Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 43 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Clauses | Castaneda | Frank I 467 Subsentence/clause/beliefs sentence/ Frege: embedded phrases: not a separate reeference, they denote only the meaning of an object. >Denotation, >Reference, >Clauses/Frege, >Sense, >Fregean Sense, >Fregean meaning. KantVs: each sentence is implicitly embedded in "I think" (puts everything in indirect speech). >"I think"/Kant, >cogito. Then all objects are not part of the semantics of singular terms. >Singular terms. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1983 b): Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief, and Reference, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983),313-327 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Colour | Frege | Dummett I 60ff Frege/Dummett: "When we see a blue surface, we have a peculiar impression that corresponds to the word "blue"; and we recognize it when we see another blue surface." Dum I 60ff But even in common language use an objective sense stands out: if you call snow white. E.g. if the snow is lighted with colored lights, the effect influences the assessment. It now appears red, but it is white. >Objectivity. Even a color-blind person can speak of red and green. He/she can tell the difference because others make a distinction, or perhaps through a physical experiment. The color word does often not refer to our subjective sensation. The color-blind person can recognize it, because the others recognize it as such. Frege: "Red": has a uniform reference, changing (Fregean) sense in speakers. (DummettVs) >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Meaning, >Reference, >Sense. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Commands | Frege | II 53 Commands/intention: Frege: the thought has an "oblique meaning" (German: "ungerade Bedeutung"). The imperative is "oblique speech" (German: "ungerade Rede"). It has no "meaning" only "sense". Command and wish are no thoughts, but they are on the same level. The "meaning" of the imperative is the command. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Meaning, >Sense, >Thoughts, >Oblique sense, >Oblique meaning. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Consciousness | Frege | Dummett I 60ff Frege: the content of consciousness are sensations, but not the mind or thoughts. These are the detection of the exterior. Frege IV 41 Thoughts/mind/imagination/Frege: thoughts do not belong to consciousness. They are objective. Thoughts are 'formed'. We 'have' ideas, moods and inclinations. They belong to the consciousness. IV 43 Third realm: thoughts: in the thirs realm thoughts are neither things in the outside world nor imaginations. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Imagination, >Thought, >Meaning, >Sensation, >Objectivity, >Subjectivity. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Correspondence Theory | Sellars | II 22 Correspondence/Sellars: the relation of linguistic and non-linguistic entities is an activity. It is reflecting projection. All true statements are true in the same sense (like Frege). They differ in that they construct in different ways a projection of the world in the subjects. >World/thinking, >Reality, >World, >Truth, >Statements, >Correspondence relation. Projection/Sellars: but the projection belongs more to the realm of thought acts than to the statements. >Thinking/Sellars, >Language and thought. --- II 334 Summary 1) The correspondence that we were looking for is limited to elementary statements. 2) It is about the fundamental role that actual statements (or thought acts) play. Like the pawns in chess: e.g. "Chicago is big." 3) All true statements are "true" in the same sense, but they differ in their roles: 2 + 2 = 4 plays a different role than "this is red". The role consists in constituting a projection in the language users of the world they live in. >Language use, >Language game, >Language community, >Meaning, >Truth value, >Fregean meaning. Sellars: pro redundancy theory: if the picture corresponds, you are convinced that "this is green" is true, so you are convinced: this is green. >Redundancy theory. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Counterfactuals | Frege | II 64 f Counterfactual/Frege: "If iron was lighter than water, it would float on water." Here, we have the two notions that iron is not lighter, and that something that is lighter floats on water. The subordinate clause again expresses the one notion and a part of the other notion. >Thought, >Clause, E.g. "After Schleswig-Holstein was cut off from Denmark, Prussia and Austria quarreled." Here, the subordinate clause expresses not only one notion, but also part of the other. Therefore, it cannot be replaced generally by another of the same truth value. >Truth value. II 64 Cases in which this simply does not work: 1) That the subordinate clause means no truth value because it only expresses part of a thought. 2) That it does mean a truth value, but does not limit itself to it, because its sense still comprises a portion of the other thought and not only one thought. The first case occurs: a) In the case of the odd meaning of the words. b) If a part of the sentence only vaguely suggests, instead of being a proper name. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Proper names, >Oblique sense, >Oblique meaning. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Denotation | Frege | Berka I 387 Designate/denote/meaning/Frege: ("sense and meaning"): denotation has a two-dimensional semantics. It identifies designation and meaning function (because of a lack of content in logic.) denote sense < ----(express)---- name ----(mean)---- > meaning >Sense, >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Meaning; cf. >Twodimensional semantics. Frege/Berka: Frege thus equates designating with meaning. Frege I 87 Variable/designating/designation/denotationFrege: "x" designates nothing. X only indicates numbers. Hence, e.g. "x² + 3x" designates nothing. The entire function only indicates. By contrast, "sin" (sine) is a sign which designates but it is still no law! A lawis : e.g., "y = sin x". >Laws. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Existence | Frege | Read III 153 Existence/Frege: existence is a second order property. Property of a property: is having an example. >Levels. Frege II 57 Existence/sense/meaning/subordinate clause/subsentence/Frege: e.g. "After Schleswig-Holstein was cut off from Denmark, Prussia and Austria quarreled." The cutting off is not part of the sense - it is rather a prerequisite for the whole sentence to makes sense. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Sense, >Meaning, >unsaturated; cf. >Non-existence. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Extensionality | Prior | I 48 Extensionality: "Law of extensionality": if the sentences S1 and S2 have the same truth value, then, each composite sentence that differs only in that it has S1 as a subset , where the other has S2 as a subset, also the same truth value. >Truth values, >Truth, >Extensions, >Clauses. PriorVs: one can count mixed constructions like "__is green and__" also "__believes that__" into the same category as the simple. - If the law of extensionality is true, then must "grass is pink" and "grass is purple" be the same thought. >Thoughts, >Thought/Frege, cf. >Fregean meaning, >Fregean sense. Solution: "x thinks, grass is pink" is not a compound sentence with "grass is pink" as a component. Cf. >Compositionality, >Thinking, >Sentences, >Propositions. I 50 Extensionality/Prior: Lesniewski/Lukasiewicz: if one drops the E, one must admit that some propositions are neither true nor false. >St. Lesniewski, >J. Lukasiewicz. PriorVsExtensionality: truth value of a statement depends not only on its truth value. (Circular). >Circular reasoning. I 93 Law of extensionality: propositions with the same truth value are identical. >Identity, cf. >Equivalence. I 139 Extensionality/Prior: "cause", "bring about" seems to be the most extensional operator: the one who brings p about, brings everything into existence ipso facto, what is equivalent with p. Cf. >Command/Prior. But it does not bring into existence what it contains (entailment, asymmetric implication ): E.g. someone is caught by the FBI and a communist, but that does not bring about, that he is a communist. >Causation, >Entailment/Prior. