Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 47 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Attributes | Quine | VII (d) 75ff Attribute/Quine: an attribute may eventually be introduced in a second step: e.g. "squareness" according to geometrical definition, but then the name also requires substitutability, i.e. an abstract entity > Universals. X 7ff Attribute/Quine: an attribute corresponds to properties, predicates are not the same as attributes. >Predicates/Quine. IX 178ff Attribute/(s): an attribute corresponds to the quantity of those x for which a particular condition applies: {x: x ε a} all objects that are mortal. Predicate: "x is mortal", is not a quantity, but a propositional function. The denomination forms refer "φx", "φ(x,y)" to the attribution. >Propositional Function/Quine. XII 38 Attributary Attitude/Quine: E.g. hunting, needing, catching, fearing, missing. Important to note here is that e.g. "lion hunt" does not require lions as individuals but as a species - > Introduction of properties. IX 177 Attributes/Ontology/Russell: for Russell, the universe consisted of individuals, attributes and relations of them, attributes and relations of such attributes and relations, etc. IX 178f Extensionality/Quine: extensionality is what distinguishes attributes and classes. >Extensionality/Quine So Russell has more to do with attributes than with classes. Two attributes can be of different order and are therefore certainly different, and yet the things that each have one or the other attribute are the same. For example the attribute "φ(φ^x <> φy) where "φ" has the order 1, an attribute only from y. For example the attribute ∀χ(χ^x <> χy), where "χ" has order 2, again one attribute only from y, but one attribute has order 2, the other has order 3. (> Classes/ >Quantities/ >Properties). XIII 22 Class/set/property/Quine: whatever you say about a thing seems to attribute a property to it. Property/Attribute/Tradition/Quine: in earlier times one used to say that an attribute is only called a property if it is specific to that thing. (a peculiarity of this object is...). New: today these two expressions (attribute, property) are interchangeable. "Attribute"/Quine: I do not use this term. Instead I use "property". Identity/equality/difference/properties/Quine: if it makes sense to speak of properties, then it also makes sense to speak of their equality or difference. Problem: but it does not make sense! Problem: if everything that has this one property, also has the other. Shall we say that it is simply the same quality? Very well. But people do not talk like that. For example to have a heart/kidney: is not the same, even if it also applies to the same living beings. Coextensivity/Quine: two properties are not sufficient for their identity. Identity/properties/possible solution: is there a necessary coextensiveness? >Coextensive/Quine Vs: Necessity is too unclear as a term. Properties/Quine: We only get along so well with the term property because identity is not so important for their identification or differentiation. XIII 23 Solution/Quine: we are talking about classes instead of properties, then we have also solved the problem e.g. heart/kidneys. Classes/Quine: are defined by their elements. That is the way of saying it, but unwisely, because the misunderstanding might arise that the elements cause the classes in a different way than objects cause their. Def Singleton/Singleton/Single Class: class with only one element. Def Class/Quine: (in useful use of the word): is simply a property in the everyday sense, without distinguishing coextensive cases. XIII 24 Class/Russell/Quine: it struck like a bomb when Russell discovered the platitude that each containment condition (condition of containment, element relationship) establishes a class. (see paradoxes, see impredictiveness). Russell's Paradox/Quine: applies to classes as well as to properties. It also shatters the platitude that anything said about a thing attributes a property. Properties/Classes/Quine: all restrictions we impose on classes to avoid paradoxes must also be imposed on properties. Property/Quine: we have to tolerate the term in everyday language. Mathematics: here we can talk about classes instead, because coextensiveness is not the problem. (see Definition, > Numbers). Properties/Science/Quine: in the sciences we do not talk about properties. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Barcan-Formula | Quine | VII (h) 156 Modal Logic/Barcan Marcus/Quine: Barcan-Formula: (38) (x)(y) {(x = y) › [notw (x = y)]} Quine: this means that at least some moves determine an object necessarily. (Compare "p . Fx"). Fitch follows Barcan. Note that (38) follows directly from (36) along with a law of substitutability for variables: (x)(y) [(x = y . Fx) › Fy]. Summary/Quine: Conclusion of the whole: one has to accept an Aristotelian essentialism if one wants to allow quantified modal logic. (s) Therefore, Kripke calls himself an essentialist. Ad VII (h) 156 > |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Calculability | Church | Thiel I 249 Calculability/Church/Thiel: how close did one get to a concept of "general calculability"? There is the concept of "Turing calculability" of "l-definability in Church, the "canonical systems" in Post. Each function, which is in one of these classes, is also demonstrable in the others. Church: Church has then assumed the presumption that an adequate specification of the general concept of calculability is achieved. ("Church thesis"). >"Church-Thesis". But it means that this is an "non-mathematical" presumption, and is not capable of any mathematical proof. An intuitive term. Whether such a specification is "adequate" cannot be answered by mathematical means. >Adequacy. I 250 Apart from finiteness and constructivity, there remain other questions: none of the definitions for the offered functional classes is finite: (e.g. μ-recursive functions). >Recursion, >Finiteness, >Definitions, >Definability. The attempt to describe effective executability with classical means remains questionable, but if we interpret the existence quantifier constructively, we have already presupposed the concept of constructivity. >Existential quantification, >Quantifiers, >Effectiveness. Thiel I 251 Calculability/Herbrand/Thiel: Due to Herbrand's demands, some of the classical laws of logic lose their validity. >J. Herbrand. For example, the end of ~ (x) A (x) to (Ex) ~ A (x) is not permissible: For example, that not all real numbers are algebraic, does not yet help us to a transfinite real number. For example, from the fact that the statements: "The decimal fraction development of pi contains an uninterrupted sequence of 1000 ones" and "The decimal fraction development of pi does not contain an uninterrupted sequence of 100 ones" both cannot be true (since the second statement follows from the first statement), one cannot conclude that the negation of the first statement or the last statement in the parenthesis is true. I 252 This counter-example, however, shows that the classic conclusion of ~ (a u b) to ~ a v ~ b is not permissible if the adjunction sign is to be used for the expression of a decidable alternative. In particular, as can be seen in the substitution of b by ~ a, we cannot conclude from ~ (a u ~ a) to ~ a v ~~ a, although this is a special case of the classical unrestrictedly valid tertium non datur. >Law of the excluded middle, >Logical constants, >Substitutability. |
Chur I A. Church The Calculi of Lambda Conversion. (Am-6)(Annals of Mathematics Studies) Princeton 1985 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Causality | Quine | I 33 Causality sentences as responses to stimuli. Graeser I 173 Causality/opportunity sentences/Quine: opportunity sentences provide us with causal hypotheses. Quine VI 106 Causality/Quine: we have no concept of causality that is as clear as we would like it to be. When science is particularly strict, it is content with constant correlations. (>Causality/Hume). VI 107 Disposition/Quine: this term is similar to causality in that it tolerates the substitutability of identity but blocks the predicate calculus. V 20/21 Def Cause/Quine: cause is ultimately the effect of forces on particles which is energy transmission (>Causality/Vollmer.) Causality/Quine: I am not interested in the epistemological basis like Hume, but in the ontological nature as the subject of a scientific theory. Even if the difference between energy and matter has been shaken in modern physics, the concept of cause is not out of place here. On a more abstract level, it simply plays no role. V 22 Cause/Quine: the interest in partial causes is remarkably independent of the share of energy transfer. For example, we have weak sound waves during communication and strong waves during a shot. V 23 Everyday language: "because" does not speak at all of energy transfer, but is also applied to logical premises, purposes, disposition. Disposition: is therefore often a better term than causality. >Dispositions/Quine. XI 112 Causality/QuineVsRegularity/QuineVsHume/Lauener: For example, to what kind of events does the crying of geese on the Capitol belong and to what belongs the salvation of Rome? |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Clauses | Schiffer | I 123 Subordinate clause/subset/singular term/Frege/Schiffer: -that the earth moves- = singular term: because of the lack of substitutability in intensional contexts. DavidsonVs/Schiffer: -the earth moves- is no part of a singular term. Cf. >Paratactic analysis. Neither clause nor proposition. >Proposition. The only reference of -earth- is earth. - I.e. there is substitutability. >Reference, >Substitution, >Asymmetry predicate/singular terms. I 285 Paratactic analysis/Davidson: three-digit relation. speaker, current statement (Italian), content clause of the reporting person. - But the surface grammar is two-digit and has a truth value. I 125 "That" in "that the earth moves"- is a singular term, that refers to a statement. >That clause. Problem: quantification into that-clauses. Must be elaborated for: E.g. Galileo says of a person that she makes a great lasagne. >Quantification, >Opaque contexts. Wrong solution: That-clause as orthographic part of "say-that". Then there is no term that carries the reference to the statement. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Content | Boer | I XIII Definition Thought/Boer: can be common to different states of mind. Proposition/Boer: I do not call it thought content, because this expression brings too much ballast with it. --- Note I XVIII Intensional transitive verbs: have three conditions, each of which is sufficient for itself: (i) failure of the principle of the substitutability of identity (ii) quantification permits a specific "narrow range" (iii) there is no existential (ontological) commitment. --- I XIV Direct objects/direct object/propositional settings/Boer: it is controversial whether the relation to direct thought objects can be analyzed as propositional attitudes. E.g. "search": here it is certainly the case, e.g. "worship": seems to contradict this analysis. Fulfillment conditions/EB/proopositional attitudes/individuation/Boer: N.B.: The fulfillment conditions do not appear to be sufficient to individuate a propositional attitude. On the other hand: Thought content/GI: seems to be sufficient for the individuation of a propositional attitude. Truth conditions: (and hence also the fulfillment conditions) can be the same for two beliefs, while the subject is not sure whether it is the same object. E.g. woodchucks/groundhogs. Propositional attitudes/Individuation/Lewis: (1969)(1): the mere existence of a convention of this kind presupposes that speakers from a community have certain propositional attitudes with certain fulfillment conditions. Abstract objects/propositional attitudes/Boer: in order to believe that patience is a virtue, one must think of patience. Definition mental reference/Terminology/Boer: Thinking of: be a mental analogue to speaker reference. Speaker reference/some authors: thesis: never exists in isolation, but is only a partial aspect of a speech act (utterance). --- I XV Mental reference: should then only be a partial aspect of thinking-of-something. Probably, there is also predication. Definition mental reference/Boer: be in a state of thought with a content of thought which defines a fulfillment condition of which the object is a constituent. Problem: non-existent objects. --- I XV Thought content/GI/Boer: must be carefully distinguished from any objects that it might contain. Definition object of thought/object/GO/Boer: "object of the propositional attitudes ψ" is clearly only the item/s to which a subject by the power of having ψ refers to. (s) So not the propositional attitudes themselves. Individuation/identification/Boer: should be identified by a that-sentence (in a canonical attribution of ψ). That-sentence/Boer: is the content (thought content). Content/thought content/Boer: is the that-sentence. Thinking about/Boer: what you think of something is the object itself. 1. David Lewis 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
| de dicto | Quine | II 147f De dicto: the intended term is in the sentence: the "necessary" number of planets is odd: that is wrong. It is notorious that the need de dicto does not obey the substitutability of identity. As long as it is all about variables, that is not a problem. Variables occur only de re. >Variables/Quine. Singular terms: here the substitutability of the simple identity does not apply to positions de dicto, but the substitutability of the necessary identity. >Substitution/Quine. II 150 Example: de dicto: Ralf believes "(Ex)(x is a spy)". de re: "There's someone Ralf thinks is a spy." de dicto: Ralf believes "Ortcutt is a spy." de re: Ralf believes "spy" of Ortcutt. >de re/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Demand for Money | Tobin | Mause I 225 Demand for Money/Keynesianism/Tobin: The Keynesian theory of money demand in the tradition of James Tobin(1) largely takes up the considerations of monetarist theory. (Economic policy/Monetarism: Thesis: All economic policy interventions are (...) assessed on the extent to which they influence the overall economic interest rate level. An expansive monetary policy initially causes interest rate cuts (liquidity effect) and thus considerable effects on the goods markets in the form of volume and price adjustments.) Tobin: Thesis: Market participants have a wealth of different investment opportunities for their assets. However, the portfolio theoretical transmission process calls into question the high substitutability between the individual asset classes. (...) This restricts the effectiveness of monetary policy. >Monetary policy, >Stock market, >Markets. 1. James Tobin, “The Interest Elasticity of the Transactions Demand for Cash”. Review of Economics and Statistics. 38 (3), 1956, S. 241– 247. |
