although all are u.) Therefore, any set of properties containing F will supervene globally on U. |
EconWillO Oliver E. Williamson Peak-load pricing and optimal capacity under indivisibility constraints 1966 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Bigelow Vs Kripke, S. A. | I 143 necessary identity/BigelowVsContingent identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: we should let the semantics decide and say that there is simply no contingent identity. ((s) BigelowVsKripke?). contingent identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: instead of changing the semantics in order to admit it after all, we should rather explain why it seems to exist: E.g. Description theory/Russell/Bigelow/Pargetter: provides a means to reconcile contingent with necessary identities: assertions of the form F = G Can be analyzed as contingent by saying that the properties F and G are contingently co-instantiated by a single thing. This is still consistent with the necessary self-identity. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| McGee, V. | Field Vs McGee, V. | II 351 Second Order Number Theory/2nd Order Logic/HOL/2nd Order Theory/Field: Thesis (i) full 2nd stage N.TH. is - unlike 1st stage N.TH. - categorical. I.e. it has only one interpretation up to isomorphism. II 352 in which the N.TH. comes out as true. Def Categorical Theory/Field: has only one interpretation up to isomorphism in which it comes out as true. E.g. second order number theory. (ii) Thesis: This shows that there can be no indeterminacy for it. Set Theory/S.th.: This is a bit more complicated: full 2nd order set theory is not quite categorical (if there are unreachable cardinal numbers) but only quasi-categorical. That means, for all interpretations in which it is true, they are either isomorphic or isomorphic to a fragment of the other, which was obtained by restriction to a less unreachable cardinal number. Important argument: even the quasi-categorical 2nd order theory is still sufficient to give most questions on the cardinality of the continuum counterfactual conditional the same truth value in all interpretations, so that the assumptions of indeterminacy in ML are almost eliminated. McGee: (1997) shows that we can get a full second order set theory by adding an axiom. This axiom limits it to interpretations in which 1st order quantifiers go above absolutely everything. Then we get full categoricity. Problem: This does not work if the 2nd order quantifiers go above all subsets of the range of the 1st order quantifiers. (Paradoxes) But in McGee (as Boolos 1984) the 2nd order quantifiers do not literally go above classes as special entities, but as "plural quantifiers". (>plural quantification). Indeterminacy/2nd Order Logic/FieldVsMcGee: (see above chapter I): Vs the attempt to escape indeterminacy with 2nd order logic: it is questionable whether the indeterminacy argument is at all applicable to the determination of the 2nd order logic as it is applicable to the concept of quantity. If you say that sentences about the counterfactual conditional have no specific truth value, this leads to an argument that the concept "all subsets" is indeterminate, and therefore that it is indeterminate which counts as "full" interpretation. Plural Quantification: it can also be indeterminate: Question: over which multiplicities should plural quantifiers go?. "Full" Interpretation: is still (despite it being relative to a concept of "fullness") quasi-unambiguous. But that does not diminish the indeterminacy. McGeeVsField: (1997): he asserts that this criticism is based on the fact that 2nd order logic is not considered part of the real logic, but rather a set theory in disguise. FieldVsMcGee: this is wrong: whether 2nd order logic is part of the logic, is a question of terminology. Even if it is a part of logic, the 2nd order quantifiers could be indeterminate, and that undermines that 2nd order categoricity implies determinacy. "Absolutely Everything"/Quantification/FieldVsMcGee: that one is only interested in those models where the 1st. order quantifiers go over absolutely everything, only manages then to eliminate the indeterminacy of the 1st order quantification if the use of "absolutely everything" is determined!. Important argument: this demand will only work when it is superfluous: that is, only when quantification over absolutely everything is possible without this requirement!. All-Quantification/(s): "on everything": undetermined, because no predicate specified, (as usual E.g. (x)Fx). "Everything" is not a predicate. Inflationism/Field: representatives of inflationist semantics must explain how it happened that properties of our practice (usage) determine that our quantifiers go above absolutely everything. II 353 McGee: (2000) tries to do just that: (*) We have to exclude the hypothesis that the apparently unrestricted quantifiers of a person go only above entities of type F, if the person has an idea of F. ((s) i.e. you should be able to quantify over something indeterminate or unknown). Field: McGee says that this precludes the normal attempts to demonstrate the vagueness of all-quantification. FieldVsMcGee: does not succeed. E.g. Suppose we assume that our own quantifiers determinedly run above everything. Then it seems natural to assume that the quantifiers of another person are governed by the same rules and therefore also determinedly run above everything. Then they could only have a more limited area if the person has a more restricted concept. FieldVs: the real question is whether the quantifiers have a determinate range at all, even our own! And if so, how is it that our