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Fregean Sense | Hintikka | II 48 Fregean Sense/Hintikka: Fregean senses are special entities in Frege, in order to be able to function as referents in intensional contexts at all. For example, to restore the inference in the example (morning star/evening star), we do not need the identity of morning star and evening star, but the identity of the Fregean sense of "morning star" and "evening star". II 49 N.B.: but Frege does not reinterpret the identity in the expression morning star = evening star itself in this way. Indeed, he cannot express this because there the identity is present in an extensional context, and later in an intensional context. Identity/Frege/Hintikka: therefore one cannot say that Frege reinterprets our normal concept of identity. Problem: it is not even clear whether Frege can express the identity of the senses by means of an explicit sentence. For, in his own formal language (in "Begriffsschrift"(1) and "fundamental laws"(2)) there is no sentence that could do so. This is what he himself says in "About Sense and Meaning": we can only refer to the senses of our expressions by prefixing the prefix "the meaning of". However, Frege never uses it himself. Cf. >Sense, >Meaning, >Fregean meaning, >Reference, >Terminology/Frege. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Grammar | Frege | II 49 Grammar/logic/Frege: subject/predicate are always thought without truth value, there is no extension. The joining of subject and predicate always leads only to a thought (sense), never to an object (meaning). >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Subject, >Predicate, >Object, >Sense, >Thought. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Idealism | Frege | Husted V 103 FregeVsIdealism/Husted: idealism is useless because it cannot represent the effect of the language. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Subject, >Predicate, >Object, >Sense, >Thought. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
| Idealism | McDowell | I 209 Idealism/VsMcDowell/McDowell: his opponents could speak of a "danger of idealism": idealistic basic mood of the "elimination of the outer boundary". >Limit/McDowell. This eludes us a possibility which we should not renounce: the possibility of direct contact between the spiritual and the objects. We became aware of this possibility in the criticism VsRussell, theory of descriptions. If one accepts the world as all that is the case, then the world is subordinated to the realm of Fregean sense ("kingdom of the conceivable"). >Description/Russell, >Fregean sense. Then there are not episodes and acts of thought but identity. Facts in this sense are thoughts; The conceivable, which is the case. --- I 209 McDowellVs: However, objects do not belong to the sphere of the conceivable (Fregean sense) but to the realm of the object reference (Fregean meaning). >Fregean meaning, >Reference, >World/Thinking/McDowell. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Intensions | Cresswell | II 70 Definition Intension: the predicate P: that what defines the extension in every world. >Extensions. II 70 Intension/Extension/Cresswell: this distinction is in contrast to the distinction sense/reference. >Sense, >Reference, cf. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. Intension/extension: is distinguished within the realm of the reference - reference: any linguistic expression is simply an intension. Intension: is simply something that is the element of a D's ((s) of any meaning category.) >Meaning category. Intension: that what is known if one knows the meaning of a simple predicate. >Meaning, >Predicates. II 149 Morning Star/Evening Star/Kripke/Cresswell: since Kripke the evening star/morning star problem is mostly formulated with Phosphorus and Hesperus - (names are more problematic than descriptions). >Names, >Descriptions, >Phosphorus/Hesperus. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Intensions | Geach | I 226 Meaning/reference/Frege/Geach: Frege's distinction is not the same as between intension/extension. >Extension, >Reference, >Meaning, >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. I 227 Term/Concepts/Frege: Frege has a purely extensional view. - Therefore there is no "sense of the name" but reference of the predicate. >Extensionality, >Predicate/Frege, >Sense, >Object/Frege, >Concept/Frege. ((s) Reference/(s): set of the mentioned items, = Extension). But: Extension/Frege: = object Concept/Frege: no object. The reason for this is: a term is unsaturated, an object saturated. "Red" does not stand a term - otherwise the term would be a name. ((s) The concepts "intension" and "extension" were coined later by Carnap.) |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Intentionality | Frege | II 52 Purpose/intention: Frege: the purpose is a thought, therefore it has an "oblique meaning" (German: ungerade Bedeutung). Imperative: is "oblique speech" (German: ungerade Rede) and has no "meaning" only "sense". Command and wish are no thoughts, but on the same level. The "meaning" of the instruction sentence: is the command. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Oblique speech (= quote to the point), >Thought, >Intention. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Meaning | Frege | Husted V 103 Def "Sense" (meaning) of the sentence: the sense of the sentence is its truth condition. II 41 Meaning: the meaning is what the sign signifies, e.g. the planet Venus, the extension. It is that what one wants to talk about. >Extension. II 42 Sense: the sense is the way of givenness, e.g. the meaning of "the intersection of b and c" is other than "a and b" (even though the point is identical). Significance is illuminated only one-sidedly by the sense. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Intension, >Sense. II 42 Example: “The celestial body that is farthest away from the Earth”. There is no doubt that these words have a meaning but it is uncertain if there is an object satisfiying it. >Reference. II 69 The "meaning" of a name is never a concept (predicate) but always a subject. II 43 Meaning/sense/Frege: meaning and sense are not the same. The meaning of a word or name is a real object. Sense: is not based on a person like an idea, e.g. there is a sense of "par excellence". See also Fregean Sense, >Imagination. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
| Meaning | Geach | I 28f Frege: sense/meaning. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Sense, >Meaning. GeachVsRussell: false equivalence with "means"/"denotes" (refers to) in Principia Mathematica(1) Seeming parallel: a description contains "meaning" (Frege: Sinn) as a component, but not on this sense but about the objects. The description denotes. >Denotation, >Description. Signifiying expression/Russell: general term with a prefix, all, some, etc. >General terms. Meaning/Principia Mathematica: two phrases mean the same thing when they maintain the same assumption. >Meaning/Russell. Signify/Frege: two sentences mean the same when they have both the same truth value. >Truth value. Incomplete symbol/Russell/late: certain descriptions have no meaning. GeachVsRussell: this is misleading – rather: we do not need a single entity that corresponds to a specific description – E. g "There is a King…". >Incomplete symbols. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Meaning | Russell | Tugendhat I 348 Meaning/Object/Russell: meaning of an expression = object. Tugendhat I 384 Meaning/Russell: he makes no distinction between meaning and object (-> Meaning/Quine: is no "entity") - Russell: object is literally in the sentence. StrawsonVsRussell: then an empty singular term has no significance. >Singular term, >Sense, >Senseless, >Meaning, >Reference, cf. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. I 58 Meaning/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell: here Russell speaks of the fact that a function means an "indeterminate object" (sic). (FregeVs) 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Meaning | Tugendhat | I 21 Meaning/Tugendhat ultimately not based on objects (not any more than on circumstances) but on truth conditions - later verification conditions. >Truth conditions, >Verification conditions, >Verification, >Circumstances/Tugendhat. I 263 Sentence: Meaning/Tugendhat by specifying its truth conditions - and explains this by demonstrating the way of verification. >Sentence meaning. I 282 Meaning/Tugendhat: the meaning of the sentence p is not the fact that p : that fails with sentences that contain deictic expressions. - Different situations have different truth conditions. >Situations, cf. >Situation semantics. I 283 Meaning/Tugendhat: of a sentence: function. Arguments: use-situations of the sentence. Values: the assertions (truth conditions). >Functions, >Use, >Use theory (only for words, not for sentences). I 432 Meaning/Tugendhat: function whose arguments are the speech situations and their values are the objects . "The meaning maps the speech situations on the items". Vs: that is metalinguistically - it requires understanding of " I " , "here", etc. first to understand - (because demontratives are not names). Substitutability is the meaning of demonstratives. >Understanding, cf. >Speaker meaning, >Substitution, >Demonstratives. II 231 Meaning/Frege/Tugendhat: should not be translate as "reference". Only where Frege conceives sentences as a proper name. >Reference, >Fregean meaning, >Fregean sense, >Sense. Frege distinguishes between reference of names and truth values of sentences. >Truth values, >Sentences. II 240 Otherwise error/Frege: ... that you can mingle meaning and concept on the one hand and meaning and subject matter on the other hand. - Correct: "What two concept words ( predicates ) mean is the same iff the corresponding extents (value progression) coincide. >Value progression, >Term scope. II 247 Tugendhat: (meaning/reference): nevertheless there is a primacy of truth over the objects. >Truth/Tugendhat, >Truth. II 242 Meaning/Tugendhat: sentences are meaningful in that they can be true/false. - predicates by apply to some (and not others) objects. >True-of, >Satisfaction. Names: denote something. Predicates can be attributed to a thing. >Names, >Predication. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Mention | Wessel | I 220 Use/mention/Wessel: the statement "a and b are identical" is not about the terms "a" and "b", but about the objects they designate - that is, the terms "a" and "b" are used and not mentioned - (s) if the terms were mentioned, one would talk about the terms and not about the objects. >Mention/use, >Use, >Levels/order, >Metalanguage, >Object language. I 286 Use/mention: logical follow-up relationship: A I- B: talks about statements (i.e. not content). >Consequence. Conditional: A -> B: talking about the content which is talked about in the statements (e.g. current, magnetic field). ((s)Question/(s): mention is = if it is not talked about statements content-related? Use: = if e.g. the truth is found? - But: "A is true" - does not mean "the current flows".) I 313 ((s) Use/mention/Wessel/(s): E.g. "The Inselsberg is referred to by the term Inselsberg": 1. incident used as a term, and designates the object, 2. the word is not used here as a term, but mentioned as a physical object Inselsberg: is mentioned - name: is used. Mention: = quote (quotes). Instead of quotation marks: t: t A: name of statement A - "the statement A". I 352 Incident/mention/use/Wessel: 1. Term or statement A occurs as a term or statement in: E.g. ~ A or A and B. 2. merely as a physical thing (darkness, sound) in E.g. "the statement A" (tA), or "the facts that A" (sA) - E.g. from "Ließchen says a" (only graphically A) and A ↔ B does not follow "Ließchen says B" - therefore it always needs to be defined what must be regarded as incident of a term. (s) A sound cannot be true or false. ad I 352 ((s) Mention/use/density/Wessel/(s): different density of the pages: just plays no role in 2 + 2 = 4.) I 35 "Odd"/Frege: occurrence as merely graphical part. >Odd sense, >Odd meaning, >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >G. Frege. Extensionality rule: statements can be replaced by identical ones in meaning, but not any graphical parts. >Extensionality, >Extensions. Wessel: the extensionality rule is here not applicable. - Because intensional rules are very similar to extensional ones, but sometimes replacing of graphical parts by genuine statements. I 353 Planets example /Wessel: Quine does not differentiate between graphic and genuine occurrence. Only identity sentences: evening star = morning star, number of planets = 9 and then substitutability for identities. >Substitution, >Substitutability, >Identity, >Morning star/evening star, >Planets example. WesselVsQuine: See them as compound expressions: then evening star unequal morning star, as simple equal (for Venus). |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Numbers | Frege | II 18 f Numbers/Frege: e.g. 16 = 4², 4 x 4 = 4². Here we see that equality of meaning does not lead to equality of thought. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Thoughts, >Equality, >Equations. II 66 ff The figure contains the expression of a concept. >Concepts. Properties will be expressed by a concept. A concept may fall under a higher one. E.g. there is at least one square root of 4. This is not a statement about a certain number 2, nor about -2, but about a concept, namely the square root of 4. II 81 f There are no variable numbers. Variable: do we not denote variable numbers by x, y, z? This way of speaking is used, but these letters are not proper names of variable numbers, like "2" and "3" are proper names of constant numbers. We cannot specify which properties "x" has in contrast to y. >Variables. Variable: is not a proper name of an indefinite or variable number. X has no properties (only in the context). "Indefinitely" is not an adjective, but an adverb for the process of calculating. Generality/Frege: generality is not a meaning but a hint. Proper Names: π, i, e are not variables! Generality: here, the number has to play two roles: as an object it is called a variable, as a property, it is called a value. Function: has generality, is a law. To any number of the x-range a number from the y-range is assigned. A function is not a variable! (An elliptic function is not an elliptic variable). The function is unsaturated. >Unsaturated. II 77 Number/object/calculating/addition/Frege: only from the meaning of the words "the number 4" (Frege: = object) we can say that it is the result of combining 3 and 1. Not of the concept. Calculation result: is an object, the result of the calculation: is not a concept. II 85 Number/Frege: e.g. "a variable takes on a value". Here, the number has to play two roles: as an object it is called a variable, as a property, it is called a value. I 38 Numbers/Frege: from physical observations no conclusions can be drawn about numbers. I 47 Quantity/Frege: quantity is a concept. Number: is an object. >Objects. I 48 Numbers/Newton: numbers are the ratio of each size to another. FregeVsNewton: here, the notions of size and ratio are presupposed. I 49 Numbers/Frege: Problem: numbers as sets: here, the concept of quantity is pressupposed. I 60 Number/Frege: number is no multiplicity. That would exclude 0 and 1. I 62 Number/one/unit/property/Frege: "One" cannot be a property. Otherwise, there would be no thing that does not have this property. I 82 Not the objects but the concepts are the bearers of the number. Otherwise, different numbers could be assigned to the same example. Thus the abstraction is accompanied by a judgment. I 90 A number is not the property of a concept. Number: is an abstract object, not a property -> see below. Number Equality/equality: number equality is a concept (not an object). I 100/101 Def Quantity/Frege: the quantity which belongs to the concept F is the scope of the concept equal numbered to the concept F. I 100 Scope/concept scope/Frege: if the straight a is parallel to straight b, then the scope of the concept of straight parallel to straight a is equal to the scope of the concept straight parallel to the straight b and vice versa - scope equality. >Term scope, >Equality. I 110 Number/Frege/(s): comes from the distinction concept term scope (quantity)/object (number). If the object is zero, the quantity that belongs to this concept is one. ((s) This is how Frege gets from 0 to 1: one is the number-of objects falling under the concept "equal-to-zero", namely one object. Zero ist the number of objects falling under the concept "equal-to-zero-and-not-equal-to-zero"). >Zero, >One. I 121 Numbers/Frege: numbers are not concepts. They are (abstract) objects (see above). Quantities are concepts. I 128 Term: e.g. square root of -1. This cannot be used with the definite article. I 135 Number/Frege: a number is neither heaps of things, nor a property of such. I 130 Number system/expansion/Frege: in the expansion, the meaning is not be established arbitrarily. E.g. the meaning of the square root is not already invariably established before the definitions, but it is determined by them. ((s) Frege: wants to point at the meaning as use within a system.). The new numbers are given to us as scopes of concepts. I 136 Each figure is an equation. >Equations. Berka I 83 Number/Frege: numbers must be defined in order to be able to present completeness of evidence at all - (> sequence).(1) 1- G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Proper Names | Frege | I 54 Proper name/Frege: for a proper name the extension is presumed. Otherwise, the negation would be: "Kepler did not die in misery or the name is meaningless". >Extension. II 69 The "meaning" of a name is never a concept (predicate), but always only an object. >Concept, >Object, >Predicate. II 72f Proper name/Frege: a proper name (saturated) can never be a predicate (but part of a predicate). Names/understanding/Frege: understanding a name means to know what object it denotes. Problem: are names without a carriers (e.g. unicorn). Problem: e.g. different names with the same carrier. >Unicorn-example, >Non-existence. Husted V 99/100 The fact that a name stands for an object is a consequence rather than part of the fact that it has a certain sense. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, Chisholm II 144f Names/Frege: "mixed proper name": contains linguistic and non-linguistic parts: the circumstances. Circumstances: are part of the meaning of an expression. >Circumstances. ChisholmVsFrege: he neglects ostension. Dummett III 68f Names/FregeVsRussell: names may well have the same sense as a specific description - what is actually considered to be a representation of an object: Valencia from the air, from the ground, within a specific buildind, or on the map? Recognition: necessary: is the awareness that the object falls under the concept that determines the proper identity criterion (here: "city"). This is the ability for recognition instead of the method of picking out ("red": is recognition, not a method for red). >Recognition. Frege II 69 Name/Frege: a name can never be a predicate - but certainly part of a predicate. >Predicate. Stalnaker I 183 Names/proper names/Frege/Stalnaker: for him there is a mental representation, i.e. we only have ideas about something that presents itself to us in a certain way. ((s) This can be reconciled with Donnellan’s attributive use). >Attributive/referential. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Propositional Attitudes | Mates | I 101f Propositional attitudes / opaque context / meaning / significance / Frege / Mates: expression changes meaning depending on the context - after "believe that" an expression has as the meaning, which usually makes up his sense and any sense as something else (indirect meaning). >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Oblique meaning, >Oblique sense, >Citations, >Sense, >Meaning, >G. Frege, >Propositions, >That-clauses. Meaning: meaning is then the proposition (instead of a truth value) >Truth values. Sense: sense in a opaque context: an indirect sense corresponds to our "direct token", a name or identification. >Opacity, >Occurrence, >Names of sentences, >Descriptions. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Propositions | Castaneda | Frank I 323 Propositions/Tradition: (not represented by anyone in pure form, not even by Frege): ideal convergence of the elements of thought, speech, reality and communication. >Convergence, >Communication, >Thought objects, >Belief objects, >Content, >G. Frege. Propositions that are primarily defined as carriers of timeless truth values, fundamental support of linguistic meaning as constituents of reality and as publicly accessible contents of communication. >Propositions, >Communication, >Truth values. Advantage: that leaves no gap between the content of thought, and that to which it is directed - for reality arise. >Reference, >Reality, >World/Thinking. CastanedaVs: this does not apply to indexical sentences. >Indexicality, >Index Words. Individuation: of indexical sentences: in the speech act, not by meaning. >Individuation. I 340ff Proposition/Tradition: (Frege, Moore): 1) psychological units, 2) ontological, 3) ontologically objective (intersubjective) 4) metaphysical units 5) logical units 6) semantic 7) linguistic units of communication. CastanedaVs: there are discrepancies between 1 - 7 in the case of diachronic flow of experiences in the changing world. VsTradition: fails with indexical reference with "I", "here", "now". Problem: E.g. "I have 30 grams of nitrogen in my liver": understanding is possible without knowledge of the truth value. >Understanding, >Truth value, >Truth conditions. Therefore meaning unequal truth value (VsFrege) - what is meant by the formation of a sentence is not some objective feature or thing in the world that is accessible to everyone. >Meaning, >Meaning/Frege, >Fregean Sense, >Fregean meaning. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Reference | Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension. |
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| Reference | Anscombe | Frank I 87 Reference/Frege/Anscombe: there is no way back from the reference to the meaning. >Sense, >Meaning. Each object has many modes of givenness or description modes. >Way of givenness. Intension/"I"/Anscombe: because of the peculiarity of the construction it succeeds to determine an object, despite the theoretically many possibilities of the way of being given: for we do not want to assume "Smith does not realize the identity with Smith". >Intension. If we consider the reflexive in the ordinary sense, this would be possible. "I"/Special Reflexivum/Anscombe: the special reflexivum can only be explained from the point of view of the first person. >First person. Frege: we have not already understood the meaning when a person is told of what object a person will speak of when he says "I" whether he knows it or not. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. However, the use of "I" ensures that the speaker knows it, but we still have a right to ask what he knows! |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Reference | Russell | Dummett I 59 RussellVsDistinction Sense/Reference: (meaning/reference). (RussellVsFrege). Cf. > Newen I 92 Name/identifier/Russell: are non-referring. Reference/Russell: only logically proper names ("this", etc.) >Names, >Logical proper names, >Description. McGinn I 178 Reference/Russell/McGinn: possible only by acquaintance - like Gareth Evans. The distinguishing knowledge is the basis of the reference. "Knowledge of." |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Science | Hacking | I 149f Science/meaning/Hacking: science is concerned with types of items instead of important species. >Natural kinds. VsPutnam: reference is ultimately not decisive. First, you examine the role: "whatever ..." (similar to Fregean sense). >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. Progress: if this sense is not the object, then a new baptism is needed. >Proper names, >Causal theory of names. I 265 Science/HackingVsPopper: science does not always mean a refutation of the theory. E.g. the discovery of the background radiation was just something new. >Progress, >Discoveries. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Sense | Castaneda | Frank I 325 Sense/Meaning/CastanedaVsFrege: the denotation within intention in propositional contexts is not Fregean meaning, but Fregean sense. >Fregean Sense, >Fregean meaning, >Denotation, >Intention, >Propositional attitudes. Reversal of Frege: the world reference can only be explained by the objects being explained as systems of Fregean senses. Then "sense "and "reference" get entirely new meanings. >Sense, >Reference. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 Frank I 400ff Sense/Meaning/CastanedaVsFrege: Guise Theory: (of designs): Vs distinction sense/meaning. >Guise-Theory. From this also follows: VsFrege: indirect speech does not lose its reference - expressions always denote the same thing, namely guises (designs). VsPerry: that also makes his distinction of designating and expressing unnecessary. I 432ff Extra-Sense/Castaneda: E.g. Ivan believes that he* is required on the phone - here is (Ivan) Ivan referencce) and ego(Ivan) its special meaning i - in an assertion of speaker a "I" expresses ego(a). PerryVsCastaneda: this explanation leads to a gap in the theory of reports of beliefs - anyone who can believe anything of Ivan, can believe the corresponding proposition of Ivan that "i" is required on the phone - KretzmannVs: still private, not even God could grasp extra-sense - PerryVs: misunderstanding, "he*" cannot be replaced by description without Index - but that does not mean that the proposition "he himself is in the hospital" can be known by none other - "i"/PerryVsCastaneda: different psychological role for Ivan and Sheila still has to be explained - that Ivan but not Scheila is the reference is not enough - Ivan must also believe that he* is i, but that is initially nothing more than that i is i! - And Sheila also believes that - in addition: information that it is about their own extra-sense. Problem: the extra-sense does not help if Ivan does not know that he was appointed Editor. - Facts about the language are no solution. I 459ff Sense/Frege: psychological mediator role. - CastanedaVs, PerryVs. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Sense | Frege | Dummett III 56 ff Sense/Frege: two arguments: 1) The sentence is the smallest unit. 2) Truth plays the crucial role in explaining the meaning. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. Sense: sense is part of the meaning and relevant for truth or falsehood. The meaning of a sentence, as such, does not determine the truth. So the sense only determines the truth conditions. Truth also depends on nature of the world. When sense determines the semantic value, the contribution of the world is already presumed. Dummett III 64 Sense/Reference/Frege: the argument (a sentence is the smallest unit of sense) has two premises: a) all predicative knowledge is based on propositional knowledge, b) for certain predicative knowledge there is more than just one proposition. Therefore, no mere knowledge of the reference is possible. Dummett III 74 Sense/Dummett: sense is not only acquired by verification method, but by understanding the circumstances which must be realized (e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture). Sense/reference/bivalence/Dummett: bivalence: Problem: not every sentence has such a sense that we can, in principle, recognize it as true if it is true (unicorn, Goldbach’s conjecture). But Frege’s argument does not depend on bivalence. >Bivalence. Dummett III 76 Bivalence does apply, however, for elementary propositions: if the semantic value here is the extension, it does not have to be decided whether the predicate is true or not. It may not be possible to effectively decide the application, but the (undefined) predicate can be understood without being able to allocate the semantic value (here truth value). Therefore, there is a distinction between sense and semantic value. Dummett III 133 Sense/Frege/Dummett: sense is constituted by the manner of givenness but it is not identical with it. Husted V 100f Meaning/sense/Frege/Husted: if both were equal, a sentence could not say anything that everyone who knows the name did not know already. The meaning of a name: is the object. The fact that a name stands for an object is a result, not part of the fact that it has a purpose. V 103 Frege: the sense of the sentence is the truth condition >Understanding/Dummett, >Understanding/Wittgenstein - Understanding, knowing what must be the case. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
| Sense | Mates | I 99 Sense/meaning/Frege / Mates: Sense and meaning should not be confused because the compositionality applies to both ((s) seperately) : e.g. (1) morning star and evening star are the same (2) morning star and morning star are the same. (1) and (2) do not have the same meaning - E.g. a = a is not the same sense as a = b. >Identity, >Identity/Frege. N.B.: nevertheless m.s. and e.s. have the same meaning (reference). >Reference, >Meaning, >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. Meaning/Frege: meaning of a statement: the truth value (object). >Truth values. Sense of a statement/Frege: thought, content, proposition. ((s) decisive place in the literature). >Thought, >Content, >Proposition. Truth value/MatesVsFrege: Truth values do not exist. - Vet Mates per Frege, without Frege's metaphysics. The sense (manner of presentation) uniquely determines the meaning (reference). >Way of givenness, cf. >Intension, >Extension. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Sense | Montague | Cresswell II 70 Sense/Reference/Terminology/Montague/Cresswell: Montague uses sense/reference similar to my use of intension/extension. >Reference, >Intension, >Extension. This is to reconcile both with Frege's approach. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >G. Frege, >Sense/Frege, >Meaning/Frege, >Reference/Frege. Reference/Terminology/Montague/Cresswell: Montague identifies reference with extension. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Sense | Wessel | I 140 Def sense/Wessel: a statement is known, if the meaning of sub-expressions and the properties of the operators are known. - ((s) No Fregean distinction sense/meaning? >Sense, >Meaning, >Fregean meaning, >Fregean sense, >Reference. I 141 Sense/logic/Wessel: the statement that A and B are linked by the mind is empty and does not mean anything - we get along without the word "sense". >Logical constants, >Connectives, >Forms, >Formalization, >Formal language, >Order. I 338 Sense/meaning/Termini/Wessel: difference sense/reference: only with composite Terms. Simple terms: here the distincten is pointless: "What is meaning, what is truth?" Because simple term are predicates, not subjects. "Sense of terms": this is a meaningless question, because it is not to discover a term, only the ability of users. The meaning of a term is only operationalist: the sense is known if the meaning is known. >Operationalism. This does not apply to composite terms: here: we have compositionality, but the meaning of the parts needs not to be known. >Compositionality. Then we do not know the meaning of the composite term. E.g. Round square: there is no method for determining the meaning. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Sentences | Prior | I 6 Sentences/Prior: sentences are different from what we want to say with them - as well as what we think is different from what we think about. >Sentences, >Propositions, >"About", >Intentionality, >Levels/order, >Description levels. I 13 Sentences/Prior: not about propositions - e.g. "The sentence S is only seemingly about propositions" is itself only seemingly about propositions." (solution: it is a sentence about the sentence) - E.g. "the proposition that the sun is hot, is true" about the sun. >Predication. I 19 Sentences/Prior: sentences denote nothing, just names. >Designation, >Proper names, >Sentences. Sentence: no relation between two names but between name and predicate that is expressed by the clause - expressing instead denoting. >Expressions, >Predicates. Instead of "fear +" that -sentence": "fear that" + sentence. Left hand side: predicate - rightright hand side: connection. >That, >That sentences. I 52f Sentence/PriorVsFrege: sentences denote nothing, not even "truth". >Truth value/Frege, >Meaning/Frege, >Fregean meaning. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Statements | Frege | Berka I 388 Name/statement/object/Frege/Berka: for syntactic reasons Frege makes a distinction between object and function, but identifies the semantic categories of name and statement. >Concept, >Object, >Function, >Name. Meaning/Frege: the meaning of a statement is the the truth value - considered as (an abstract) object. Russell: ditto. >Truth value, >Fregean meaning, |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Terminology | Frege | Frege, German Original: "gerade Rede" = "normal speech", i.e. "gerade" = normal. Normal speech/Frege: normal speech is a literal quote. Oblique speach is an analogous quote. The oblique meaning (of a word) is its normal sense (!) Chisholm II 146 Frege/saturated/unsaturated: by Husserl: are dependent/independent clauses. --- Frege II 58 Hypothetical Judgment/German original: "hypothetisches Urteil"/Frege: a hypothetical judgment is an implication. --- I I29 Unsaturated: is e.g. "capital city of". Saturated: is e.g. "Deutsches Reich". I 72f Term = is the meaning of a predicate, unsaturated, predicative, of something. Subject matter: is saturated and never the whole meaning of a predicate. A proper name (saturated) can never be a predicate (but part of a predicate). Thought: a part must be unsaturated, as a binder - example: "falls under". I 87 Function: is unsaturated. I 88 Function/Frege: a function sign is unsaturated, e.g. "sin" (sine). On the other hand: it is saturated by connection with numeric signs (argument): e.g. "sin 1" - is each time a number. Value of the function. I 89 Thus, we can also call functions self-unsaturated. I 88 Number sign/Frege: e.g. "2" is saturated. On the other hand: the function sign, e.g. "sin" (sine) is unsaturated. --- IV 70/71 Body/Frege: the body does not need to be supplemented. > ((s) objects are saturated). IV 11 Terminology/Frege: "subter": is an individual/class or subject/term and corresponds to "ε". Epsilon/Frege/ (s): epsilon always denotes that an individual is contained, not a subset. On the other hand: "sub": is a class/class or term/term - this corresponds to the horseshoe ⊂ (subset). IV 73 ff Mental structure/Frege: 1. type: A u B - 2. type: ~(A u B). - 3. type: ~A u ~ B. - 4. type: ~(~A u ~B). 1.-4. are interchangeable in order. 5. type ~A u B - 6. type: ~(~A u B). >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Terms | Searle | V 174 Term Theory/Strawson/Thesis: both the subject and the predicate identify non-linguistic entities: The subject identifies single terms (non-relational connection). The predicate identifies a general term. Frege: the name means object. Predicate: means a term, ((s) not a property). Cf. >concepts, >Individuation >Identification, >Fregean Meaning, >General term, >Singular term, >Predicate. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| That-Clauses | Frege | II 51 That-Clauses/Frege: a that-clause has no truth value. The meaning of a that-clause is the thought. >Clauses, >Thoughts, >Truth values, >Meaning, >Fregean meaning. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Thoughts | Frege | Dummett I 62 Consciousness Content/Frege/Dummett: the content of consciousness are sensations but not meaning. Thoughts: thoughts are the grasping of external things. Dummett I 19 Thought/Thinking/Frege: thought is not identical with the meaning of the sentence - beings with identical thoughts are possible without linguistic cover. Frege II 47 Frege: a sentence about a non-existent unicorn is without truth value, predicates cannot be attributed or denied - the thought is the same, whether there is reference ("meaning") or not. Thought: is a sentence without truth value (because "meaning" (reference) is unresolved) - the same thought in an actor without meaning - judgment: is progress from thought to its truth value. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. II 71 Truth Value: a truth value cannot be one part of a thought, as little as the sun can, because it is not a sense, but an object (truth value = object). >Truth value, >Object. II 76 Thought: one part must be unsaturated, as a binding agent, e.g. "falls under". Thought: not all parts of the thought may be complete, at least one should be unsaturated (predicative), otherwise they would not stick together. Dummett I 32 Frege: grasping the thought: is psychic act. The thought is not the content of consciousness. Consciousness is subjective, the thought is objective - WittgensteinVs. >">Objectivity. Frege IV 52 Thought/Frege: there is not a complete thought without a time determination. But then it is timelessly true or false. Expression/assertion/Frege: there is a difference: time determination belongs to the expression whereas truth belongs to assertion and is timeless. Timeless things are not part of the external world. >Truth, >Timelessness. --- Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 47 ff Thought/Frege: a thought is not the sentence meaning (reference), because it is possible common property of many thinkers (content, objective). Sense of the sentence: is the expressed thought (abstract). Unequal content: sense can be grasped without knowing whether the sentence has a meaning (reference, existing object). Thought/Frege: a thought is abstract. Contradiction: content, idea. Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 57ff Odd Meaning/Frege: odd meaning refers to the expressed thoughts - (thought: abstract, unequal content). Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 66ff Thought/identity criterion for thoughts/Frege/St: sentence A contains the same idea as sentence B, if (i) the assumption that A and B lead to a contradiction - (ii) vice versa - that allows us to conceive thoughts as invariant abstractions - (>partial identity: identity of thoughts) Invariant: is the thought. The thought contained in a sentence is what element A has in common with all the propositions which are logically equivalent to A, and that changes when we move on to a proposition B which is not logically equivalent to A. Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 68 Thought/Frege/St: a thought is that element of an assertion that can be true or false, and which is the object of the believing-to-be-true of epistemic subjects. >Propositions. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 |
| Truth | Frege | Husted V 103 Truth/Frege: truth is the absolute basic concept for Frege. The definition of the notion of numbers is about the clarification of the truth conditions for sentences such as "The number of planets equals the number of muses". >Numbers, >Comparisons, >Comparability. FregeVsTruth definition: recourse: always presumes the truth of other sentences. >Truth detinition, >Truth theory. Berka I 83 Truth/Frege: there are 2 types: a) purely logical truths, from the nature of the argument - b) truths from experience.(1) 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 Frege I 48 Truth/Frege: the pursuit of truth allows us to penetrate from sense (intension) to meaning (extension). >Extension, >Intension. IV 33 Truth/Frege: not a sentence is true, but its meaning. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. IV 32 Just as a picture cannot be simply true, no idea can be true. Only in relation to an intention. >Intentions, >Actions. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Truth Values | Prior | I 51 Truth/"the true"/Frege: all phrases denote "truth": because there are no different truths for different sentences, so as it is always the same truth that various accounts are true. Analogy: sentences denote the truth, as number names name numbers. >Truth value/Frege, >Meaning/Frege, >Fregean meaning. PriorVsFrege: false analogy: does not work with propositional attitude: "X believes that p" does not have to be wrong if p is false. >Propositions. ((s) while different argument values provide other function values, one can attribute to the other any belief-attitudes (also false) without prejudging with it, if he can believe it (i.e. whether the compound sentence gets wrong).) I 63 Truth value/Prior: so we make up the term "truth value" for what we describe as identical if the condition (0) is true: (0) Eφy i.e. "If φ then y and if y then φ". Notation Lesniewski: E = equivalence). Because the truth value is the description of the identical, truht value itself is not the "signified" (VsFrege). >Designation/Prior, >Designation, >Sentences. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Unicorn Example | Frege | II 47 Unicorn/Frege: the term unicorn in a sentence is a sentence without truth value, predicates cannot be denied nor attrributed. The thought is the same, whether there is reference ("meaning") or not. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Thought, >Reference, >Truth value, >Predicate, >Predication, >Attribution. Husted V 97 The fact that a particular name has no support in the form of an external object, has no consequences for the belonging of the name to the language. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bundle Theory | Newen Vs Bundle Theory | New I 233 Def Reference/Newen: Relation between the occurrence of a singular term and the object thus designated. ((s) i.e. general terms do not refer?). Names/Proper Names/Newen: two problems: 1) Reference definition: how is the reference determined 2) Meaning: what is the meaning of a name. Names/Description Theory/Newen: E.g. "Aristotle": the meaning would then be "student of Plato". Vs: Problem: it could be that someone does not know that Aristotle was a student of Plato, but otherwise uses the name correctly. Bundle Theory/Solution/Searle/Newen/(s): it should not happen that a single failure refutes the entire theory, therefore, a bundle of descriptions should be decisive, not a single description. I 234 Bundle Theory/Reference Definition/Searle/Newen: Searle's bundle theory simultaneously regards itself as a theory of reference definition. Names/Proper Names/KripkeVsBundle Theory/KripkeVsDescription Theory/KripkeVsSearle/Kripke/Newen: (modal argument): there is a necessary condition for Def meaning equality/Kripke: (meaning equality) if two expressions a1 and a2 have the same meaning, they are mutually replaceable in sentences that are introduced by the modal operator "It is necessary that", without changing the truth value. I 235 E.g. It is necessary that Aristotle is K. Here, "student of Plato" is not usable. Hence the name "Aristotle" (quotation marks by Newen) cannot have the same meaning as "student of Plato". Description Theory/Meta-Linguistic/Names/Newen: special case description theory of proper names: the so-called meta-linguistic description theory: E.g. the meaning of the name Aristotle can be specified with the description "The bearer of the name "Aristotle"." Point: this description captures the context-independent knowledge of a speaker with respect to the name. KripkeVs/Newen: if the modal argument is also true for the meta-linguistic theory, it cannot be right: it is indeed necessary that Aristotle is Aristotle, but not necessary that Aristotle is I 236 the bearer of the name "Aristotle". He could have been given a different name. Object Theory/Meaning/Names/Proper Names/Newen: Thesis: The meaning of a name is the designated object. A variation of this theory is Russell's theory of the meaning of logical proper names. ("dis", etc.) Epistemology/VsRussell/Newen: Russell's epistemology proved untenable. Solution/Newen: Reference definition by a description: "The only object that satisfies the description associated with the concept "E" (quotation marks by Newen)". Frege: was the first to specify this (in his theory of sense and meaning) Names/Frege/Newen: the Fregean meaning of a name is the designated object. Reference Definition/Frege/Newen: through description. This is Frege's theory of sense. Sense/Frege/Newen: through description (= reference definition for proper names). Names/Frege/Newen: Frege combines an object theory of meaning with a description theory of reference definition. I 237 ((s) KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsDescription Theory/Newen/(s): Kripke also criticized the description theory of reference definition: E.g. Schmidt was the discoverer of the incompleteness theorem, not Gödel. Nevertheless, we refer with "Gödel" to Gödel, and not to an object which is the singled out with a description that can be true or not.) Solution/Kripke: causal theory of proper names. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Frege, G. | Wittgenstein Vs Frege, G. | Brandom I 919 TractatusVsFrege: nothing can be considered an assertion, if not previously logical vocabulary is available, already the simplest assertion assumes the entire logic. --- Dummett I 32 Frege capturing of thought: psychic act - thought not the content of consciousness - consciousness subjective - thought objective - WittgensteinVs I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. WittgensteinVsFrege: Understanding no psychic process, - real mental process: pain, melody (like Frege). Dummett I 62 Wittgenstein's criticism of the thought of a private ostensive definition states implicitly that color words can have no, corresponding with the Fregean assumption, subjective, incommunicable sense. (WittgensteinVsFrege, color words). But Frege represents anyway an objective sense of color words, provided that it is about understanding. Dummett I 158 WittgensteinVsDummett/WittgensteinVsFrege: rejects the view that the meaning of a statement must be indicated by description of their truth conditions. Wittgenstein: Understanding not abruptly, no inner experience, not the same consequences. --- Wolf II 344 Names/meaning/existence/WittgensteinVsFrege: E.g. "Nothung has a sharp blade" also has sense if Nothung is smashed. II 345 Name not referent: if Mr N.N. dies, the name is not dead. Otherwise it would make no sense to say "Mr. N.N. died". --- Simons I 342 Sentence/context/copula/tradition/Simons: the context of the sentence provided the copula according to the traditional view: Copula/VsTradition: only accours as a normal word like the others in the sentence, so it cannot explain the context. Solution/Frege: unsaturated phrases. Sentence/WittgensteinVsFrege/Simons: context only simply common standing-next-to-each-other of words (names). That is, there is not one part of the sentence, which establishes the connection. Unsaturation/Simons: this perfectly matches the ontological dependence (oA): a phrase cannot exist without certain others! --- Wittgenstein I 16 Semantics/Wittgenstein/Frege/Hintikka: 1. main thesis of this chapter: Wittgenstein's attitude to inexpressibility of semantics is very similar to that of Frege. Wittgenstein represents in his early work as well as in the late work a clear and sweeping view of the nature of the relationship between language and the world. As Frege he believes they cannot be expressed verbally. Earlier WittgensteinVsFrege: by indirect use this view could be communicated. According to the thesis of language as a universal medium (SUM) it cannot be expressed in particular, what would be the case if the semantic relationships between language and the world would be different from the given ones? Wittgenstein I 45 Term/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: that a concept is essentially predicative, cannot be expressed by Frege linguistically, because he claims that the expression 'the term X' does not refer to a concept, but to an object. I 46 Term/Frege/RussellVsFrege/Hintikka: that is enough to show that the Fregean theory cannot be true: The theory consists of sentences, which, according to their own theory cannot be sentences, and if they cannot be sentences, they also cannot be true ". (RussellVsFrege) WittgensteinVsFrege/late: return to Russell's stricter standards unlike Frege and early Wittgenstein himself. Wittgenstein late: greatly emphasizes the purely descriptive. In Tractatus he had not hesitated to go beyond the vernacular. I 65ff Saturated/unsaturated/Frege/Tractatus/WittgensteinVsFrege: in Frege's distinction lurks a hidden contradiction. Both recognize the context principle. (Always full sentence critical for meaning). I 66 Frege: unsaturated entities (functions) need supplementing. The context principle states, however, neither saturated nor unsaturated symbols have independent meaning outside of sentences. So both need to be supplemented, so the difference is idle. The usual equation of the objects of Tractatus with individuals (i.e. saturated entities) is not only missed, but diametrically wrong. It is less misleading, to regard them all as functions I 222 Example number/number attribution/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: Figures do not require that the counted entities belong to a general area of all quantifiers. "Not even a certain universality is essential to the specified number. E.g. 'three equally big circles at equal distances' It will certainly not be: (Ex, y, z)xe circular and red, ye circular and red, etc ..." The objects Wittgenstein observes here, are apparently phenomenological objects. His arguments tend to show here that they are not only unable to be reproduced in the logical notation, but also that they are not real objects of knowledge in reality. ((s) that is not VsFrege here). Wittgenstein: Of course, you could write like this: There are three circles, which have the property of being red. I 223 But here the difference comes to light between inauthentic objects: color spots in the visual field, tones, etc., and the actual objects: elements of knowledge. (> Improper/actual, >sense data, >phenomenology). --- II 73 Negation/WittgensteinVsFrege: his explanation only works if his symbols can be substituted by the words. The negation is more complicated than that negation character. --- Wittgenstein VI 119 WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: he has not seen what is authorized on formalism that the symbols of mathematics are not the characters, but have no meaning. Frege: alternative: either mere ink strokes or characters of something. Then what they represent, is their meaning. WittgensteinVsFrege: that this alternative is not correct, shows chess: here we are not dealing with the wooden figures, and yet the figures represent nothing, they have no Fregean meaning (reference). There is simply a third one: the characters can be used as in the game. Wittgenstein VI 172 Name/Wittgenstein/Schulte: meaning is not the referent. (VsFrege). --- Sentence/character/Tractatus 3.14 .. the punctuation is a fact,. 3.141 The sentence is not a mixture of words. 3.143 ... that the punctuation is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of expression of writing. (WittgensteinVsFrege: so it was possible that Frege called the sentence a compound name). 3.1432 Not: "The complex character 'aRb' says that a stands in the relation R to b, but: that "a" is in a certain relation to "b", says aRb ((s) So conversely: reality leads to the use of characters). (quotes sic). --- Wittgenstein IV 28 Mention/use/character/symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: their Begriffsschrift(1) does not yet exclude such errors. 3.326 In order to recognize the symbol through the character, you have to pay attention to the meaningful use. Wittgenstein IV 40 Sentence/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: the verb of the sentence is not "is true" or "is wrong", but the verb has already to include that, what is true. 4.064 The sentence must have a meaning. The affirmation does not give the sentence its meaning. IV 47 Formal concepts/Tractatus: (4.1272) E.g. "complex", "fact", "function", "number". WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: they are presented in the Begriffsschrift by variables, not represented by functions or classes. E.g. Expressions like "1 is a number" or "there is only one zero" or E.g. "2 + 2 = 4 at three o'clock" are nonsensical. 