EconTobin I James Tobin The Interest Elasticity of the Transactions Demand for Cash 1956 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Denotation | Quine | I 257 Indefinite terms do not denote objects. An indefinite singular term must therefore be in a purely denoting position: E.g. "The tax auditor is looking for someone" (the position is denoting - "someone" is not denoting). "Purely denoting" unambiguous (substitutability of identity) is not: "Tullius was a Roman" is trochaic - E.g. Tax auditor is looking for the director: -> propositional attitudes. Expression in quotation marks is not purely denoting. It has an ambiguous reference. Every truth function is transparent for denotation. Words denote, sentences do not denote (no singular term). Nevertheless, a sentence has a meaning: the singular term formed by bracketing of the sentence (this is no proposition). A proposition here is: completion of correct sentence to a timeless one. A timeless sentence is "The door is open": which door? This does not denote anything. I 413f Object: that what is denoted by singular terms, names and accepted as values. (But singular term is eliminated!) - E.g. "glimmer", but not "glimmeriness". II 61 ff Naming: is a name or singular term. Denoting: is to predict - both are referencing, not meaning various descriptions can name the same thing but have a different meaning. VII (a) 10ff Singular Term/Quine: a singular term must not denote. It has a gap between meaning and denotation. VII (c) 48ff Singular Terms/Quine: singular terms designate ("name"). >Singular Terms/Quine. A general term: means (denotes). - (> Descriptions). VII (h) 140 Purely denoting position/Quine: E.g. "Giorgione was called so because of his size". "So" is not purely denoting. Correct would be: "Giorgione was called Giorgione because...". This is then usable: "Barbarelli was called Giorgione because...". Missing substitutability signals is not a purely denoting position. One might say: The following incidents were non-denoting: "9" and "Evening Star" or "number of planets" in (15) - (17) but it is not about that. The point is that the substitution makes true statements false. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Denotation | Russell | Hintikka I 165 On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for real constituents of propositions. Problem/Frege: failure of the substitutability of the identity (SI) in intensional contexts. >Substitution, >Identity/Frege, >Opacity, >Intensionality, >Intension. Informative identity/Frege: that identity can sometimes be informative at all is related to this. ((s) Explanation: uninfromative identity. a0a - informative identity: a=b; the same object under a different description.) EG/existential generalization/Russell: it, too, can fail in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms). >Existential generalization, >Nonexistence. HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather avoids the problems with denotating terms. The present King/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential generalization that there is a present king of France. HintikkaVsRussell: but there are other problems. (See below: because of the ambiguity of the cross-world identification). >Cross world identification. Hintikka I 173 Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: N.B.: a brilliant feature of Russell's theory of the denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers who denote! >Quantifiers. Theory of Description/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") Thesis: contains the reduction of descriptions on objects of acquaintance. >Theory of descriptions/Russell. I 174 Hintikka: this connection is astonishing. It also appears to be circular, only to admit objects of acquaintance. Solution: we must see what successfully denotating phrases actually denote: they denote objects of acquaintance. >Acquaintance. Ambiguity/uniqueness/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization. E.g. Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: that only objects of acquaintance are allowed, shows its own example: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is actually a primary event, i.e. his example (2). "Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "whether" instead of "did not know". Secondary Description/Russell: can also be expressed in the way that George wanted to know from the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott. I 175 That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (at a distance) and asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell choose an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not normally deal with individuals of flesh and blood, whose identity is known to us, rather than merely with perceptual objects? Knowledge who/knowledge what/perception object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely in the case of perception objects, it seems as if the kind of uniqueness that we need for a knowledge-who does not exist. >Ambiguity. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Dependence | Boer | I 7 Conceptual dependency/conceptual/strong metaphysical intentionality/Boer: is the second feature of strong intentionality: is much more problematic: For example, Oedipus would like to marry Iokaste. marry. Must then be conceptually dependent, because he certainly does not want to marry his mother. --- I 8 Conceptual dependency/Boer: it seems that we should characterize it by (CD): (CD) R is a concept-dependent relation = it is possible that for some objects x and y and properties F and G, x R to y, qua has the thing that is F, but x has R not to y qua the thing which is G. Vs: this makes conceptual dependency easily to something paradox. It can happen that the identity of terms is no longer respected: E.g. objects a, b and x, so that b = c and a has R to b, but a does not have R to c. This would follow logically from (CD), if the definiens of (CD) was merely symbolized as M (Ex) (Ey) (EF) (EG) (y = the F & y = the G & R (x, the F) & R (x, the G)). That would be fatal. Relation/Boer: the mere idea of a relation, which does not recognize the identity of its terms, violates the following two principles (in referential quantification): (P2) For objects x and y: if x = y, then for every property F applies, x has F iff Y has F. (Leibniz's law) (P3) Neccessary, for each double-digit relation R and objects x and y: x has R to y iff y has the relational property of being a thing z such that x has R to z (formal: "[λzRxz]"). This is the principle of abstraction/concretion. Both principles are indisputable and have (T2) as a consequence: (T2) For arbitrary objects x, y, z and every two-digit relation R: if y = z and x has R to y, then x has R to z. For according to (P3) there is then a property [λzRxz] which is exemplified by y. And because of y = z, z must have it itself, then it follows from (T2) that x has R to z. This derivation of T2) is not circular, because from the formula φ --- I 9 and equation [a = b] we derive with standard substitution for identity: Φ (a//b). Substitutability/Identity/Conceptual dependency/Boer: those who think that conceptually dependent relations do not respect the identity of their terms, would not the recognize substitutability. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
| Description Theory | Russell | Hintikka I 165 Descriptions/Russell/Hintikka: Definition primary description: for them, the substitutability of identity (SI) applies. Definition secondary description: for them the substitutability of identity (SI) fails. I 166 E.g. Russell: two readings: (1) George IV did not know whether Scott was the author of Waverley. Description/Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: "The Author of Waverley": (ix) A (x) Primary: the description has the following force: (2) (Ex)[A(x)&(y)A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (Scott = x). ((s) notation: the quantifier is here always a normal existence quantifier, mirrored E). That is, the quantifier has maximum range in the primary description. More likely, however, is the second reading: Secondary: (3) ~ George IV knew that (Ex)[A(x) & (y) > y = x & (Scott = x)]. ((s) narrow range) Range/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is a third possibility for the range of a quantifier ((s) "medium range"/Kripke). (4) ~ (Ex) [A(x) & (y)(A (y)> y = x) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)]. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| I, Ego, Self | Castaneda | Frank I 159 ff I/Castaneda: "volatile egos": like "here", "now", irreducible. - They are entirely epistemological, only for re-presentation, not empirical. Limited identity: only consubstantiation (sameness between coexisting sets of characteristics): not diachronic (transsubstatiation), therefore not all properties are identical, no substitutability, no strict identity with person. "I" is criteria-less, content-neutral. - "I" can only be represented by the impersonal and situation independent quasi-indicator "he". I-design/Castaneda: Vs "I" as "Something". >Guise theory, >Quasi-Indicator. I 167ff I*/Castaneda: "I myself" in an episode of self-awareness one refers to oneself - (corresponding for he*). I 186 "I" is no demonstrative. >Demonstratives. I 170 Transcendent I/Castaneda: we experience ourselves as a not completely identical with the content of our experiencen and therefore associated to the world beyond experience. I 171 I/Self/Consciousness/Self-Awareness/SA/Logical Form/Hintikka/Castaneda: E.g. "The man who is actually a, knows that he is a". Wrong: "Ka (a = a). - Right: (Ex) (Ka (x = a)) -the individual variables occurring in "Ka (...)" are conceived as relating to a range of objects that a knows - "there is a person whom a knows, so that a knows that this person is a" - CastanedaVs: does not work with contingent assertions: "there is an object, so that a does not know it exists" - E.g. "the editor does not know that he is the editor" - (Ex) (Ka(x = a) & ~Ka(x = a))) was be a formal contradiction - better: (Exa)(Ka (x = a) & Ka (x = himself) (not expressible in Hintikka). I 226f I/Castaneda: no specific feature - different contrasts: opposites: this/that, I/she - I/he - I (meaning/acting person) - I/you - I/we -> Buber: I/it - I/you -> Saussure: network of contrasts (plural). Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 Frank I 378 I/hall of mirrors/Castaneda: seems to need two selves: one he speaks to, one he speaks about - but simple self as different from I and body not sufficient. I 430f I/Extra sense/Castaneda: psychological role that one associates with "I" - which explains mental states that do not explain proper names or descriptions: "I'm called for on the phone": spec. mental states - PerryVsCastaneda: not sufficient, you also need to know that it is the own It! - A proposition with "he*" itself says nothing about the meaning of this expression, therefore no identification - E.g. "heaviest man in Europe" could know this without a scale if "he*" could act independently without antecedent. Solution: intermediary extra sense for Sheila's beliefs about Ivan's extra-sense-i. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 I 470 I/Castaneda: Variable, not singular term, not singular reference: instead: i is the same as j and Stan believes of j... >Singular Terms, >Variables. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Intensionality | Boer | I 21 Definition Intensionality/Boer: is nowadays negative, defined as non-intensionality. So we need a definition of "extensional sentence". Denotation/denoting/Boer: Assuming, denotating terms are: names, indices, demonstrativa and mass terms. Definition English +/Boer: be an extension of English by zero or more denotating expressions and predicates. --- I 22 Definition extensional reading/Boer: (preliminary): E.g.: "A thing x is such that ... x ..." is unique, then it is an extensional reading S iff it fulfills the following extensional principles: Definition strong principle of existential generalization/extensionality/Boer: for a denotating term D and variable v which does not belong to S if S has the form [... D ...], then one can conclude from S validly [an existing thing v is such that ... v ...]. Definition replacement principle for co-extensive predicates/Boer: ...from [for object x1,...xn, either P(x1, ... xn) or Q (x1, ... xn) or neither P nor Q], one can deduce every sentence by replacing one or more occurrences of P in S by Q. (DF). (LL). Definition substituting principle for material-equivalent propositions/Boer: for every sentence P and Q in English +, if P is present in S, one can conclude from S and [Either P and Q, or neither P nor Q] every sentence one or several occurrences of P in S by Q. Definition of the substitutability of the identity/Boer: for each denotating term D and E of English+: if S has the form [... D ...], one can deduce every sentence from S and an equation of the form [D = E] (or [E = D ] which is formed by replacing one or more occurrences of D by E in S. --- I 22 Validity/everyday language/Boer: can only be asserted relatively to a particular reading. English +/Boer: we need it to exclude the fact that the four principles are not trivially fulfilled by there being no counterexamples to the inferences in question simply because there are not enough names or predicates to formulate one. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
| Leibniz Principle | Cresswell | I 127 Leibniz Principle/Identity/Cresswell: a) metaphysical (uncontroversial): indistinguishability b) linguistically: substitutability. >Indistinguishability, >Substitution. Problem: in the context of reference: are descriptions real qualifying words? >Reference, >Descriptions, >Designation. Indefinite description: no one believes that it is referring. Exception: Epsilon Operator/Hilbert: εxF (x): "an x such that F (x)". Indefinite description: here the Leibniz-Principle does not apply. ((s) Explanation: Example mathematics: √4: +2 or -2. These are not indistinguishable). |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Logic | Quine | II 47ff Bivalence: Problem: Sorites. II 53 Bivalence is still a basic feature of our scientific world. - In the liberal sense there is no problem - Frege: each general term is true or not - all terms are vague by ostension. >Sorites. II 168 Logic, old: deals with properties - new: with relations - Quine: feels implications. II 169 Logic, old: failed with relative terms: drawing figures/drawing circles (Carroll) - new: no problem with that: implication lies precisely in the relative term. II 173 Existence: "all x are y" controversy: does this imply the existence of "x"? medieval logic: yes - Modern Times: No (thus gains in symmetry and simplicity). --- VII (e) 82 Logic/Quine: triple: propositions - classes - relations - logical terms: we only need three "ε" ("element of") - Sheffer stroke and universal quantifier. --- VII (f) 119 ff Class logic/Quine: emerges from quantifier logic if we bind scheme letters (predicate letters) "F" etc. - ((s) 2nd order Logic ). --- IX 8 Logic/Quine: main task: to prove the validity of schemes - 2nd order logic: this is about the validity of the formula schemes of quantifier logic - E.g. substitutability of bi-subjunction: "x1 ..." xn[((AB) and CA) > CB]. --- X 110 Logic/Quine: if you determine the totality of logical truths, you have established the logic. X 110 Different logic/Quine: there is no differing procedure of taking evidence, but rejection of part of the logic as untrue. X 111 "Everything could be different"/translation/different logic/interchanging/and/or/key position/ Gavagai/Quine: assuming a heterodox logic, in which the laws of the adjunction now apply to the conjunction, and vice versa - there is a mere change of phonetics or the designation. - ((s) If he says adjunction, he uses our conjunction.) - Quine: we force our logic on him by translating his different way of expressing himself. It is pointless to ask which one is the right conjunction. - There is also no essence of the conjunction beyond the sounds and signs and the laws for its use. >Gavagai/Quine, >Connectives/Quine, >Schmatic Letters/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Meaning | Quine | Davidson I 143 Quine connects meaning and content to the firing of sensory nerves ("compromise"). This is his naturalized epistemology. (according to Rorty ): concept, meaning: Quine: is only one species of intentions - And all intentions are to be tilted. "Does", "believes" and "wants" have no behavioral equivalents. We do not need "opinion" and "want", neither "concept" and "intuition". Quine I 89f Stimulus meaning is independent - by number of speakers - watching nearby: social: similarity of the stimulus meaning within the community - high stimulus nearness: Colors - low stimulus nearness: "Bachelor". I 92 Stimulus synonymy: for each speaker: "Bachelor" = "unmarried man" - but it is not a stimulus meaning. Gaurisankar: opportunity sentences exclude each other, after the discovery of stimulus meanings fall along. >Stimulus Meaning/Quine. I 92 Meaning of "neutrino" is not language-neutral. It is not translated into a native language. - A theory is forever underdetermined. There are real cultural opposites. Synonymy is indefinable. - Truth of scientific methods is indefinable. (Within the theory). I 317 Laws: in terms of importance. That Socrates only applies to one is not so random - Law of the meaning of the general term - not from circumstances. II 61ff Naming : Name or singular term - Denoting: predicate - both are reference, not meaning. Meaning: something that can have an expression, as something external - demands various homonyms - term expression cannot assume meaning of the term - key: substitutability (in the affirmative, not absolute). "Mean" is intransitive - with the same meaning - not a common thing - but: by assumption of "equal signifying" we can assume a meaning! (> Ontology/Quine). VI 74 Definition Meaning/Quine: a class of all expression meanings is the same as an expression. Can there be a thing as a class of all things equal to a? Can you define the same things? - No, because a dog cannot be equated with the class of dogs. Then this is just the particularity of meaning? VI 75 Meaning/Quine: only testable sentences have empirical content. - Problem: meaning of connectives, etc. - Solution: Substitutivity? - Not possible from language to language. XII 94f Meaning/experience/holism/QuineVsPeirce: if meaning is what makes a difference to the experience, it affects the whole theories, not individual experience sentences - pro: this is then the basis of experience - falsification/QuineVsPopper: it shows only the falsity of one or more statements, but not what is false. >Experience/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Meaning | Tugendhat | I 21 Meaning/Tugendhat ultimately not based on objects (not any more than on circumstances) but on truth conditions - later verification conditions. >Truth conditions, >Verification conditions, >Verification, >Circumstances/Tugendhat. I 263 Sentence: Meaning/Tugendhat by specifying its truth conditions - and explains this by demonstrating the way of verification. >Sentence meaning. I 282 Meaning/Tugendhat: the meaning of the sentence p is not the fact that p : that fails with sentences that contain deictic expressions. - Different situations have different truth conditions. >Situations, cf. >Situation semantics. I 283 Meaning/Tugendhat: of a sentence: function. Arguments: use-situations of the sentence. Values: the assertions (truth conditions). >Functions, >Use, >Use theory (only for words, not for sentences). I 432 Meaning/Tugendhat: function whose arguments are the speech situations and their values are the objects . "The meaning maps the speech situations on the items". Vs: that is metalinguistically - it requires understanding of " I " , "here", etc. first to understand - (because demontratives are not names). Substitutability is the meaning of demonstratives. >Understanding, cf. >Speaker meaning, >Substitution, >Demonstratives. II 231 Meaning/Frege/Tugendhat: should not be translate as "reference". Only where Frege conceives sentences as a proper name. >Reference, >Fregean meaning, >Fregean sense, >Sense. Frege distinguishes between reference of names and truth values of sentences. >Truth values, >Sentences. II 240 Otherwise error/Frege: ... that you can mingle meaning and concept on the one hand and meaning and subject matter on the other hand. - Correct: "What two concept words ( predicates ) mean is the same iff the corresponding extents (value progression) coincide. >Value progression, >Term scope. II 247 Tugendhat: (meaning/reference): nevertheless there is a primacy of truth over the objects. >Truth/Tugendhat, >Truth. II 242 Meaning/Tugendhat: sentences are meaningful in that they can be true/false. - predicates by apply to some (and not others) objects. >True-of, >Satisfaction. Names: denote something. Predicates can be attributed to a thing. >Names, >Predication. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Mention | Wessel | I 220 Use/mention/Wessel: the statement "a and b are identical" is not about the terms "a" and "b", but about the objects they designate - that is, the terms "a" and "b" are used and not mentioned - (s) if the terms were mentioned, one would talk about the terms and not about the objects. >Mention/use, >Use, >Levels/order, >Metalanguage, >Object language. I 286 Use/mention: logical follow-up relationship: A I- B: talks about statements (i.e. not content). >Consequence. Conditional: A -> B: talking about the content which is talked about in the statements (e.g. current, magnetic field). ((s)Question/(s): mention is = if it is not talked about statements content-related? Use: = if e.g. the truth is found? - But: "A is true" - does not mean "the current flows".) I 313 ((s) Use/mention/Wessel/(s): E.g. "The Inselsberg is referred to by the term Inselsberg": 1. incident used as a term, and designates the object, 2. the word is not used here as a term, but mentioned as a physical object Inselsberg: is mentioned - name: is used. Mention: = quote (quotes). Instead of quotation marks: t: t A: name of statement A - "the statement A". I 352 Incident/mention/use/Wessel: 1. Term or statement A occurs as a term or statement in: E.g. ~ A or A and B. 2. merely as a physical thing (darkness, sound) in E.g. "the statement A" (tA), or "the facts that A" (sA) - E.g. from "Ließchen says a" (only graphically A) and A ↔ B does not follow "Ließchen says B" - therefore it always needs to be defined what must be regarded as incident of a term. (s) A sound cannot be true or false. ad I 352 ((s) Mention/use/density/Wessel/(s): different density of the pages: just plays no role in 2 + 2 = 4.) I 35 "Odd"/Frege: occurrence as merely graphical part. >Odd sense, >Odd meaning, >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >G. Frege. Extensionality rule: statements can be replaced by identical ones in meaning, but not any graphical parts. >Extensionality, >Extensions. Wessel: the extensionality rule is here not applicable. - Because intensional rules are very similar to extensional ones, but sometimes replacing of graphical parts by genuine statements. I 353 Planets example /Wessel: Quine does not differentiate between graphic and genuine occurrence. Only identity sentences: evening star = morning star, number of planets = 9 and then substitutability for identities. >Substitution, >Substitutability, >Identity, >Morning star/evening star, >Planets example. WesselVsQuine: See them as compound expressions: then evening star unequal morning star, as simple equal (for Venus). |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Models | Kauffman | I 415 Model/economy/Kauffman: in economics and other systems there are an enormous number of niches. What gives rise to these? According to which rules do workstations, tasks, functions and products connect to networks? >Niches, >Rules, >Progress, >Society. Thesis: we can view goods and services as sign strings that affect other strings. Hammer acts on nails and two boards. >Character strings, >Functions/Kauffman. I 416 Model/Kauffman: what use are models if we do not know the true laws of complementarity and substitutability? >Substitutability. Their benefit is that we can recognize the kind of things we would expect in the real world if our model is in the same "universality class". ((s) cf. >Brandom on singular terms, predicates in relation to the degree of generality). Definition Universality class/physics/Kauffman: Class of models that show the same robust behavioral patterns. >Models, cf. >Model theory. Lambda Calculus/Church/Kauffman: System for performing universal calculations. Also Emil Post. Universal system and Turing machine, all these systems are equivalent. >Lambda calculus, >Turing machine. I 417 Model/Post/Kauffman: For example, a system where the left-hand list of sign strings represents the "grammar", each pair of sign strings specifies a substitution. I 419 The sign strings can then interact with each other, like enzymes on substrates. Arbitrary rules can lead to non arbitrary ones! >Arbitraryness, >Contingency, >Necessity. The number of possible grammars is infinite. >Grammar, >Infinity, >Countability, >Overcountable. Complexity: if the right links of the sign strings are shorter than the left ones, the "soup" will react inert, because all the chains become shorter, and no longer fit on an "enzymatic digit". The different regions form universality classes. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 |
| Monetary Policy | Tobin | Mause I 225 Monetary Policy/Tobin: Market participants have a wealth of different investment opportunities for their assets. (1) However, the portfolio theoretical transmission process calls into question the high substitutability between the individual asset classes. (...) This restricts the effectiveness of monetary policy.(2) >Stock market, >Markets. 1. James Tobin, “The Interest Elasticity of the Transactions Demand for Cash”. Review of Economics and Statistics. 38 (3), 1956, S. 241– 247. 2. Duwendag, Dieter, Karl-Heinz Ketterer, Wim Kösters, Rüdiger Pohl, und Diethard B. Simmert. Geldtheorie und Geldpolitik. Eine problemorientierte Einführung mit einem Kompendium monetärer Fachbegriffe, Berlin/ Heidelberg 1999. |
EconTobin I James Tobin The Interest Elasticity of the Transactions Demand for Cash 1956 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Objects of Belief | Hintikka | II 45 (A) Objects of Knowledge/objects of belief/Frege/Hintikka: Frege was concerned about which objects we must adopt in order to understand the logical behavior of the language when it comes to knowledge. Solution/Frege/Hintikka: (see below: Frege's objects of knowledge are the Fregean senses, reified, >intensional objects). Hintikka: I am concerned first with the individuals we are talking about in epistemic contexts, and secondly, I am concerned about whether we can call them "objects of knowledge". Semantics of possible worlds/HintikkaVsFrege: we can opppose Frege's approach with the semantics of possible worlds (Hintikka pro semantics of possible worlds). II 46 Idea: the application of knowledge leads to the elimination of possible worlds (alternatives). Possible Worlds/Hintikka: the expression is misleading because it is too global. >Possible worlds. Def Scenario/Hintikka: everything that is compatible with the knowledge of a knowing person b is a scenario. We can also call it b's worlds of knowledge. Set of all worlds/Hintikka: the set of all worlds can be called illegitimate. Objects of Knowledge/Hintikka: objects of knowledge can be objects, persons, artefacts, etc. Reference/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumes a completely referential language. I.e. all our expressions stand for any entities (Frege's thesis). These can be taken as Frege's objects of knowledge. Identity/substitutability/substitutability in identity/terminology/Frege/Hintikka: substitutability in identity is the thesis of the substitutability of the identity ((s) only applies restrictedly in intensional (opaque) contexts). >Opacity. II 47 (...) E.g. (1) ... Ramses knew that the morning star = the morning star From this, one cannot infer that Ramses knew that morning star = evening star (although morning star = evening star). II 48 Context/Frege/Hintikka: Frege distinguishes two types of context: Direct context/Frege/Hintikka: the direct context is extensional and transparent. Indirect context/Frege/Hintikka: the indirect context is intensional and opaque. For example, contexts with "believes" (belief contexts). ((s) Terminology: "extensional", "opaque" etc. are not words used by Frege). Frege/Hintikka: according to his picture: (4) Expression > Meaning > Reference. ((s) I.e. according to Frege, the intension determines the extension.) Intensional Contexts/Frege/Hintikka: here the picture is modified: (5) expression (>) meaning (> reference). II 49 (B) Objects of Knowledge/Possible Worlds Approach/HintikkaVsFrege: Idea: knowledge leads us to create an intentional context that compels us to consider certain possibilities. This is what we call possible world. New: we do not consider new entities (intensional entities) next to the referents, but we consider the same referents in different worlds. Morning Star/evening star/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: solution: "morning star" and "evening star" now take out the same object, namely the planet in the actual world. >Possible worlds, >Possible world semantics. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Opacity | Hintikka | II 57 Opacity/Frege/identity/opaque context/Hintikka: Frege was involved in the failure of the (substitutability in identity) ((s) that is, that the individuals may have different names) and not in the failure of the existential generalization. ((s) That is, the individuals may not exist.) >Existential generalization, >Substitution, >Substitutability. Hintikka: therefore we need different additional premises. Semantics of possible worlds: Substitutability in identity: here, for substitutability in identity, we need only the assumption that we can compare the referents of two different terms in every world. Existential generalization: here we must compare the reference of one and the same term in all worlds. Frege/Hintikka: it seems now that Frege could still be defended in a different way: namely, that we now quantify via world lines (as entities). ((s) This would meet Frege's Platonism.) II 58 World Lines/Hintikka: world lines are somehow "real". Are they not somehow like the "Fregean senses"? HintikkaVs: it is not about a contrast between world-bound individuals and world lines as individuals. World Lines/Hintikka: but we should not say that world lines are something that is "neither here nor there". To use world lines is not to reify. Solution/Hintikka: we need world lines because without them it would not even make sense to ask whether a resident of a possible world is the same as that of another possible world ((s) cross-world identity). II 59 World Line/Hintikka: we use the world line instead of Frege's "way of giving". HintikkaVsFrege: his mistake was to reify the "way of givenness" as "sense". They are not something that exists in the actual. Quantification/Hintikka: therefore, we do not have to ask in this context "about what do we have to quantify"? >Quantification. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Opacity | Quine | I 263 Opacity: not "belief" is opaque, but the "that"! (Kronecker-Example) - ((s) CresswellVs?). I 268 Opaque context: has no significant function - Frege: "Name of a thought", "name of a property", "name of individual concepts" - Russell: "propositional attitude". >Propositional Attitudes/Quine. I 270 Opaque verb: "hunts lions" is nothing in relation and is not appointed to a Lion - Relative Term: the police chases a man. XI 175 Quantification in opaque contexts/FollesdalVsQuine: we would then have to make opaque contexts referentially transparent (what is true, is true of the object regardless of the givenness) - and at the same time makes extensionally opaque (some properties are necessary, other accidental) - this is the essentialism. >Quantification/Quine. Perler / Wild I 103 Referentially Opaque/Quine/Armstrong: basic: shows actual content of beliefs, not coreferentially replaceable expressions - transparent: substitutability by coreferential expressions: is suitable for the attribution of attitudes to animals. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Possibility | Quine | I 423f Unrealized possibilities: e.g. the different kinds of possible hotels on the corner: no identity by localization - they are at most universals. III 259 Possibility/possible objects/actual/real/Quine: some are of the opinion that there are concrete individuals of two species: a) real (actual) b) unreal (not actual). QuineVs: this overpopulates the universe. (s) Problem: should one then say "not real Zerberus is real", or "the real Zerberus is not real"? For it would be too much to want to say "the unreal Zerberus is not real". At most, a representative could invoke that "not really Zerberus" is already a double. III 260 Not actual/Possibility/Quine: the trick here depends on the concept of the possible. QuineVs: but this is not possible for more complicated cases. Example "the round pyramid of Copilco": is completely impossible ((s) not updatable). Non-existence/possibility/meaning/significance/Quine: wrong solution: some authors think that a word for a completely impossible object is meaningless. Analogue: just as a logically unrealizable sentence is a non sentence, is not false but meaningless. ((s) (here sic, but otherwise mostly called senseless.) >Meaning/Quine. QuineVs: 1. this is unnatural. 2. it is also impractical. Then we no longer have a test procedure for significance, just as the quantifier logic has no decision procedure for universality and satisfiability. >Satisfaction/Quine. Solution/Quine: it is sufficient that words have the task of designating something. This is sufficient to express non-existence. The words have a full meaning. >Designation/Quine. VI 102 Necessity/Possibility/Quine: are intensional in that they do not conform to the substitutability of identity. Again fluctuating between de re and de dicto. >de re/Quine, >de dicto/Quine. VII (h) 148 Necessity/possibility/Quine: is not a general feature of the objects concerned but depends on the way of reference. >Necessity/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Predication | Searle | V 150 Predication: problem: e.g. "Sam is drunk": is there something that is equivalent to "drunk" as is equivalent to "Sam"? Yes: the term "drunkenness". But there is a problem: substitutability is not possible >salva veritate. V 182 Predication: predication is not reference. It is a kind of >abstraction (such as a move in chess). It only indicates a content and is completely determined by an >illocutionary role. V 182 Term theory/predicate/reference/Strawson/Searle: the term theory understands predication as a special kind of reference (SearleVs). V 174 Theory of terms: both the subject and the predicate identify non-linguistic entities. The subject identifies single terms (non-relational connection). The predicate identifies the general term. Frege: the name means the object. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Propositional Attitudes | Quine | I 264 Propositional attitudes: e.g. believes, says, endeavors that, asserts, is surprised, fears, desires, etc... I 265 Propositional attitudes create opaque contexts that must not be quantified into. (You must not replace a singular term with a term of the same name without affecting the truth value. Also, not a general term by an equally comprehensive one. Cross-references from opaque contexts are also prohibited. (>Opacity/Quine). I 250ff Purely indicative unambiguous (substitutability of identity). Not: Tullius was a Roman is trochaic. The expression in quotation marks is not purely indicative. It is an ambiguous reference. Every truth function is denotation transparent. >Truth Functions/Quine I 263 Opacity: not belief is opaque, but "that" (> Kronecker-example) Opaque context: is a non-denoting function - Frege: Name of a thought, name of a property, name of an individual concept - Russell: propositional attitude. I 367 Propositional attitude: The object can only be a timeless sentence. I 372 Objects of the propositional attitude are eliminated: Thomas believes (Cicero has): no longer form Fab a = Thomas, b = (). - But: Fa where F is a complex expression - does not believe term anymore, but operator. I 377 Direct speech: like a birdsong - is also an acting performance, is a propositional attitude. II 153 f Propositional Attitude/Quine: they remain intact but not de re. X 56 Propositional attitude: 1) some authors: that-sentence is the name for a proposition, therefore it is an entity. - QuineVs: Objects of desire should be no entity. 2) others: formation rule that turns two-digit predicates believes+sentence into a one-digit predicate by the interposition of that: believes that y. 3) believes that new category "attitude expression", then we have a formation rule, which turns attitude expression + sentence into a one-digit predicate: believes that Darwin was wrong -predicates: two digits: believes - one digit: believes that Darwin was wrong-/(s) rear position is satisfied. >Predicates/Quine |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Propositions | Perry | Frank I 396 Meaning/idea/PerryVsFrege: We must separate sharply meaning and thoughts. >Thoughts, >Thoughts/Frege, >Sense. The thought is not a mental entity, but corresponds to the informational content. >Thought content, cf. >Thought objects. The meaning corresponds to the role of words. >Conceptual role, >Words, >Word meaning. The same role creates another de re proposition in any context. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Context, >de re. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 --- I 409f Proposition/PerryVsTradition: what is missing, is not a conceptual component, but an indexical. >Indexicality, >Index words. New theory: a kind of proposition is individuated by an object and a part of the old proposition. VsTradition: limiting the substitutability in quotations with propositional attitudes is not explained. >Opacity, >Substitutability. Tradition: E.g. Dean/Franks neighbor (identical, one and the same person): no variable but term. Problem: "He" does not provide a concept but a variable. Cf. >He/He himself. Solution/Perry: "open proposition": with objects and a conceptual component: "de re". - Then the "dean himself" is included and not only the term "Dean". >de re. Then a substitution by "Frank's neighbor" is valid and a quantification meaningful. >Quantification. Vs: de re does not solve the problem of mess in the supermarket (sugar trail) - (because of "I"). >Sugar trail example. --- I 455f Proposition/extra sense//Perry: parabola E.g. early humans who can only eat carrots lying in front of them, are equipped with the ability to believe propositions (to collect and pick up carrots). - Nothing happens, because the propositions do not say to humans that they even appear in it. Solution/Castaneda: additional localization in space and time. >Extra-Sense/Castaneda. Vs: the king of France does not know that he is the King of France and whether the carrot is not in front of the editor of Soul. VsExtra-sense: an extra-sense does not help the thinker embedding himself into a network of mental states. People understand sentences but do not form beliefs. >Understanding, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. List of extra senses for everyone: too long. Extra-sense "i" for everyone: validity by decree: solves the carrots problem but maims the language. Rule: "I" stands for the user ": makes people to speak of themselves in the "third person": ""I" is doing this". Problem: for truth of such sentences one needs reference (reference), meaning ("user") is not enough. >Reference, >Sense. The same meaning cannot perform different references. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Reduction | Reduction, philosophy: reduction is the tracing back of a set of statements to another set of statements by rephrasing and replacing concepts of a subject domain by concepts from another subject domain. There must be conditions for the substitutability of a concept from the first domain by a concept from the second domain. An example of a reduction is the tracing back of mental concepts to physical concepts or to behavior. See also bridge laws, reductionism, translation, identity theory, materialism, physical/psychical, physicalism, eliminationism, functionalism, roles, indeterminacy. |
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| Representation | Frege | Brandom I 581 Representation/Frege/Brandom: representation equals substitutability. >Substitution, >Substitutability; cf. >Singular terms/Brandom, >Predicates/Branom. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Sentences | Quine | I 252f "Purely indicative" unambiguous (substitutability of identity) not: "Tullius was a Roman" is trochaic - An expression in quotation marks is not purely indicative - ambiguous reference. - Every truth function is denotation-transparent. I 332 Sentence = Universal! - Value of the variables: Proposition (object) - remains intact even after the elimination of the singular term. - The proposition resists a change of the truth value. - The proposition remains nameless in "x0p". I 337 Sentence: is not the class of its expressions, otherwise non-expressed sentenceswould be = zero class (all would have the same meaning). - A sentence is not a property of expressions either. - Solution: sentence as a consequence: class of pairs. - Partial sign: class of expression incidents. I 336 Words describe - sentences do not (no singular term)! - Nevertheless, a sentence has a meaning: the singular term is formed by bracketing the sentence. (not a proposition!) - Proposition here: completion of the correct sentence to a timeless sentence - timeless sentence "The door is open": which door? denotes nothing. --- Prior I 35 Sentence/Quine: is not an object - Then also no quantification, no bound variables for it - PriorVsQuine: unproblematic: E.g. "J. believes p": J. does not believe anything, this ultimately stands for a sentence. --- Quine VII (f) 109ff Sentence/QuineVsFrege: sentences must not be regarded as names and "p", "q" not as variables, accept the entities as entities named through expressions as values. --- X 31 Sentence/Quine: we speak only of sentences if we want to generalize - (and we cannot do that through objects). X 35 Semantic ascent/Quine: this mention of sentences is only a technical necessity that arises when we want to generalize in one dimension, which cannot be grasped by a variable. --- XII 39 Sentence/Proposition/Propositional attitude/Translation/ChurchVsQuine: if sentence bears the meaning instead Proposition, then problem: E.g. Edwin believes the German sentence S - English Translation: a) leave sentence, b) reproduce in indirect speech in English: then both are not equivalent - "QuineVsVs: admitted, but unclear concept of everyday language equivalence. Quine: still not accepts linguistic forms as objects of propositional attitude: too artificial. >Propositional attitudes. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Singular Terms | Brandom | I 407 Singular Term/Predicate/Subsentential Expressions/Brandom: this is about objective referencing (reference), not about believed propositions - non-propositional, conceptual contents. >Reference. I 527ff Singular Terms - substitution inferences are always symmetrical: equivalence classes. >Substitution, >Equivalence classes. Predicate substitution inferences may be asymmetric: Families (reflexive, transitive). I 512f Singular Term/Frege: the concept particular cannot be explained independently from the concept singular term. Brandom: not clear what singular terms are, cannot be explained by successful reference. Quine: singular terms include reference, error is possible. Brandom: not everything can be recognized as a singular term: E.g. "√2", "natural satellite of the Earth" may be more than one thing. Problem: if omniscience of the speaker should be required. I 517 Because sentences are fundamental, it is not clear why there should be any subsentential expressions at all. - They cannot have a semantic content in the same respectas sentences. - Subsentential expressions are necessary for the formation of potentially infinite number of sentences. >Subsententials. I 528 Singular Term/Brandom: its introduction does not only require application criteria but also identity criteria (for substitutability). I 533 Singular Term/Brandom: are those expressions which play a dual syntactic and semantic substitutional role: 1) SIS: substitution-inferential significance - 2) SSR - substitution-structural role. I 533 Definition singular term/Brandom: an expression that is substituted and whose occurrence is symmetrically inferentially significant - the substitutable (singular term): symmetric - substitution frame (predicates) asymmetrical. I 535 Inversion: Substitutions are not always right: the conclusions are often inferentially weaker than the premises - from "something is a dog" follows "it is a mammal", but not vice versa - singular term: exists, because expressive power of the language would be lost if they were allowed to be asymmetric - Example/(s): if substitution led to weakening of the determination of the object. I 546 Singular term/Brandom: Frames can be regarded as derived singular terms: e.g. "the father of a" may then be substituted into her (FregeVs). Brandom: they are still subsitutable and therefore they differ from sentences. I 548 There are exceptions in the singular terms that behave differently, but they can only exist, because there are normal singular terms. I 561 They play both the syntactic and semantic substitutional role. I 569 Singular Term/Predicate/Brandom: indispensable in all languages with conditionals. - Why are objects needed: for the same reason as singular terms: you need something that means what conditionals mean. --- II 162 Singular Term/Brandom: 1) Obtain - 2) Designate - 3) Name --- Newen I 165 Singular Term/Brandom: Problem: because it does not have reference as a basic concept, it creates 1) equivalenz classes of syntactically identical terms (substitutability) 2) inferential role: helps to isolate the grammatical entities and identify their role as subject, verb , etc. >Inferential role. Subject Term/Singular Term: here the implications are symmetrical and reversible. - E.g. Franklin/Postmaster. Verb: here the reversal is not symmetrical - E.g. goes for a walk/exercises. - At the same time transcendental argument for the splittedness of the world - (predecessor: Strawson). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Slingshot Argument | Searle | III 229ff Slingshot Argument/Searle: the slingshot argument originates from Frege; it was used by Quine against the modal logic and revived by Davidson against the correspondence theory. III 230 If a true statement corresponds to a fact, then it corresponds to any fact, hence the notion of correspondence is completely empty. The proposition that snow is white, corresponds to the fact that grass is green. Analysis: there is a difference between co-referential singular terms and equivalent sentences, e.g. "x is identical with Diogenes and snow is white". III 231 Solution/Searle: 1. There is irrelevance: "...Diogenes", 2. Logical equivalence of sentences does not mean identity of the relevant facts. Conclusion/Searle: the slingshot argument does not refute the correspondence theory. >Correspondence theory, >facts. III 230 Step 1: The statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that snow is white. Step 2: a) The whole statement remains true when replacing co-referential singular terms. b) The whole statement remains true when replacing logically equivalent sentences. (Def logically equivalent: in each model the same truth value). Step 3: we assume: the sentence a) "Snow is white" is logically equivalent to the sentence: b) "The x such that (x is identical to Diogenes) is identical to the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes and snow is white)". Step 4: we assume: the proposition: "grass is green" is logically equivalent to the proposition: "The x such that ( x is identical to Diogenes) is identical to the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes and grass is green). III 231 Step 5: we assume: the expression "the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes and snow is white)" refers to the same object as the expression "the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes and grass is green)". Step 6: (is derived from step 1): the statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes) is identical to the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes and snow is white). (From 2b) Step 7: (from 2a together with the reference from 5): the statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes) is identical to the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes and grass is green). Step 8: (from 2b): the statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that grass is green. SearleVsSlingshot Argument: an argument of this kind can at most show the falseness of its assumptions. These are contraintuitive consequences. III 232 Irrelevance: the statement that snow is white does not correspond to any fact concerning Diogenes. Even Diogenes' own identity (or the fact that 2+2 = 4) has nothing to do with what makes the statement that snow is white true. Correspondence theory: some authors accuse her of petitio principii. III 233 The accusation may be returned. It is a petitio principii to assume to the correspondence theory that it is subject to principles like 2b, if no argument for the applicability of this principle is given. Logical equivalence: the substitutability of logically equivalent propositions does not mean identity of facts! Example "The statement that a corresponds to the fact that b". Here one can replace b by c only if: the fact that b, is identical to the fact that c. Intensionality/Searle: the expression: "The fact that ...." is completely non-extensional. (In contrast, "X corresponds Y" is completely extensional). "The fact that..." does not preserve the selfhood of the reference by replacing logically equivalent propositions. But why should you? Why should facts concerning snow be identical to facts concerning Diogenes or anyone else? III 235 Slingshot argument: Searle: conclusion: it does not refute the correspondence theory. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Substitution | Brandom | I 454 Substitution/Substitutability/Identification/Meaning/Frege/Brandom: important: (t): "the man to which Hans referred with "such a hard head" and "the meaning of (t)" must be mutually substitutable. I 458 Not substitutable: demonstratives and pronouns. >Pronouns, >Demonstratives. I 523 Substitution/Brandom: three possible roles of expressions in the context of Substitution: 1) an expression can be substituted 2) an expression can be substituted into it 3) substitutional frame - Substitution: fundamental Frame: derived - frames are predicates - cannot be substituted themselves like singular terms - but can be exchanged. I 525 Frame: is itself a result of substitutions (derived). I 526 Substitution inference: connects two sentences as a premise and conclusion: "Franklin invented the bifocals"> "The Postmaster General ..."- the singular terms are material, but do not contain the predicate, because that can be replaced by "went for a walk". I 943 Substitution of singular terms: reversible - predicates: not reversible. >Singular terms, >Predicates. I 528 Substitution/Brandom: singular term: substitution inferences are always symmetrical (equi-classes). Predicate: substitution inference can be asymmetric. stronger/weaker: something is a dog/a mammal - (s) Singular Term/black: always predicates - from "Franklin .." to "American ...". No Substitution inference, because here we have one singular term, one general term. I 611 Anybody/everybody/someone/Brandom: Problems with substitution. >Generalization, >Generality, >Reference. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Substitution | Castaneda | Frank I 194 Substitutability /Substitution / I / Castaneda: Statements like "I m Privatus" have a non-replaceable use of "I" included for the user - "Himself" ("he *") can not be replaced for the user: i.e. "self" can be no other. >Self-identification, >Indexicality, >Index Words. Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Substitution | Hintikka | II 194 Substitutability of Identity/intensionality/Hintikka: a sure indicator of intensionality is the failure to preserve the identity of the individual domain. >Intentionality. If it happens that the identity fails from one possible world to another, we have a counter-example to the known law ((s) Leibniz's law): (Substitutability of identity) (x)(y) (X = y > F[x] > F[y])). ((s) identical objects have all properties in common). This is sometimes called the "bound variable form of identity". Equivalent to: (x)(y) ( x = y > neccessary (x = y)) ((s) What is identical is necessarily identical). Hintikka: this failure of the substitutability of the identity is to be distinguished from the failure for any singular terms. Here it can simply be because a singular term refers to another thing in another possible world. II 195 Identity/individuals/Hintikka: it is much less clear how the identity can fail for certain individuals in the transition to another possible world. That is, that world lines can branch (> separation). Separation/KripkeVsSeparation/substitutability of identity/SI/Hintikka: Kripke excludes separation because the substitutability of identity is valid for him. A separation would violate the transitivity of the identity according to him. After a separation, the individuals would not be identical, even if they were identical after the transition. Therefore, the substitutability of identity is inviolable to Kripke. HintikkaVsKripke: that is circular: Transitivity of Identity/Hintikka: can mean two things: A) transitivity within a world or B) transitivity between worlds. The plausibility of transitivity belongs to the former, not to the latter. Transitivity of the identity between possible worlds is simply to exclude separation. This is the circularity in Kripke's argument. Substitutability of Identity/Hintikka: many authors have noted that identity and quantification remain meaningless in intensional contexts unless we have the substitutability of identity. HintikkaVs: that is simply wrong: after the world lines are defined, we can formulate the truth conditions for sentences with arbitrary intensional expressions. And then, independently of the behavior of the world lines. Modal Logic/substitutability of identity/Hintikka: it is double ironic that the defenders of conventional modal logic want to save the substitutability of identity by saying that without it, possible worlds and intensional logic makes no sense. This is because substitutability of identity excludes separation. Fusion/Hintikka: to exclude it, we need the reverse form instead substitutability of identity we need identity of substitutability: (identity of substitutability) (x)(y) (possible (x = y) > x = y) ((s) possible identity is identity, i.e. ultimately it is necessary). Problem/Hintikka: identity of substitutability is not valid in some conventional systems of the quantified modal logic, including that of Ruth Barcan Marcus. For these systems, we must allow separation when we go from possible worlds to the actual worlds (travel home). Direction/interpretation/Hintikka: however in interpretation there is nothing to distinguish between the directions. II 196 It is only a coincidence that these systems do not contain retrospective operators (Saarinen, see above). That is, every defender of these conventional systems secretly defends the possibility of separation. That is, the rejection of substitutability of identity. II 196 Separation/Hintikka: separation is useful in a few models of cross-world identification, re-identification in time. E.g. a computer could be dismantled and two computers could be built from it. This could be revised later. >Cross world identity. Re-Identification/Hintikka: re-identification is the key to cases of separation and fusion. Separation/Hintikka: there is a structural reason why it is so rare: if world lines are composed of infinitesimal elements as the solutions of differential equations, the separation of a singularity corresponds - this is a rare phenomenon. Separation/Hintikka: the arguments against them are circular in a deep sense. They are based on the idea that for quantification the individual domain should remain fixed (HintikkaVsKripke). Possible World/individual area/HintikkaVsKripke: one should not demand that the individuals must remain the same when changing from world to world. The talk of worlds is empty, if there are no possible experiences that could distinguish them. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Substitution | Parfit | Singer I 108 Life/Substitutability/Substitute/D. Parfit/Peter Singer: (D. Parfit 1976)(1): e.g. Suppose two women want to give birth to a child. One of the two women finds out in the 98m third month of her pregnancy that her future child will be severely damaged, but this is averted by taking a simple pill without side effects, which will bring the child into the world without suffering. The second woman is not yet pregnant. She learns that her child will be born with the same defect without any remedy. This defect is averted if she waits three months before she becomes pregnant. We can assume that both women make the right decision. I 109 Let us assume that both decide differently and both give birth to a severely suffering child. You would say they both made a mistake. Is the mistake in one of the two mistakes more serious? Problem: we could say that the mistake is equally serious in both cases. But the first woman has damaged an existing embryo, and the second woman has only helped an embryo to exist. So she can say: "Without my decision you would not have existed. That is why I did not harm you." Replaceability argument/P. Singer: this consideration brings us closer to the argument of substitutability, since it is about the interests of beings that need to be brought into existence in the first place. This in turn leads to reflections on future generations in connection with climate change. >Decision, cf. >Abortion, >Ethics, >Morality, >Climate change. 1. D. Parfit (1976). Rights, Interests and Possible People". In: S. Gorovitz et al. (Eds), Moral Problems in Medicine (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1976. |
Parf I D. Parfit Reasons and Persons Oxford 1986 Parf II Derekt Parfit On what matters Oxford 2011 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Substitution | Quine | VII (b) 29 Substitutability/substitution/QuineVsLeibniz: the strength of this requirement varies with the richness of the language - we need both, single- and multi-digit predicates, truth functions (not, and, or, etc.), classes, classes of classes, descriptions, singular terms. >Classes, >Descriptions, >Truth functions, >Predicates, >Richness, >Expressiveness, >Singular terms. This language is then extensional: any two predicates that match extensionally (are true for the same object) are substitutable salva veritate - but that does not secure cognitive synonymy. >Extensionality, >Extension. --- VII (c) 56 Substitutability/Quine: question salvo quo? Something is always changed. --- IX 9 Replace/substitution/Quine: if in a statement that has been substituted for "Fx" free variables other than "x" occurr, then they may not be such that fall under the scope of quantifiers that occur in the scheme in which the substitution was made. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Substitution | Tugendhat | I 480 Substitutability/Tugendhat: Substitutability is not circular because identifications are no descriptions. But several identifications from various situations add up to an identification. >Individuation, >Identification, >Circular reasoning. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Substitution (Insertion) | Inserting: in a formula an icon can be replaced under certain conditions by another icon. E.g. inserting a constant for a variable will make a propositional function become a sentence. See also substitutability, substitution, validity, statements, propositional functions. |
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| Substitution (Insertion) | Gödel | I Berka 306 Inserting/replacing/substitution/Goedel: individual variables (free and bound) may be replaced by any other, provided there occurs no overlap of the range of equally naming variables.(1) >Range, >Scope, >Variables, >Individual variables, >Substitution, >Substitutability, >Formulas, >Free variables, >Bound variables. 1. K. Gödel: Die Vollständighkeit der Axiome des logischen Funktionenkalküls, in: Mh, Math. Phys. 37 (1930), pp. 349-360. |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 |