use (practices) define this area ? In this context it is not even clear what it means to have the concept of a restricted area! Because if all-quantification is indeterminate, then surely also the concepts that are needed for a restriction of the range. Range/Quantification/Field: for every candidate X for the range of unrestricted quantifiers, we automatically have a concept of at least one candidate for the picking out of objects in X: namely, the concept of self-identity! ((s) I.e. all-quantification. Everything is identical with itself). FieldVsMcGee: Even thoguh (*) is acceptable in the case where our own quantifiers can be indeterminate, it has no teeth here. FieldVsSemantic Change or VsInduction!!!. II 355 Schematic 1st Stage Arithmetic/McGee: (1997, p.57): seems to argue that it is much stronger than normal 1st stage arithmetic. G. is a Godel sentence PA: "Primitive Arithmetic". Based on the normal basic concepts. McGee: seems to assert that G is provable in schematic PA ((s) so it is not true). We just have to add the T predicate and apply inductions about it. FieldVsMcGee: that’s wrong. We get stronger results if we also add a certain compositional T Theory (McGee also says that at the end). Problem: This goes beyond schematic arithmetics. McGee: his approach is, however, more model theoretical: i.e. schematic 1st stage N.TH. fixes the extensions of number theory concepts clearly. Def Indeterminacy: "having non-standard models". McGee: Suppose our arithmetic language is indeterminate, i.e. It allows for unintended models. But there is a possible extension of the language with a new predicate "standard natural number". Solution: induction on this new predicate will exclude non-standard models. FieldVsMcGee: I believe that this is cheating (although some recognized logicians represent it). Suppose we only have Peano arithmetic here, with Scheme/Field: here understood as having instances only in the current language. Suppose that we have not managed to pick out a uniform structure up to isomorphism. (Field: this assumption is wrong). FieldVsMcGee: if that’s the case, then the mere addition of new vocabulary will not help, and additional new axioms for the new vocabulary would help no better than if we introduce new axioms simply without the new vocabulary! Especially for E.g. "standard natural number". Scheme/FieldVsMcGee: how can his rich perspective of schemes help to secure determinacy? It only allows to add a new instance of induction if I introduce new vocabulary. For McGee, the required relevant concept does not seem to be "standard natural number", and we have already seen that this does not help. Predicate/Determinacy/Indeterminacy/Field: sure if I had a new predicate with a certain "magical" ability to determine its extension. II 356 Then we would have singled out genuine natural numbers. But this is a tautology and has nothing to do with whether I extend the induction scheme on this magical predicate. FieldVsMysticism/VsMysticism/Magic: Problem: If you think that you might have magical aids available in the future, then you might also think that you already have it now and this in turn would not depend on the schematic induction. Then the only possible relevance of the induction according to the scheme is to allow the transfer of the postulated future magical abilities to the present. And future magic is no less mysterious than contemporary magic. FieldVsMcGee: it is cheating to describe the expansion of the language in terms of its extensions. The cheating consists in assuming that the new predicates in the expansion have certain extensions. And they do not have them if the indeterminist is right regarding the N.Th. (Field: I do not believe that indeterminism is right in terms of N.Th.; but we assume it here). Expansion/Extenstion/Language/Theory/FieldVsMcGee: 2)Vs: he thinks that the necessary new predicates could be such for which it is psychological impossible to add them at all, because of their complexity. Nevertheless, our language rules would not forbid her addition. FieldVsMcGee: In this case, can it really be determined that the language rules allow us something that is psychologically impossible? That seems to be rather a good example of indeterminacy. FieldVsMcGee: the most important thing is, however, that we do not simply add new predicates with certain extensions. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Plato | Meixner Vs Plato | I 104 Exemplification/E./Meixner: the actual (strong, not Meinongean) exemplification has still two forms: the predicative exemplification, in which the exemplified entity y is a predicative universal (U), i.e. a single-digit or multi-digit U, and the type exemplification, in which the exemplified entity is a non-predicative U, i.e. a type-object. Predicative Exemplification: can be traced back to the actuality of instantiation facts. Type Exemplification/Meixner: reminiscent of Plato's "Participation": "x is sufficiently similar to the idea (the type object)". Today: when we think of "beauty" we think of a certain universalism, namely the property of being beautiful (= o1[o1 is beautiful]). Plato: thought on the other hand of a certain type object; the idea of beauty. Participation/Plato: For example, Diotima participates in beauty because it is different from beauty. Meixner: undoubtedly, beauty is now sufficiently similar to beauty (timeless), because it is even identical to it. Thus follows Plato's original interpretation of type exemplification, I 105 that the beauty EXEM T the beauty. It follows that the sentence "Beauty is beautiful" is true! This is the most famous Platonic self-predication. The