4.12721 the formal concept is already given with an object, which falls under it. IV 47/48 So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as basic concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: you cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as basic ideas, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers. Successor/Begriffsschrift/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 4.1273 E.g. b is successor of a: aRb, (Ex): aRx.xRb, (Ex,y): aRx.xRy.yRb ... General/something general/general public/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: the general term of a form-series can only be expressed by a variable, because the term "term of this form-series" is a formal term. Both have overlooked: the way, how they want to express general sentences, is circular. IV 49 Elementary proposition/atomism/Tractatus: 4.211 a character of an elementary proposition is that no elementary proposition can contradict it. The elementary proposition consists of names, it is a concatenation of names. WittgensteinVsFrege: it itself is not a name. IV 53 Truth conditions/truth/sentence/phrase/Tractatus: 4.431 of the sentence is an expression of its truth-conditions. (pro Frege). WittgensteinVsFrege: false explanation of the concept of truth: would "the truth" and "the false" really be objects and the arguments in ~p etc., then according to Frege the meaning of "~ p" is not at all determined. Punctuation/Tractatus: 4.44 the character that is created by the assignment of each mark "true" and the truth possibilities. Object/sentence/Tractatus: 4.441 it is clear that the complex of characters IV 54 Ttrue" and "false" do not correspond to an object. There are no "logical objects". Judgment line/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 4.442 the judgment line is logically quite meaningless. It indicates only that the authors in question consider the sentence to be true. Wittgenstein pro redundancy theory/Tractatus: (4.442), a sentence cannot say of itself that it is true. (VsFrege: VsJudgment stroke). IV 59 Meaning/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: (5.02) the confusion of argument and index is based on Frege's theory of meaning IV 60 of the sentences and functions. For Frege the sentences of logic were names, whose arguments the indices of these names. IV 62 Concluding/conclusion/result relation/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 5.132 the "Final Acts" that should justify the conclusions for the two, are senseless and would be superfluous. 5.133 All concluding happens a priori. 5.134 one cannot conclude an elementary proposition from another. ((s) Concluding: from sentences, not situations.) 5.135 In no way can be concluded from the existence of any situation to the existence of, IV 63 an entirely different situation. Causality: 5.136 a causal nexus which justifies such a conclusion, does not exist. 5.1361 The events of the future, cannot be concluded from the current. IV 70 Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are no primitive signs, let alone that they signify any relations. IV 101 Evidence/criterion/logic/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.1271 strange that such an exact thinker like Frege appealed to the obviousness as a criterion of the logical sentence. IV 102 Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essential of the equation is not that the sides have a different sense but the same meaning, but the essential is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions, that are connected by the equal sign, have the same meaning, since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 --- Wittgenstein II 343 Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. (WittgensteinVs). Why wanted both so much to define the number? |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Holism | Millikan Vs Holism | I 10 Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature. For that I need Fregean meaning as the main concept. As one can err when it comes to knowledge, so one can err when it comes to meaning. I 11 Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: we are trying to avoid it. Then we will understand why we still can know something of the world, despite everything. Realism/Millikan: I stay close to the Aristotelian realism. properties/kind/Millikan: exists only in the actual world. MillikanVsNominalismus. I 13 MillikanVsHolismus: it is about understanding without holism and without the myth of the given how to test our apparent skills to recognize things and our apparent meanings. Observational concepts/Millikan: we have a lot more of then than is commonly supposed. For them, there are good - albeit fallible - tests that are independent of our theories. Convictions: insofar as our meanings and our ability to recognize things are correct and valid, I 14 most of our Convictions and judgments are true. ((s) >Beliefs/Davidson). Appropriateness/Millikan: by bringing our judgments to interact iwth those of others in a community, we have additional evidence that they are reasonable. That's also how new concepts are developed which may be tested independently of theories, or not. I 67 conviction/Millikan: (see chapter 18, 19): Thesis: if one believes something, then normally on grounds of observational judgments. Problem: Background information that could prevent one from the judgment is not necessarily information, the denial of which would normally be used to support the conviction! I 68 I will use this principle MillikanVsQuine. Theory/observation/Quine: thesis: both are insolubly twisted with each other. MillikanVsHolismus. Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: should not be regarded as a mechanism. However: Engine: may also be regarded as a hierarchy, where higher levels can stop the lower ones. And I as a user must know little about the functioning of the lower levels. I 298 Test/Millikan: Ex the heart can only be tested together with the kidneys. Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/projection/Millikan: We're just trying to understand how there can be a test that can historically be applied to human concepts in this world of ours, and the results of which are correlated with the world for reasons we can specify. Problem: we are here more handicapped than realism. I 299 It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all ("How is it possible?"). Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: epistemic holism is wrong. Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if it is applied only to a small group of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts. concepts/adequacy/Millikan: if they are adequate, concepts exercise their own function in accordance with a normal explanation. Their own function is to correspond to a variant of the world. An adequate concept produces correct acts of identification of the references of its tokens. I 318 Holism/theory/observation/concept/dependency/MillikanVsHolismus/Millikan: the view that we observe most of the things we observe just by observing indirect effects is wrong. Anyway, we observe effects of things, namely, on our senses. I 319 Difference: it is about the difference between information acquisition through knowledge of effects on other observed things and the acquisition of information without such an intermediary knowledge of other things. Problem: here arises a mistake very easily: this knowledge does not have to be used. I 321 Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: our findings about the outside world are not individually brought before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body. Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our convictions are never brought before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other convictions. Affirmation: only affirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my preferences. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| McDowell, J. | Verschiedene Vs McDowell, J. | I 64 VsMcDowell: some accuse me of anthropocentrism: a groundless confidence that the world is completely within the reach of our thinking. I 65 McDowell: there is no guarantee for this and the ability of spontaneity brings with it the obligation to constantly reflect on the evidence that guides the active activity at all times. I 209 VsMcDowell: danger of idealism: idealistic prevailing mood of elimination of the outer border. This deprives us of a possibility that we should not renounce: the possibility of direct contact between the mental and the objects! I 210 If one accepts the world as everything that is the case, then one subordinates the world to the realm of the Fregean sense ("realm of the conceivable"). Then there are not episodes and acts of thought, but identity. Facts in this sense are thoughts, the thinkable that is the case. McDowellVs: but objects do not belong to the realm of the thinkable (Fregean Sense) but to the realm of the reference to objects. (Fregean meaning) VsMcDowell: the objection is now that Wittgenstein's "commonplace" (see above) aligns the mind with the realm of meaning, but not with the realm of object reference (meaning). VsMcDowell: then we need some kind of theory of description. Theory of Description/Russell/McDowell: indirect reference to the world. |
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