| Synonymy | Quine | I 77 Synonymy: is inadequate even with preferred occasion sentences. (Additional information required). >Context, >Circumstances. I 78 Synonymy is not equality of stimulus meaning - We do not have a criterion. >Stimulus meaning, >Equality, >Criteria. I 92 Stimulus synonymy: for each speaker: "bachelor" = "unmarried man" - But this is not stimulus meaning. I 99 Synonymy: some things are synonymous for the experts, but are not for the novice. - Two terms can refer to the same thing - occasion sentences are different, things are the same (front and back of a coin). I 103 Synonymy of "Gavagai" and "Rabbits" depends on agreement to stimuli, not on synonymy of terms. I 126 Stimulus synonymy is improved by socialization (agreement) - also stimulus analyticity: but now: "2 + 2 = 4" on the same level as "There are black dogs" (acceptability). I 351 Synonymy and analyticity are downgraded, identity is absolute. I 358 Synonymy: inappropriate for paraphrases. --- II 61 ff Cognitive synonymy: various points in time, individual > Community > substitutability of words - same verdicts - not in translation. --- VII (b) 24 Synonymy/Quine: not supplied by (empirical) encyclopedia - Synonymy must come before every definition - perhaps from behavior? - explanation is always based on other synonymy. VII (b) 28 Synonymy/Quine: substitutability does not prevent vagueness - nevertheless: substitution of synonyms leads from analytical sentences to logical truths - that leads to cognitive synonymy. VII (b) 29 Cognitive synonymy/Quine: E.g. "bachelor" and "unmarried" are supposed to be cognitive synonym, this is the same statement as (3) "All and only bachelors are married is analytical" (iff equivalence) - problem: that requires analyticity. - sufficient condition for cognitive synonymy: (4) "It is necessary that all and only bachelors are bachelors - then insert (5) "unmarried" - then it must be said that (5) is true in order to say that (3) is analytical - therefore bachelors and unmarried cognitive synonymy - (s) cognitive synonymy = truth of analyticity - singular terms are cognitive synonym ift the statement of identity, that is expressed by the equal sign "=" between them, is analytical - statements are cognitive synonym if their biconditional is analytical - we can therefore call cognitive synonymy substitutability salva analyticitate. --- VII (c) 56 Synonymy/Quine: a) within one language - b) between languages - for words: mostly only partial synonymy plus stage directions E.g. "spoiled" for food and individuals - chains must be long enough for real synonymy - seems to consist vaguely in approximate equality of the expression situations - and also in similarity the listener reaction. VII (c) 58 Homonymy/Quine: E.g. jaw, marrow - problem: - if a is synonymous with b and b with c, then a is also synonymous with c - ((s) transitive) - if b has two meanings, it can be synonymous with a in one meaning and with c in the other. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Terminology | Castaneda | Frank I 325 Guise Theory/Castaneda: "Theory of ontological formations". Draws ontological consequences from the semantic discovery that private references have uneliminable meaning (non-substitutability) and from the intensionality conditions - not between thinking and the world, but primarily reference of thinking - because the private must no longer be excluded from the object area - furhtermore to thinking and world can remain typically propositionally structured. (VsLewis/VsChisholm). I 337f "Doxastic Accusative"/Castaneda: avoids facts as objects - thinking episodes are individuated by their accusatives - accusative: an attribute, not a thing. I 386ff Doxastic Accusatives/Castaneda: Problem: pure universals are too far away, particularized properties or propositions are too big - Solution: Guise theory of formations: middle road: particularized properties, particularized to very thin, finite individuals. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 I 463ff Guise/CastanedaVsFrege: consubstantiation: sameness of Oedipus' father and Oedipus' predecessor on the throne - VsFrege: every singular term, denotes an object in each use - no varying denotation - designs one-dimensional, not like Frege: two-dimensional: purpose and object. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Translation | Quine | Rorty I 217 Quine: indeterminacy of translation: we look at the totality of truths about nature, also unknown and unobservable as well as future truths. My thesis is that the indeterminacy of translation even resists all of these truths, the whole truth about nature. There is not really a question of making the right choice. Also within the allotted choices under determination any theory about nature has no objective fact. >Indeterminacy, >Facts, >Objectivity, >Theories. VsQuine: Many critics believe this is a remnant of traditional empiricism (Chomsky). PutnamVsQuine: why should we not just say: translation in accordance with those manuals that have this property? This is a variant of essentialism: according to which we know from the outset that something that cannot be packed into the vocabulary of the physics of the day is so insignificant that it merely exists "in the eyes of the affected person". (subjective convenience). Quine I 90 Stimulus meaning/SM: objective reality that the linguist needs - translation, not identity but approaching stimulus meaning. I 81 Translation: is independent of stimulus meaning. E. g. "soltero" = "Bachelor" not because of a particular face. - But words are learned first through stimulus meaning, later through abstraction. I 117 Truth of categorical sentences depends on the object. - Our special denoting apparatus. - But stimulus meaning is similar for natives. - Goodman’s individuals calculus is translatable as syllogistic. I 129ff Translation: translatable: observation sentences, truth functions (conjunctions, negatives, alterations) - Identifiable: stimulus analytical sentences, stimulus synonymous occasion sentences of natives - untranslatable: stimulus synonymous occasion sentences. I 368 Animal: for them fear is equivalent to an English sentence. - Church: but this sentence has many different possible translations. I 431 Paraphrase (no synonymy): Newton could be reformulated relativistically. - That is like some sentences used in Church: "true in a higher sense". - Quine: Sometimes that is acceptable. --- II 34 Permutation: is possible if sentence-by-sentence structure is maintained. II 37 Actual: radical translation: no fact decides which of the two translation manuals is right - Actual ontologically, naturalistically - neither transcendental nor epistemological. - Physical conditions, not empirical skills are decisive. - Reinterpretation is possible only for others, not for ourselves. - Factuality like gravity, inherent to our nature. >Radical interpretation. II 61 ff Cognitive synonymy: various points in time, individual > Community > substitutability of words - same verdicts. - But this does not hold for translation. >Synonymy. --- VII (c) 60f Translation/Quine: (early): a) link a sound sequence to the circumstances - b) a synonymy of this sound sequence with English sound sequence that is associated with similar circumstances, assume - problem: the relevant properties of the circumstances are hidden in the person of the speaker (>Gavagai). Cassirer/Whorf/Quine: language inseparable from the rest of the world - differences correspond with circumstances of the form of life - Morning Star can still be a good translation of the Evening Star. - We confuse meaning and reference, because we are used to pointing to things - problem: during work alienation from direct reports, thus the clarity of potential conflicts decreases. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Truth Values | Tugendhat | II 233ff Def Truth value potential/Tugendhat: two names that denote the same object, have the same truth value potential. Solution for the conflict: Frege: subsets, quotes: names of sentences- Searle: sentences are never names. Tugendhat then truth value potential quasi transmission of the characteristics of sentences to names. II 237 Truth Value/sentence/object/Frege: by substitutability it is proved that the truth values of sentences correspond to the object of the names - TugendhatVsFrege: it can be proved only in reverse that the objects of the names correspond to the truth values. II 243 Odd meaning/Frege: name of a sentence. >Odd Meaning, >Names of sentences. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Utility Theory | Norvig | Norvig I 611 Utility theory/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Intuitively, the principle of Maximum Expected Utility (MEU) seems like a reasonable way to make decisions, but it is by no means obvious that it is the only rational way. After all, why should maximizing the average utility be so special? What’s wrong with an agent that Norvig I 612 maximizes the weighted sum of the cubes of the possible utilities, or tries to minimize the worst possible loss? Could an agent act rationally just by expressing preferences between states, without giving them numeric values? Finally, why should a utility function with the required properties exist at all? Solution: constraints on rational preferences. Possible preferences: a) the agent prefers A over B, b) he is indifferent between A and B, c) he prefers A over B or is indifferent between them. The primary issue for utility theory is to understand how preferences between complex lotteries are related to preferences between the underlying states in those lotteries. To address this issue we list six constraints that we require any reasonable preference relation to obey: 1. Orderability: Given any two lotteries, a rational agent must either prefer one to the other or else rate the two as equally preferable. That is, the agent cannot avoid deciding. 2. Transitivity: Given any three lotteries, if an agent prefers A to B and prefers B to C, then the agent must prefer A to C. 3. Continuity: If some lottery B is between A and C in preference, then there is some probability p for which the rational agent will be indifferent between getting B for sure and the lottery that yields A with probability p and C with probability 1 − p. 4. Substitutability: If an agent is indifferent between two lotteries A and B, then the agent is indifferent between two more complex lotteries that are the same except that B Norvig I 613 is substituted for A in one of them. 5. Monotonicity: Suppose two lotteries have the same two possible outcomes, A and B. If an agent prefers A to B, then the agent must prefer the lottery that has a higher probability for A (and vice versa). 6. Decomposability: Compound lotteries can be reduced to simpler ones using the laws of probability. This has been called the “no fun in gambling” rule because it says that two consecutive lotteries can be compressed into a single equivalent lottery (…). These constraints are known as the axioms of utility theory. >Preferences/Norvig, >Rationality/AI research, >Certainty effect/Kahneman/Tversky, >Ambiguity/Kahneman/Tversky. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Utility Theory | Russell | Norvig I 611 Utility theory/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Intuitively, the principle of Maximum Expected Utility (MEU) seems like a reasonable way to make decisions, but it is by no means obvious that it is the only rational way. After all, why should maximizing the average utility be so special? What’s wrong with an agent that Norvig I 612 maximizes the weighted sum of the cubes of the possible utilities, or tries to minimize the worst possible loss? Could an agent act rationally just by expressing preferences between states, without giving them numeric values? Finally, why should a utility function with the required properties exist at all? Solution: constraints on rational preferences. Possible preferences: a) the agent prefers A over B, b) he is indifferent between A and B, c) he prefers A over B or is indifferent between them. The primary issue for utility theory is to understand how preferences between complex lotteries are related to preferences between the underlying states in those lotteries. To address this issue we list six constraints that we require any reasonable preference relation to obey: 1. Orderability: Given any two lotteries, a rational agent must either prefer one to the other or else rate the two as equally preferable. That is, the agent cannot avoid deciding. 2. Transitivity: Given any three lotteries, if an agent prefers A to B and prefers B to C, then the agent must prefer A to C. 3. Continuity: If some lottery B is between A and C in preference, then there is some probability p for which the rational agent will be indifferent between getting B for sure and the lottery that yields A with probability p and C with probability 1 − p. 4. Substitutability: If an agent is indifferent between two lotteries A and B, then the agent is indifferent between two more complex lotteries that are the same except that B Norvig I 613 is substituted for A in one of them. 5. Monotonicity: Suppose two lotteries have the same two possible outcomes, A and B. If an agent prefers A to B, then the agent must prefer the lottery that has a higher probability for A (and vice versa). 6. Decomposability: Compound lotteries can be reduced to simpler ones using the laws of probability. This has been called the “no fun in gambling” rule because it says that two consecutive lotteries can be compressed into a single equivalent lottery (…). These constraints are known as the axioms of utility theory. >Preferences/Norvig, >Rationality/AI research, >Certainty effect/Kahneman/Tversky, >Ambiguity/Kahneman/Tversky. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Frege, G. | Quine Vs Frege, G. | Quine I 425 VsFrege: tendency to object orientation. Tendency to align sentences to names and then take the objects to name them. I 209 Identity/Aristotle/Quine. Aristotle, on the contrary, had things right: "Whatever is predicated by one should always be predicated by the other" QuineVsFrege: Frege also wrong in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung". QuineVsKorzybski: repeated doubling: Korzybski "1 = 1" must be wrong, because the left and right side of the equation spatially different! (Confusion of character and object) "a = b": To say a = b is not the same, because the first letter of the alphabet cannot be the second: confusion between the sign and the object. Equation/Quine: most mathematicians would like to consider equations as if they correlated numbers that are somehow the same, but different. Whitehead once defended this view: 2 + 3 and 3 + 2 are not identical, the different sequence leads to different thought processes (QuineVs). I 264 according to Russell "Propositional Attitudes": believes, says, strives to, that, argues, is surprised, feares, wishes, etc. ... I 265 Propositional attitudes create opaque contexts into which quantification is not allowed. (>) It is not permissible to replace a singular term by an equally descriptive term, without stretching the truth value here. Nor a general term by an equally comprehensive one. Also cross-references out of opaque contexts are prohibited. I 266 Frege: in a structure with a propositional attitude a sentence or term may not denote truth values, a class nor an individual, but it works as "name of a thought" or name of a property or as an "individual term". QuineVsFrege: I will not take any of these steps. I do not forbid the disruption of substitutability, but only see it as an indication of a non-designating function. II 201 Frege emphasized the "unsaturated" nature of the predicates and functions: they must be supplemented with arguments. (Objections to premature objectification of classes or properties). QuineVsFrege: Frege did not realize that general terms can schematized without reifying classes or properties. At that time, the distinction between schematic letters and quantifiable variables was still unclear. II 202 "So that" is ontologically harmless. Despite the sad story of the confusion of the general terms and class names, I propose to take the notation of the harmless relative clause from set theory and to write: "{x:Fx} and "ε" for the harmless copula "is a" (containment). (i.e.the inversion of "so that"). Then we simply deny that we are using it to refer to classes! We slim down properties, they become classes due to the well-known advantages of extensionality. The quantification over classes began with a confusion of the general with the singular. II 203 It was later realized that not every general term could be allocated its own class, because of the paradoxes. The relative clauses (written as term abstracts "{x: Fx}") or so-that sentences could continue to act in the property of general terms without restrictions, but some of them could not be allowed to exercise a dual function as a class name, while others could. What is crucial is which set theory is to be used. When specifying a quantified expression a variable may not be replaced by an abstraction such as: "x} Fx". Such a move would require a premise of the form (1), and that would be a higher form of logic, namely set theory: (1) (Ey)(y = {x:Fx}) This premise tells us that there is such a class. And at this point, mathematics goes beyond logic! III 98 Term/Terminology/Quine: "Terms", here as a general absolute terms, in part III single-digit predicates. III 99 Terms are never sentences. Term: is new in part II, because only here we are beginning to disassemble sentences. Applying: Terms apply. Centaur/Unicorn/Quine: "Centaur" applies