fact that beauty is beautiful, justice just, ugliness ugly and injustice unjust could perhaps still be accepted. MeixnerVsPlato: Problem: if bravery is supposed to be brave and dirtiness dirty (quite apart from the fact that the idea of dirtiness no longer suits the upscale society of beauty, justice, etc.). It becomes completely implausible with the type object human being: according to Plato's original theory, the type object human being would be a human being itself. (Because of self-identity, not only similarity). Solution/Meixner: each type object (TO) should have a unique property. x EXEM T y = y is a TO and y EXEM P is the y corresponding property. The corresponding property is known to us, namely "the y corresponding property is a one-digit universal and is a fact and actual". Question: is there a better alternative to this exemplification theory? (So not type exemplification as "predicative exemplification turned into non-predicative" as it were?). I 106 Exemplification/Plato/Meixner: originally: mirroring from more or less great distance, where in the borderline case image and original coincide. Participation: here another alternative already suggests itself. Concatenation: also exemplification as concatenation is at least indicated in Plato. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Saussure, F. de | Putnam Vs Saussure, F. de | Putnam III 162 Saussure assumed that the idea of a system of differences should be transferred as a whole by the individual elements to the language . (to semantics). But in fact it is so that different languages do not have the same semantic opposites available. A language might only have four basic colors, another 7. Such a way out leads quite quickly to the conclusion that meanings are reserved to specific individual languages. And from here it is not far to the thought that they are reserved for different "texts". According to this thesis two languages never express the same meanings. So even the concept of the meaning that can release itself from the sign, collapses. DerridaVsSaussure: is that good, he criticized Saussure only that he did not go further, and that he dropped the concept of the sign completely. --- I (k) 276 Definition signifié/Putnam: this signified is in the French semiology the meaning of the signified, the intension, not the extension. --- I (k) 266/269 PutnamVsSaussure: the alternative to his view is to maintain the concept of "meaning equality", while one recognizes that it must not be interpreted as the self-identity of objects, which are called "meaning" or "signified". There is no question of a mathematically clean equivalence or non-equivalence of contrast systems, when two uses of a word can be seen as "same" or "not the same". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Slingshot Argument | Searle Vs Slingshot Argument | III 231 SearleVsSlingshot argument: an argument of this kind can at most show the falsity of its conditions. Contra intuitive consequences. III 232 Irrelevance: the statement that snow is white corresponds to no fact that concerns Diogenes. Even the self-identity of Diogenes (or the fact that 2 + 2 = 4) has nothing to do with what makes the statement that snow is white, true. Correspondence theory: some authors accuse it of being a petitio principii. III 233 The accusation can be returned. It is petitio principii to insinuate the correspondence theory that it should be subjected to principles such as 2b, if no argument for the applicability of this principle is given. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Williams, B. | Nozick Vs Williams, B. | II 29 Self/Person/Self-Identity/Identity/B.Williams: E.g. two stories that put together present us with a mystery: Case 1: a person enters a new body, or rather two persons exchange their bodies. Two persons, A and B enter a machine A body person: (now connected to the body A): has all the memories, all the knowledge, values, behaviors, etc. of the (former, complete) person B. In the body A is now the "vector product" of this B material with the physical boundaries of body A. Similarly, all the other way round for B. The situation is symmetrical. II 29/30 If A were to decide (after substitutions) now, which severe pain should be inflicted by the two bodies, then A would select the A body for it! Because he believes that he himself inhabits the B body. Case 2: Imagine someone tells them that they are to endure terrible pain. That frightens them. Next, they get the information that they will undergo an enormous change in their psychological constitution, perhaps to the extent that they will have exactly the same character, the memories and behaviors of someone else, who is currently alive. That will scare them even more. They do not want to lose their identity and suffer pain afterwards. Williams: question: why had person A not exactly the same concerns when she heard the first story, as in Case 2? What makes the first story a story about the transfer of a person to a different body and not a story about something that happens to a person who remains who they are? How can the difference consist in that in the first case, in addition to what happens to body A, II 31 also A's memories and mind end or are newly created in body B? Problem: what happens anywhere else can have no effect on whether A continues to live in body A. If this happens to a body, it is a psychological task and the acquisition of a new psyche. Question: how can two tasks and the acquisition of new memories and values result in the exchange of two bodies? Body A / B Body 1) Situation acquires memories + character of B/acquires memories + character of