to any centaur and to nothing else, i.e. it applies to nothing, since there are no centaurs. III 100 Applying/Quine: Problem: "evil" does not apply to the quality of malice, nor to the class of evil people, but only to each individual evil person. Term/Extension/Quine: Terms have extensions, but a term is not the denotation of its extension. QuineVsFrege: one sentence is not the denotation of its truth value. ((s) Frege: "means" - not "denotes"). Quine: advantage. then we do not need to assume any abstract classes. VII (f) 108 Variables/Quine: "F", etc.: not bindable! They are only pseudo-predicates, vacancies in the sentence diagram. "p", "q", etc.: represent whole statements, they are sometimes regarded as if they needed entities whose names these statements are. Proposition: these entities are sometimes called propositions. These are rather hypothetical abstract entities. VII (f) 109 Frege: alternatively: his statements always denote one or the other of exactly two entities: "the true one" or "the false one". The truth values. (Frege: statements: name of truth values) Quine pro Frege: better suited to distinguish the indistinguishable. (see above: maxim, truth values indistinguishable in the propositional calculus (see above VII (d) 71). Propositions/Quine: if they are necessary, they should rather be viewed as names for statements. Everyday Language/Quine: it is best if we return to everyday language: Names are one kind of expression and statements are another! QuineVsFrege: sentences (statements) must not be regarded as names and "p", "q" is not as variables that assume entities as values that are entities denoted by statements. Reason: "p", "q", etc. are not bound variables! Ex "[(p>q). ~p]> ~p" is not a sentence, but a scheme. "p", "q", etc.: no variables in the sense that they could be replaced by values! (VII (f) 111) VII (f) 115 Name/QuineVsFrege: there is no reason to treat statements as names of truth values, or even as names. IX 216 Induction/Fregean Numbers: these are, other than those of Zermelo and of von Neumann, immune against the trouble with the induction (at least in the TT), and we have to work with them anyway in NF. New Foundations/NF: But NF is essentially abolishing the TT! Problem: the abolition of TT invites some unstratified formulas. Thus, the trouble with induction can occur again. NFVsFrege: is, on the other hand, freed from the trouble with the finite nature which the Fregean arithmetic touched in the TT. There, a UA was needed to ensure the uniqueness of the subtraction. Subtraction/NF: here there is no problem of ambiguity, because NF has infinite classes - especially θ - without ad-hoc demands. Ad 173 Note 18: Sentences/QuineVsFrege/Lauener: do not denote! Therefore, they can form no names (by quotation marks). XI 55 QuineVsFrege/Existence Generalisation/Modal/Necessary/Lauener: Solution/FregeVsQuine: this is a fallacy, because in odd contexts a displacement between meaning and sense takes place. Here names do not refer to their object, but to their normal sense. The substitution principle remains valid, if we use a synonymous phrase for ")". QuineVsFrege: 1) We do not know when names are synonymous. (Synonymy). 2) in formulas like e.g. "(9>7) and N(9>7)" "9" is both within and outside the modal operaotor. So that by existential generalization (Ex)((9>7) and N(9>7)) comes out and that's incomprehensible. Because the variable x cannot stand for the same thing in the matrix both times. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Frege, G. | Hintikka Vs Frege, G. | Cresswell I 148 Compositionality/Cresswell: It has long been known that it fails on the surface structure. (Cresswell 1973 p 77). HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: H. says that it is simply wrong. In saying that, he ignores the deep structure. And indeed you can regard the difference of the two readings of (39) (Everybody loves somebody) in the context of the game theory as changing the order in the choice of individuals. Then you could say that the only linguistic object is the surface structure. CresswellVsHintikka: but when it comes to that, his observations are not new. Compositionality/Cresswell: fails if we say that the two readings depend on the order in which we first process "and" then "or", or vice versa. Nevertheless, the Frege principle (= compositionality) is in turn applicable to (44) or (45). It is treated like this in Montague. (see below Annex IV: Game-theoretical semantics). I 149 HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: fails even with higher order quantification. CresswellVsHintikka: this is a mistake: firstly, no compositionality is effective in the 1st order translation of sentences like (29). But authors who use higher-order entities (Montague and Cresswell) do not see themselves as deniers of the Frege principle. Hintikka seems to acknowledge that. (1982 p 231). I 161. "is"/Frege/Russell: ambiguous in everyday language. HintikkaVsFrege/KulasVsFrege: (1983): not true! Cresswell: ditto, just that "normal semantics" is not obliged to Frege-Russell anyway. Hintikka II 45 (A) Knowledge/Knowledge Objects/Frege/Hintikka: His concern was what objects we have to assume in order to understand the logical behavior of the language, when it comes to knowledge. Solution/Frege/Hintikka: (see below: Frege’s knowledge objects are the Fregean senses, reified, >intensional objects). Hintikka: For me, it is primarily about the individuals of which we speak in epistemic contexts; only secondarily, I wonder if we may call them "knowledge objects". Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: we can oppose the possible worlds semantics to his approach. (Hintikka pro possible worlds semantics). II 46 Idea: application of knowledge leads to the elimination of possible worlds (alternatives). Possible World/Hintikka: the term is misleading, because too global. Def Scenario/Hintikka: everything that is compatible with the knowledge of a knower. We can also call them knowledge worlds. Set of All Possible Worlds/Hintikka: we can call it illegitimate. (FN 5). Knowledge Object/Hintikka: can be objects, people, artifacts, etc. Reference/Frege/Hintikka: Frege presumes a completely referential language. I.e. all our expressions stand for some kind of entities. They can be taken as Fregean knowledge objects. Identity/Substitutability/SI/Terminology/Frege/Hintikka: SI is the thesis of the substitutability of identity ((s) only applies with limitation in intensional (opaque) contexts). II 47 E.g. (1) ... Ramses knew that the morning star = the morning star From this it cannot be concluded that Ramses knew that the morning star = the evening star (although MS = ES). II 48 Context/Frege/Hintikka: Frege distinguish two types of context: Direct Context/Frege/Hintikka: extensional, transparent Indirect Context/Frege/Hintikka: intensional, opaque. E.g. contexts with "believes" (belief contexts). ((s) Terminology: "ext", "opaque", etc. not from Frege). Frege/Hintikka: according to his own image: (4) expression >sense >reference. ((s) I.e. according to Frege the intension determines the extension.) Intensional Contexts/Frege/Hintikka: here, the picture is modified: (5) Expression (>) sense (> reference) Def Systematic Ambiguity/Frege/Hintikka: all our expressions are systematically ambiguous, i.e. they refer to different things, depending on whether they are direct (transparent, extensional) contexts or indirect ones (intensional, opaque). Fregean Sense/Hintikka: Fregean senses in Frege are separate entities in order to be able to work at all as references in intensional contexts. E.g. in order to be able to restore the inference in the example above (morning star/evening start) we do not need the identity of morning star and evening star, but the. identity of the Fregean sense of "morning star" and "evening star". II 49 Important argument: but Frege himself does not reinterpret the identity in the expression morning star = evening star in this way. He cannot express this fact, because there identity occurs in an extensional context and later in an intensional context. Identity/Frege/Hintikka: therefore we cannot say that Frege reinterprets our normal concept of identity. Problem: It is not even clear whether Frege can express the identity of the senses with an explicit sentence. For in his own formal language (in "Begriffsschrift"(1) and "Grundgesetze"(2)) there is no sentence that could do this. He says that himself in: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung": we can only refer to the meanings of our expressions by prefixing the prefix "the meaning of". But he never uses this himself. (B) Knowledge Objects/Possible World Approach/HintikkaVsFrege: Idea: knowledge leads us to create an intentional context that forces us to consider certain possibilities. These we call possible worlds. new: we do not consider new entities (intensional entities) in addition to the references, but we look at the same references in different possible worlds. Morning Star/Evening Star/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: Solution: "morning star" and "evening star" now single out the same object, namely the planet in the real world. II 50 (C) Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: there is no systematic ambiguity here, i.e. the expressions mean the same thing intensionally as extensionally. E.g. Knowing what John knows means knowing those possible worlds which are compatible with his belief, and knowing which are not. II 51 Extra premise: for that it must be sure that an expression singles out the same individual in different possible worlds. Context: what the relevant possible worlds are depends on the context. E.g. Ramses: here, the case is clear, On the other hand: E.g. Herzl knew Loris is a great poet Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal. II 53 Meaning Function/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: the difference in my approach to that of Frege is that I consider problems locally, while Frege considers them globally. Fregean Sense/(= way of givenness) Hintikka: must be considered as defined for all possible worlds. On the other hand: Hintikka: if Fregean sense is construed as meaning function, it must be regarded as only defined for the relevant alternatives in my approach. Frege: precisely uses the concept of identity of senses implicitly. And as meaning function, identity is only given if the mathematical function works for all relevant arguments. Totality/Hintikka: this concept of totality of all logically possible worlds is now highly doubtful. Solution/Hintikka: it is precisely the possible worlds semantics that helps dispense with the totality of all possible worlds. ((s) And to consider only the relevant alternatives defined by the context). Fregean Sense/Hintikka: was virtually constructed as an object (attitude object propositional object, thought object, belief object). This is because they were assumed as entities in the real world (actual world), however abstract. II 54 Meaning Function/M. F./HintikkaVsFrege/Hintikka: unlike Fregean senses, meaning functions are neither here nor elsewhere. Problem/Hintikka: Frege was tempted to reify his "senses". Knowledge Object/Thought Object/Frege/Hintikka: Frege, unlike E.g. Quine, has never considered the problem. Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: entitles us to move from a sentence S(b) with a singular term "b" to the existential statement (Ex) S(x). This fails in intensional (epistemic) contexts. Transition from "any" to "some". E.g. epistemic context: (10) (premise) George IV knew that (w = w) (11) (tentative conclusion) (Ex) George IV knew that (w = x) II 55 Problem: the transition from (10) to (11) fails, because (11) has the strength of (12) (12) George IV knew who w is. EG/Fail/Solution/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumed that in intensional (opaque) contexts we are dealing with ideas of references. HintikkaVsFrege: Problem: then (11) would follow from (10) in any case ((s) and that’s just what is not desired). Because you’d have to assume that there is definitely some kind of sense under which George IV imagines an individual w. Problem: "w" singles out different individuals in different possible worlds. II 56 Possible Worlds Semantics/Solution/Hintikka: E.g. Suppose. (13) George knows that S(w) to (14) (Ex) George knows that S(x) where S(w) does not contain expressions that create opaque contexts. Then we need an additional condition. (15) (Ex) in all relevant possible worlds (w = x). This is, however, not a well-formed expression in our notation. We have to say what the relevant possible worlds are. Def Relevant Possible Worlds/Hintikka: are all those that are compatible with the knowledge of George. Thus, (15) is equivalent to (16) (Ex) George knows that (w = x). This is the additional premise. I.e. George knows who w is. (Knowing that, knowing who, knowing what). Knowing What/Logical Form/Hintikka/(s): corresponds to "knows that (x = y)" ((s) >single class, single quantity). E.g. knowing that "so and so has done it" does not help to know who it was, unless you know who so and so is. ((s) i.e. however, that you know y!) Solution/Hintikka/(s): the set of possible worlds compatible with the knowledge) II 57 Meaning Function/M. F./Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: in order to be a solution here, the meaning function (see above) needs to be a constant function, i.e. it must single out the same individuals in all possible worlds. Frege/Identity/Opaque Context/Hintikka: Frege had to deal with the failure of the SI (substitutability in case of identity) ((s) i.e. the individuals might have a different name), not with the failure of the Existential Generalization (EG). ((s) I.e. the individuals might not exist). Hintikka: therefore, we need several additional premises. Possible Worlds Semantics: SI: here, for substitutability in case of identity, we only need on the assumption that the references of two different concepts in any possible world can be compared. Existential Generalization: here we have to compare the reference of one and the same concept in all possible worlds. Frege/Hintikka: now it seems that Frege could still be defended yet in a different way: namely, that we now quantify on world-lines (as entities). ((s) that would accomodate Frege’s Platonism). II 58 World Lines/Hintikka: are therefore somehow "real"! So are they not somehow like the "Fregean senses"?. HintikkaVs: it is not about a contrast between world bound individuals and world lines as individuals. World Lines/Hintikka: but we should not say that the world lines are something that is "neither here nor there". Using world lines does not mean reifying them. Solution/Hintikka: we need world-lines, because without them it would not even make sense to ask at all, whether a resident of a possible world is the same one as that of another possible world. ((s) cross world identity). II 59 World Line/Hintikka: we use it instead of Frege’s "way of givenness". HintikkaVsFrege: his error was to reify the "ways of givenness" as "sense". They are not something that exists in the actual world. Quantification/Hintikka: therefore, in this context we need not ask "about what we quantify". II 109 Frege Principle/FP/Compositionality/Hintikka: if we proceed from the outside inwards, we can allow a violation of Frege’s principle. (I.e. the semantic roles of the constituents in the interior are context dependent). II 110 HintikkaVsFrege/HintikkaVsCompositionality: Thesis: meaning entities should not be created step by step from simpler ones in tandem with syntactic rules. They should instead be understood, at least in some cases, as rules of semantic analysis. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 2. Gottlob Frege [1893–1903]: Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Jena: Hermann Pohle Wittgenstein I 71 Def Existence/Wittgenstein: predicate of higher order and is articulated only by the existence quantifier. (Frege ditto). I 72 Hintikka: many philosophers believe that this was only a technical implementation of the earlier idea that existence is not a predicate. HintikkaVsFrege: the inexpressibility of individual existence in Frege is one of the weakest points, however. You can even get by without the Fregean condition on a purely logical level. HintikkaVsFrege: contradiction in Frege: violates the principle of expressing existence solely through the quantifier, because the thesis of inexpressibility means that through any authorized individual constant existential assumptions are introduced in the logical language. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Frege Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 31 Numbers / LeibnizVsKant: because the provability of the numerical formulas has claimed. "There is no immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4 Assuming that 4 indicates 3 and 1 one can prove it, in a way.: Definitions: 1st 1 and 1 are 2 2nd 2 and 1 are 3 3rd 3 and 1 are 4 Axiom: If one inserts the same, the equation remains true. I 44 Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4 So by Axiom: 2 + 2 = 4 FregeVsLeibniz: here is a gap that is covered by omitting parentheses. It should be called more precisely: each (1 + 1), (2 + 1), etc. Then we see that the set 2 + (1 + 1) = (2 + 1) + 1 is missing. (see LeibnizVsKant, FregeVsKant) FregeVsLeibniz: this tends falsely to regard all truths as provable. Leibniz I 38f Definition/Leibniz: always in the form of the identical sentence A = B, the predicate is identical to the subject. (FregeVsLeibniz) Substitutability/Leibniz: "Making obvious through the consequences". Contrast: Prove by reason. I 46 "Chain of definitions": reduction of complex concepts to simple ones. I 48 "Chain of evidence": problem: where is the beginning? |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Wessel Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 221 Def Identity/Leibniz: match in all properties (traced back to Aristotle). Identity/WesselVsLeibniz: inappropriate because it suggests searching for two objects to compare and verify properties. In modern mathematics, the problem is circumvented by specifying a fixed range with precisely defined predicates. In an attempt to apply Leibniz's definition to empiricism, an attempt was made to establish the identity relation directly ontologically, without seeing its origin in the properties of language. Wrong approach: in the relative temporal stability of objects: Dilemma: from a = a results not much more than "Socrates is Socrates". Problem: one must then demand that Socrates must have had the same qualities at all times of his life. In fact, some authors have linked the negation of the possibility of change to it. I 228 Def Diversity/Leibniz: "which is not the same or where the substitution sometimes does not apply". Identity/Leibniz: substitutability salva veritate. x = y = def AP(P(x) ↔ P(y)). (s) All properties of one are also those of the other and vice versa). WesselVsLeibniz: the corresponding bisubjunction (= without def) is existentially loaded and therefore not logically true. Identity/PeirceVsLeibniz: "his principle is completely nonsense. No doubt all things are different from each other, but there is no logical necessity for that". Identity/Peirce: x = y ↔ AP(P(x) u P(y) v ~P(x) u ~P(y)) WesselVsPeirce: this is also existentially charged! Identity/Indistinguishability/Wessel: in literature there is a distinction between the principle of the identity of the indistinguishable. (x)(y)AP((P(x) ↔ P(y)) > x = y) (e) and the principle of indistinguishability of the identical (also substitution principle): (x)(y)(x = y > AP(P(x) ↔ P(y))) (n) Identity/Vagueness/WesselVsLeibniz: in vagueness the Leibniz's principle of the identity of the indistinguishable does not apply, since in non-traditional predication theory the formulae P(x) ↔ P(y) and -i P(x) ↔ -i P(y) are not equivalent. Additional demand (Wessel 1987; 1988): the same predicates must also be denied! strict identity: x = y =def AP((P(x) ↔ P(y)) u (-i P(x) ↔ -i P(y))). WesselVsWessel: but this cannot be maintained, because the corresponding bisubjunction is existentially loaded! I 229 In term theory, we will define identity with the help of the term relation. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Wessel Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 352 Intension/WesselVsFrege/WesselVsQuine: Vs Differentiation Intension/Extension: does not help with the problems. Just the hint that these are intensional contexts is not enough. Extensionality Rule/Wessel: according to it, only occurrences of linguistic entities as terms or as statements can be replaced by identical meanings, but not arbitrary graphical parts. Therefore it cannot be said that it is only valid here to a limited extent, because it is not applicable at all! The wrong view is taken because in intensional contexts logical rules apply due to their definitions, which are very similar to the extensionality rule and which, possibly under additional conditions, also allow to replace mere occurrences of graphical parts by certain terms and statements. I 353 Wessel: but in general you cannot say that: Example "a said the statement A" this phrase is used in two different meanings: one is the exact word and letter sequence, the other only the information (indirect speech). Planet Example/WesselVsQuine: he does not use the relation of the meaning equality of terms and the substitutability for meaningful terms, but the identity propositions "evening star = morning star" and the substitutability rule for identities. Wessel: our formulation with equality of meaning is more general. But it also applies to identities. Quine: does not distinguish between an occurrence as a term and as a mere graphic part! Quine interprets all the propositions in connection with the planet example as logical modalities. (Therefore Stegmüller speaks of the peculiarity of the copula "is" and doubts the possibility of a modal logic). Modal Logic/Quine/Wessel: the modalities occurring in Quine's statements can be interpreted as both alethic and epistemic modalities. I 354 WesselVsQuine: this concludes from a wrong premise: Ms(9 ' 7) > ~Wit(9 ' 7). (Ms if the state of affairs is possible, ~Wi: = not refutable) Morning star/evening star/simple/composite/Wessel: one can regard both as simple terms, then the paradox dissolves: ta '_' tb or a = b). (The morning star is the same object as the evening star). 2. as compound terms: then it applies that: ~(ta '_' tb) or ~(a = b). They are then not identical in meaning. WesselVsQuine: in this case one of its prerequisites is wrong. Quine replaces in his construction the paradoxical parts of expressions, which do not occur as terms, but only as graphical parts. VsVs: but the objection has little weight, since additional rules of substitutability can be proven for modal contexts. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Sententialism | Schiffer Vs Sententialism | I 120 Def classic sententialism/Schiffer: after him the meaning or the contents determine, which proposition one believes. I 120 And that is also the problem: DavidsonVsclassisc sententialism, VsSententionalism/VsSententialism/Schiffer: Problem: Ambiguity in one language and in several languages. 1. E.g. [Empedokles liept]: in English: he leaped (leaped, (in the Etna), in German: he loves). (Davidson 1968, 98). 2. E.g. Field: "visiting relatives can be boring". Problem: the truth conditions of belief are after the unrefined sententialism the same as those of the believed proposition. In ambiguous propositions this would then be several truth-conditions!. E.g. if there was a language in which "love is cruel" means that kangaroos are flying, then Henri must believe both!. I 123 DavidsonVsSententialism: 1.a) with a proposition as a reference object of the that-proposition, there would be a fixation on only one language. b) Because of the ambiguity then there could be several truth conditions in the same language. (1975, 165f). 2. (alsoVsFrege): A very different semantic role than normal is ascribed to the proposition: Frege and sententionalism construct "the earth moves" as a major part of a singular term, namely "that the earth moves." They both do that because of the lack of substitutability in intensional contexts. I 137 Meaning/Propositional attitude/Belief/SchifferVsSententialism: there can therefore exist no correct sententialistic theory of propositional attitude Because no man knows the content-determining characteristics. Therefore, it also no proper access to extensionalistic compositional semantics for natural languages can exist. Previously we had already seen that failed as a non-sententialistic theory. I 157 Belief/Belief systems/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine belief systems never are true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. But: QuineVsBrentano: ~ no propositional attitudes belong in the canonical scheme, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms. (W+O 1960, p 221). Vssententialist dualism/SD/Schiffer: 1. QuineVs: If we accept the sD, we need to acknowledge with Brentano the "importance of an autonomous science of intention". Problem: this commonsense theory would then be cut off from the rest of science. And: Isolation/Science/Wright: (Wright 1984): to be isolated from the scientific means to be discredited. Theory/Quine: if it is discredited, their theoretical terms cannot be true of something and propositions such as "I think some dogs have fleas" cannot be true. Sententialist Dualism/Field: pro: (1972, 357): Physicalism is a successful hypothesis ... that would only force a large number of experiments to be ad. I 158 We bring Quine and Field as follows together: (1) "Believes", "wishes", "means" and so on are theoretical terms (TT) of a common sense psychological theory. (2) The justification for methodological physicalism (what Field wants) and the nature of the commonsense theory require that - should the theoretical terms physicalistically be irreducible - the folk psychology must be wrong. That means the terms are true of nothing (Quine). (3) Therefore, the sD must be wrong: belief systems cannot be both: true and irreducible. SchifferVs: is not convincing. I doubt both premises. Ad (2): there is no legitimate empirical hypothesis that requires that theoretical facts on physical facts are reducible. That would only be plausible if the TT would be defined by the theory itself that it introduces. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Tugendhat Vs Strawson, P. F. | Wolf II 20 Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: he underestimates the importance of the space-time system for identification. Most basic statements: those with perception predicates. I 387/388 StrawsonVsRussell: logical proper names are only fictitious. "This" is not an ambiguous proper name but has a uniform meaning as a deictic expression and designates a different object depending on the situation of use. TugendhatVsStrawson: but you cannot oblige Russell to use this word as we use it in our natural language. Russell fails because he does not take into account another peculiarity: the same object for which a deictic expression is used in the perceptual situation can be designated outside that situation by other expressions. (Substitutability). I 389 TugendhatVsStrawson: what StrawsonVsRussell argues does not actually contradict his theory, but seems to presuppose it. I 433 Learning: the child does not learn to attach labels to objects, but it is the demonstrative expressions that point beyond the situation! The demonstrative expressions are not names, one knows that it is to be replaced by other deictic expressions, if one refers from other situations to the same. (TugendhatVsRussell and StrawsonVsRussell). I 384 StrawsonVsRussell: Example "The present King of France is bald" (King-Example). It depends on what time such an assertion is made. So it is sometimes true. I 385 Example "The present king of France is bald" has a meaning, but no truth value itself. (>expression, >utterance): RussellVsStrawson: that would have nothing to do with the problem at all, one could have added a year. StrawsonVsRussell: if someone is of the opinion that the prerequisite for existence is wrong, he will not speak of truth or falsehood. RussellVsStrawson: it does not matter whether you say one or the other in colloquial language, moreover, there are enough examples that people speak more of falsity in colloquial language. I 386 TugendhatVsStrawson: he did not realize that he had already accepted Russell's theory. It is not about the difference between ideal language and colloquial language. This leads to the Oxford School with the ordinary language philosophy. It is not about nuances of colloquial language as fact, but, as with philosophy in general, about possibility. I 387/388 StrawsonVsRussell: logical proper names are only fictitious. "This" is not an ambiguous proper name but has a uniform meaning as a deictic expression and designates a different object depending on the situation of use. TugendhatVsStrawson: but you cannot oblige Russell to use this word as we use it in our natural language.) Russell fails because he does not take into account another peculiarity: the same object for which a deictic expression is used in the perceptual situation can be designated outside that situation by other expressions. (Substitutability). I 389 TugendhatVsStrawson: what StrawsonVsRussell argues does not actually contradict his theory, but seems to presuppose it. I 395 Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: uses identification in the narrower sense. Tugendhat: my own term "specification" (which of all objects is meant) is superior to this term. "To pick put" is Strawson's expression. (Taken from Searle). (>Quine: "to specify"). I 397/398 TugendhatVsStrawson: example "The highest mountain" is no identification at all: which one is the highest? Something must be added, an ostension, or a name, or a location. For example, someone can be blindfolded and led to the highest mountain. He will also not know more. I 399 Identification/Strawson: distinguishes between two types of identification a) Direct pointing b) Description by marking. Space-time locations. Relative position to all other possible locations and all possible objects (in the world). I 400 TugendhatVsStrawson: he overlooked the fact that demonstrative identification in turn presupposes non-demonstrative, spatio-temporal identification. Therefore, there are no two steps. Strawson had accepted Russell's theory of the direct relation so far that he could not see it. ((s) > Brandom: Deixis presupposes anaphora.) I 415 TugendhatVsStrawson: he has overlooked the fact that the system of spatio-temporal relations is not only demonstratively perceptively anchored, but is also a system of possible positions of perception, and thus a system of demonstrative specifications. I 419 TugendhatVsStrawson: he did not ask how the meaning of singular terms is explained or how it is determined which object a singular term specifies. This is determined with different objects in very different ways, sometimes by going through all possible cases. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
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