A 2) Situation acquires memories + character of B/keeps memories + character or perhaps entirely new Two principles should explain this: Principle 1/Williams: If x at t1 is the same individual as y after t2, then this can only depend on facts about x, y and the relations between them. No facts about any other existing thing are relevant. That entails: Principle 2/Williams: if y at t2 (is part of the same continuous particular like) x at t1, by virtue of a relation R to x at t1, then there could be another additional thing z at t2 that also (together with y) stands in R to x at t1. If this additional thing z at t2 exists, then neither z nor y would be identical to x. If this z could potentially exist now, although it does currently not exist, then y at t2 is not identical with y at t1, at least not by virtue of relation R! ((s) If there is a relation R that allows identity at a later time, then several things can "benefit" from that and then the identity (which must be unique) would be destroyed. This is true even if the existence of a second thing is merely possible.) II 32 Self/Identity/Person/Williams: Williams had formulated these two principles in three earlier publications to support his thesis: Physical identity is a necessary condition of personal identity. Otherwise it would be possible to imagine that e.g. a person enters a machine, disappears and appears again in another machine at a distance without having crossed the space between them. Or: E.g. There could be a third machine on the other side from which an also (qualitatively) different identical being emerges. Neither would be the original person who had entered the machine in the middle. Now, if in this case of double materialization the original person is not identical with either of the two later persons, so not even in the first case, where only one person appears in a different place. Williams: the mere possibility that someone appears intermittently in another place is sufficient to show that he himself cannot be the same person without doubling. 1) Principle: Identity of something cannot depend on whether there is another thing of some sort. 2) Principle: if it is possible that there was another thing that prevented identity, then there is no identity, even if this other thing did not exist! ((s) The first follows from the second here). NozickVsWilliams: both principles are wrong. 1) (without personal identity): E.g. the Vienna Circle was expelled from Vienna by the Nazis, one member, Reichenbach, came to Istanbul. Suppose there were 20 members of the circle, three of which went to Istanbul and continued to meet. In 1943, they hear that the others are dead. Now they are the Vienna Circle which meets in Istanbul. ((s) ArmstrongVs/ChisholmVs: a local property is not a property.) In 1945, they learn that 9 other members continued to meet in America and further developed the same philosophical program. Nozick: then the group in America is the Vienna Circle, the one in Istanbul is just the offshoot. Nozick: how is that possible? Either the group in Istanbul is the Vienna Circle or it is not. How can this be influenced by something that takes place elsewhere? ((s) Because subsets play a role here, which do not play a role, e.g. in personal identity. Analogue would have been to assume that some of the psychological characteristics are kept during the body changes). II 33 Nozick: E.g. would it not be clear that if the 9 others had survived living underground in Vienna, this would show that the Istanbul group is not the Vienna Circle? So the First Principle (Williams) cannot be applied here: it is not plausible to say that if the group of three in Istanbul is the same entity as the original Vienna Circle, that this can only depend on relations between the two ... Nozick: ...and not on whether anything else exists. Def "Next Successor"/Closest Continuer/Nozick: Solution: The Istanbul group is the next successor. Namely so if no other group exists. But if the group in America exists, it is the next successor. Which one constitutes the Vienna Circle depends (unlike Williams) on the existence of other things. Being something later means being the next successor. ((s) and being able to be called later then depends on the amount of shared properties). E.g. How many other groups of the Vienna Circle are there in exile? ("Scheme"). Identity in Time:/Nozick: it is no problem for something to replace its parts and to keep the identity. E.g. Ship of Theseus/Nozick: 2nd ship made of collection of discarded parts from the old ship: two originals? (Was already known in this form in antiquity). Next Successor: helps to structure the problem, but not solve it. Because the scheme does not say of itself, which dimension of weighted sum of dimensions determine the proximity. Two possibilities: a) spatio-temporal continuity b) continuity of the parts. If both are weighted equally, there is a stalemate. II 34 Neither of them is the next successor. And therefore none is the original. But even if one originally existed without the other, it would be the original as next successor. Perhaps the situation is not a stalemate, but an unclear weighting, the concepts may not be sharp enough to rank all possible combinations. Personal Identity/Nozick: this is different, especially when it comes to ourselves: here we are not ready, that it is a question of decision of the stipulation. Ship of Theseus/NozickVsWilliams: external facts about external things do matter: when we first hear the story, we are not in doubt, only once the variant with the second, reconstructed ship comes into play. Next Successor/Nozick: necessary condition for identity: something at t2 is not the same entity as x at t1 if it is not x's next successor. If two things are equally close, none of them is the next successor. Something can be the next successor of x without being close enough to x to be x itself! If the view of the next successor is correct, then our judgments about identity reflect weights of dimensions. Form of thought: reversal: we can conversely use these judgments to discover these dimensions. II 35 A property may be a factor for identity without being a necessary condition for it. Physical identity can also be an important factor. If something is the next successor, it does not mean that his properties are qualitatively the same as those of x, or are similar to them! Rather, they arise from the properties of x. They are definitely causally caused! Spatio-Temporal Continuity/Nozick: cannot be explained merely as a film without gaps. Counter-example: The replacement with another thing would not destroy the continuity of the film! Causal Relation/Next Successor: the causal relation does not need to involve temporal continuity! E.g. every single thing only possessed a flickering existence (like messages through the telephone). If this applies to all things, it is the best kind of continuity. NozickVsWilliams: but if you find that some things are not subject to the flickering of their existence, then you will no longer talk of other things as the best realizations of continuously existing things. Dependency of identity on other things! Theology/God/Identity/Nozick: Problem: if the causal component is required, and suppose God keeps everything in continuous existence, closing all causal connections in the process: how does God then distinguish the preservation of an old thing in continuity from the production of a new, qualitatively identical thing without interrupting a "movie"? II 36 Temporal Continuity/NozickVsWilliams: how much temporal continuity is necessary for a continuous object depends on how closely things are continuously related elsewhere. Psychology/Continuity/Identity/Nozick: experiments with objects which emerge (again) more or less changed after a time behind a screen. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
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Reference |
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| Selbstidentität | Kripke, S.A. | Newen / Schrenk I 87 Self-identity / identity / Kripke / Newen / Schrenk: Kripke: self-identity is necessary - E.g. Cicero is identical with Tully -((s) not that Cicero s first name was Tullius). Newen / Schrenk I 101 Name / Mill / Newen / Schrenk: the meaning of a name is the designated object. VsMill: Problem: blank name and informative identity sentences. Eg "Cicero is identical with Tully": if the meaning is the object then we have here only the self-identity that is necessary. |
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| Names | Mill, J. St. | Newen / Schrenk I 101 Name / Mill / Newen / Schrenk: the meaning of a name is the designated object. VsMill: Problem: empty names and informative identity sentences. E.g. "Cicero is identical with Tully": if the meaning is the object then we have here only the self-identity that is also necessary. |
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| Meaning/Content | Perry, J. | Newen/Schrenk I 110 Singular Term/Meaning Theory/Perry/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis: different adequacy conditions are taken into account for different expressions. Perry: Separation of meaning and content Meaning/Perry: (a linguistic expression): the description associated with language competence. For example, the rule that Aristotle is called "Aristotle". (Language rule). Content/Singular Term/Perry: different ways to characterize a thought. Name/Content/Perry: Thesis: always the designated object (for any type of content). Thus he takes into account Kripke's theory that names are referential terms. Problem: e.g. Bieri is identical with Pascal Mercier: here the informativity of the identity is not reflected in the content, because the content is therefore the self-identity. Identity/Informative identity phrases/Perry: does not have to be completely dealt with within semantics. Cognitive Adequacy/Perry: cannot be completely fulfilled within semantics. (>Pragmatics). Similar to Kripke. Description/Indicators/Perry: have other contents than names. Description/Perry: has an identifying condition as referential content, which can be specified by the description. Designatory content: (of the description) is then the object. Semantics/Pragmatics/Perry/Newen/Schrenk: pragmatic aspects (reading, use) are already taken into account within semantics. Perry: thesis there are multiple statements for description and indicators. |
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| Bare Particulars | Stalnaker, R. | I 72 Bare Individuals/Anti-Essentialism/Stalnaker: Thesis: For every individual and every characteristic there are possible worlds in which the individual has this characteristic and other worlds in which it does not have it - exceptions: Self-identity - Problem: for this we need a special semantics. I 79 Bare Individuals/linguistic essentialism/Stalnaker: we can even bring this together with the thesis of bare individuals: it can be assumed as a purely linguistic fact that certain normal predicates are world-indexed (in relation to the real world) rather than properties in the narrower sense. For example, according to this, Babe Ruth would be essentially human, but still he could look like a billiard ball or even be one. |
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